THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 3 SEPTEMBER VOL. XLV

THE OXFORD CONFERENCE OF MODERN CHURCHMEN

BY THE EDITOR

THE thirty-eighth Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen was held in Somerville College, Oxford, July 25—29, 1955. Oxford, like Cambridge, is a popular centre for our conferences and Somerville College with its quiet grounds, spacious chapel, and gracious hospitality is an ideal centre. This year wonderful summer weather added to the attraction. The Conference and the assemblies were well attended. The discussions at the lectures were of a hgh order — educational rather than controversial.

The theme of the Conference was 'Man: His Nature and Destiny'. The opening sermon, by Dr. Leslie Hunter, Bishop of Sheffield, who attended the famous Girton Conference of 1921, dealt most appropriately with the problem of the Christian Church and the Modern Man.

Our President, Sir Henry Self, although overwhelmed with official duties, delivered his Presidential address in person. During the next four days ten papers were contributed and discussed. These are published in full in this issue of the *Modern Churchman.*

The thanks of the Conference are due to our distinguished lecturers; to the Rev. A. W. Adams, Dean of Divinity of Magdalen College, the Chairman of the Conference; to the Women's Committee and its Hon. Treasurer and Secretary, Miss Irene Walker, F.R.Hist.S.; to the Rev. W. T. A. Philpot (the Chaplain of the Conference) for his judiciously diversified and reverently rendered Services of Prayer and Praise.

Our next Conference will be held at Girton College, Cambridge, during the last week in July, 1956.

CONFERENCE SERMON*

By the Right Rev. LESLIE S. HUNTER, D.D., D.C.L., LL.D., Lord Bishop of Sheffield

> The gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.
>
> Jesus called his disciples and said to them, I have compassion on the multitude . . . because they have nothing to eat.
>
> (*From the Epistle and Gospel for Trinity VII*)

CHRISTIANITY is a life. Time and again, however, the Christian Church has been led away from this fact either by those who insist that Christianity is primarily a religion, i.e. a form of piety, or that it is primarily a creed, i.e. a form of belief, or that it is an ethic. Truth and piety and morals have their place; but Christianity is, first and last, *a life*. Belief and piety are subordinate to that, its primary and unique character. And by life I do not mean a rule of life or a code of behaviour, but simply and without qualification *a life*—'living at full compass'—embracing the whole man and making men whole in and through Jesus Christ. 'The gift of God is eternal life'—the noun, not the qualifying adjective, is the operative word in the sentence. Because it is life, not a strangulated, sin-bound, narrowly church-bound, or over-intellectualized existence, but life deriving from God in the plenitude of His Being and Purpose, it is deathless, eternal; a perennial spring welling up in human society, and therefore joyful even in its most sacrificial moments.

When men say of a church or congregation that they look to be dead it is a most serious criticism. Churches get this inert and deadly look whenever they become exclusively interested in a segment of man's life. When evangelism and the pastoral ministry fail to evoke response it is probably because they are not touching a man and a society at the vital points in their life, and therefore the response is limited, temporary, even perfunctory. On the other hand, whenever the Christian Gospel touches a man or a society at that point where they are most vital, alert and finely stretched, the response is bound to be lively, decisive, whole and entire—else God were not God and man were not His child.

It may well be that the vital point in man's life where the spark ignites the fire of love is not always the same point in every age and country. There are, to take just one example, many self-giving men and women to-day who are allergic to the appeals of

* Sermon delivered to the Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen in the Chapel of Somerville College, Oxford, July 25, 1955.

traditional evangelism, and are not sin-conscious in the traditional way. Again, others who have seen death erupting into life all around them in war may be allergic to appeals based upon the fear of death. There is something a little ludicrous when a young priest, fresh from the ivory towers in which some Biblical theologians dwell, tries to frighten more robust men and women into the ecclesiastical fold by threats of judgment and of the wrath to come.

It is easier, however, to say that pastor and teacher must strike a man or a society at the point in their life where they are least inert than to find what those points are, and to do it. We cannot pretend that we yet know how to penetrate industrial society and talk to industrial man so as to evoke a sustained response. The problem of communication for a Church in a technological, industrial age, is a perplexing and baffling one. For one thing, there are so many folk who are content to tick over on one cylinder, so many who have not the slightest desire to leave their boat, still less burn it and start afresh. If the Spirit of God is a disturber of their complacency, they do not wish to meet Him. So long as the Church merely asks them to buy a ticket for the whist drive or occasionally to join in public worship, they ' don't mind if we do,' but if it asks them to join in presenting and representing Christ to the world, that is a different story.

To get a man to see that his job might be more than earning a pay-packet, that to achieve a finer quality of life is more than raising the standard of living, that there are tracts of unexplored country in his own personality, that God's world is richer than the small sector he is content to live in, that his conscience and the God-ward side of his being are only partially sensitised is not easy. These insights, however, have to be stimulated before that man is able to receive with thanksgiving and gladness the gift of God, which is *life* in and through Jesus Christ. I hasten, however, to add that there are men and women outside of or on the fringe of the Church in our industrial society who are vitally alive at certain points and do kindle when these points are contacted; that I know. When these persons, be they a shop-steward, a Union organizer, a deputy, a technician, a manager, do respond, they do not wish to be introduced to an Unknown God whose altar frontals are decorated with question marks. Like the present-day generation in the universities, they want a Gospel of which they can be sure; a faith not so clouded with doubts as to inhibit courage—it takes a lot of courage to be the new sort of Christian lay man on the shop-floor to-day. That is not to say that Christian teachers whose task is to expound what ' through Jesus Christ our

Lord' means, have to expound revealed truth as though it left no unanswered questions, as though it were like a pre-medieval painting innocent of the rules of perspective, or a country without any prominent features. The teacher has to lead these men and women to the mountains and to the rock from which the living water flows. Once a man has his feet on the rock—if I may change the landscape—and grows a first-hand faith, and his will is fully committed, he can carry quite a number of unanswered questions in his head. None the less, it is a gospel that has to be preached and decisions of will that have to be evoked and a working faith sustained.

How? The spear-head of Christian evangelism is not words but life; the witness of a fellowship of Christians looking outwards to their responsibilities in the world, because they have had a true vision of the Son of God and know the power of the Holy Spirit in their lives. The old words, unfortunately, have gone stale on us, and in a quasi-Christian country they are at a discount —and this partly because the life of the Church-groups has corresponded so imperfectly to them. By contrast, it was the profound experience of fellowship—all things in common on the surface for existential reasons and at a deep level oneness in Christ, which gave to the first Christians their vitality—of thought and action, love, peace, prayer, *joie de vivre*. This vitality of love not only amazed St. Paul—'phrophecies and tongues shall cease, love never'—it amazed outsiders—'see how these Christians love one another.' It convinced the Apostolic Church that the Spirit stirring in their common life and in their hearts was the authentic Spirit of Jesus. One ministry, one body, one life His and theirs. 'We know that we have passed from death into life because we love the brethren'—even, the writer might possibly have added, the tiresome brethren whom we find it hard to like.

The juxta-position of the two sentences (which I have used as my text) one at the close of Sunday's epistle and the other at the beginning of the Gospel, surely is significant and important for the Church in our time to notice?

Jesus called His followers and said to them, I am sorry for the people because they are hungry. Precisely that. He did not say that He was sorry for them because they were unsaved sinners or because they needed sacramental grace, but simply because their stomachs were empty. I expect, however, that most of the addresses on the Gospel yesterday were in fact upon the Eucharist and the value of frequent Communion. It is quite legitimate to allegorise for pedagogic purposes the Gospel narrative, provided one makes clear what one is doing and first does justice to the

plain meaning of the words and to the actual situation first. The Lord Jesus had a concern for the whole life of men, and one of the facts of life, both inconvenient and also pleasurable, is that man and beast quickly get hungry and thirsty. It will not do, therefore, for middle-class churchmen to get superior and critical about the welfare state, security and good wages. As a result of these, thank God, many of our fellow-citizens no longer go hungry—though they could still improve their diet with advantage. Neither will it do, because the most elementary needs and injustices are now being met, to think that we can put charity back into the church safe, and preach to men and women about the judgment of God instead of about His mercy. To-day as yesterday the only way to get men and women into the Christian Church is to love them in. Not the sentimental love which meets their physical needs and little else, but an intelligent love that respects, understands, cares for the whole man, the whole family and for the whole of their life, not just its religious aspect. I have never known a priest or a congregation look out upon the parish with that Christ-like love without evoking a response—like to like. Would that there were more such ministers of Christ in the Church, ordained and lay; and that the Church was so presenting and representing Christ to a world, physically hungry in many places, millions of them homeless, and here, where there are homes, as elsewhere, men and women starved of forgiveness, in need of imaginative sympathy and a word of life which speaks to their condition.

This brings me to say that in the years ahead churchmen should try to make the Church of England more effectively the Church of the English people.

One of the unexpected consequences of the Ecumenical Movement has been to emphasize pan-denominationalism. I greatly enjoyed the family gathering of Anglicans at Minneapolis last summer—it was friendly and inspiring. But world-wide communions have not so intimate, so incarnational a relationship to the life of peoples as a national church can have, and as our Church still has locally and nationally.

Some of our fellow-churchmen are greatly troubled by the woolliness of many nominal Anglicans and in consequence they are disposed to think that the Church must contract before it can effectively be a Church militant and expand. They hope that a policy of the closed shop, fencing the font and all that, for a time will make the Church more soundly and purely Christian at heart. Such a policy would more likely make it Pharisaic. I do not believe a Church becomes more Christian at the centre by a

a tightening up of passport and custom controls on the circumference. If Christianity were an orthodoxy, a piety, a code of morals, such a strategy might work, but Christianity is a life. The love that is of God, unlike the commodities of this world, increases the more it is used. It is the one power that can break through the entanglement of sin, humble the proud heart and stir into activity the inert will. In the vision of the Seer, the twelve gates of the heavenly City stood open day and night, because the Lamb that was slain was the centre of its life. So as far as may be the Church on earth has to keep open its doors into the world. That is specially needful for a Church like ours which stands in a special relation to the people. This does not require us to minimise the fact that the Church is the family of God or to be careless about church order and discipline, or to become erastian. It does, however, require us to distinguish the crabbed individualism which is bred of parochialism and economic inequalities and is so destructive of fellowship in action, from the freedom of a prophetic ministry and the initiative of men of imagination and courage. It will require us to go on holding some good things in tension. But there is no fundamental conflict between a national Church and the Church universal. Our Church, indeed, has a special vocation to speak a prophetic word and to be as light, leaven and salt in the country's life. Tightening up frontier regulations might be its death; devotion to the Lord of all life at its heart will always be its life. And its ministry to be effective has to be corporate—laity and clergy in association. Only so in contemporary England will the Church in parish, diocese and nation, in home and factory, present and represent Christ the Lord of Life to all men.

MAN: HIS NATURE AND DESTINY

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS—JULY 25, 1955

By Sir Henry Self, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.B.E., B.D., M.Sc.

THIS Conference is to be addressed by eminent experts in the many aspects of human life and thought relevant to our theme of 'Man: His Nature and Destiny.' By way of introduction I can only attempt a more general survey—and particularly one which might reflect the perplexity of the thinking layman as he wrestles with the conflict between man's religious history and spiritual experience on the one hand, and twentieth century thought and practice on the other. For myself, I believe in the Church of England as the shrine of the spiritual tradition of this great nation, and the instrument through which all the churches should be linked in a joint effort (without loss of individual status and outlook) to guide mankind towards its destiny. It is supremely necessary today that Christianity should re-establish itself in the modern world and give its ministers a message which they themselves have re-found, declaring that God and the Spiritual World are supremely real; that the Character of God was revealed in the life of Jesus; and that God's Presence can be experienced in the inner spiritual life, to-day as always.

The peace of mind which passes understanding can only spring from a spiritual religion which has re-found itself, even in the modern world. The evils of two world wars and the menaces confronting humanity must indeed cause the thinking man to reflect: but added to this, he has the task of reconciling his religious faith with modern science. Anthropologists show him his animal roots and ancestry; biologists see him as just another organism; sociologists point to him as a bundle of 'conditioned reflexes' bound together by social custom; psychoanalysts often tend to explain him more in terms of psychoses and neuroses, with little thought for an enduring 'self'; philosophers analyse him away in terms of sense-experience, whilst describing his values and his religion as 'non-sense' and therefore meaningless. These extremists are answered by more sober-minded scientists of at least equal calibre—but the 'mud' having been thrown, sticks! Then along come the mathematicians, the physicists and the chemists claiming to explain life itself in terms of bio-mathematics, bio-physics and bio-chemistry: one might almost say 'What a life!'

A particular difficulty is the cumulative effect of a century of higher critcism as to the status of religion itself. For example, the majority of thinking laymen to-day credit scientific research and mythology with having undermined the origins and nature of religion and its records. But should they not be led to realize that all religious literature is, and must be, compounded more or less with 'myth.' The 'myth' is man's way of putting into poetry, parables, legends or picture-stories his inner apprehensions of spiritual truths which are beyond his power fully to understand or to express. He does the best he can—but the result must be mythological in form, whilst yet enshrining historic fact and spiritual truth. Always and everywhere man at his best 'knows' the haunting Presence of the Divine—and Christianity is the supreme religion because it presents the life-giving experience of Christ, manifest in the historic Jesus, in terms which inspire response, despite the legendary accretions, which should be frankly acknowledged.

The Modern Threat to Religion

There are two intellectual movements of this century which threaten greater disaster to mankind than the current menaces of international tension and the waywardness of society, because they strike at the roots of man's faith in himself, his status and his destiny. The first is that which has striven to re-cast the theory of human knowledge in terms of logical analysis, known as logical positivism. This has not only sought to purge man's thinking from its illusions by restricting it to analysis of sense-experience, but it has at the same time opened the doors to a fresh burst of Humean scepticism by undermining common-sense acceptance of man's ability directly to 'know' Nature. In the process it has sought to discredit religion, ethics, values and metaphysics as being 'non-sense' (i.e. outside verifiable sense-experience) and therefore meaningless. This is to strike at the inner significance of life and to destroy with a phrase the fruits of twenty centuries of human intellectual endeavour, moral aspirations and religious experience—if it succeeded in so doing, it would inevitably destroy man's belief in his spiritual destiny, whilst offering him the tepid consolations of scientific humanism, with its optimism, unwarranted on its own tenets, in the ability of humanity to shape its own ends. Those ends could only be for the benefit in some long-distant future of an unborn generation which will have done nothing to deserve such a boring materialistic paradise.

I crave your indulgence for a brief assessment of this new threat to the status of human knowledge and faith, before passing to the second movement, to wit the scientific revolution which after seven centuries of patient human striving has now reached a full crescendo of trenchant but destructive criticism. Modern science presents itself as an all-embracing complex of multitudinous fields of research, each isolated in its specialization, yet venturing to offer re-interpretation of the whole in terms of its own prospective achievement or destruction, according to the whims or choice of a self-shaping humanity, presumably so endowed with intuitive vision that its decisions can be faced with equanimity—a strange conclusion in the light of the tribulations of the century in which the bravado has attained its climax.

The Nature of Human Knowledge

The twentieth century thus dispenses with tradition because its theory of knowledge discards metaphysical thinking and leaves the thinker with such a limited range that we are in danger of a phase of neo-scepticism. This is the end of logical positivism if it persists in its original thesis, but the clear signs of withdrawal from the advanced positions taken up initially by the Vienna Circle and the Cambridge School are so manifest that metaphysicians will no doubt take heart and re-emerge from their places of hiding with renewed ardour. The trend of the times is established by the recent works of Professor A. J. Ayer in England, and G. Bergman's' book, *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism*, in America. The title of the latter is no doubt intended to be paradoxical, nevertheless it indicates that logical positivists have overplayed their hand. Professor Ayer's first book, *Language, Truth and Logic*,[1] manifested a brilliant mind in its blossoming which not unnaturally expressed itself in iconoclastic *joi de vivre*. It is not surprising that he is now seeking to withdraw from the more extreme position of his early years.

The extreme assertions of logical positivism are not, however, the only aspects which need to be considered; the movement has affected most academic thought to a greater or less extent. Even those who contend with it, pause to emphasize the virtues of logical analysis in itself. If follows that great attention must be paid to the significance of logical analysis, but its claims seem to be illustrated by Bertrand Russell's early exposition of the metaphysics of Leibnitz.[2] As Miss Saw has suggested, Russell tried

[1] Gollancz, London, 1936.

[2] *The Philosophy of Leibnitz*. (Allen & Unwin, 1900.)

to reveal Leibnitz as producing a logical system which is valid as such, but has no necessary relevance to anything outside the realm of thought. A revivified Leibnitz studying as a pupil of Bertrand Russell in the twentieth century might conceivably so re-act, but it was not what Leibnitz intended in the turn of the seventeenth century. He thought he was teaching a constructive interpretation of a universe of monads founded in the supreme monad, God. He must have had quite a different conception of the status of human knowledge from that held to-day.

Modern logical analysis thinks it turns difficulties by saying that a question its exponents are unable to answer is illegitimate because it is meaningless. No question can be illegitimate except within the setting of conventional rules. Neither is it meaningless. If it is asked it is a question, which has some meaning in the mind of the questioner. The person who cannot answer the question may say it is meaningless and illegitimate, but he would say more truly that he cannot answer it; whether because he does not understand it or because it is beyond his capacity to enter into the other person's experience does not matter, but it is subterfuge to burke a question by saying it is meaningless and illegitimate.

This seems to me to be the fundamental fallacy of twentieth century logical positivists. They emphasize a scheme of logical analysis which justifies the shaping of a mental structure provided its principles are duly honoured, but in their view the meaning of that structure cannot be relied upon to give knowledge of anything outside the range of sense-verification. Their thesis is obviously true because it is contained within the definition which they framed to regulate their operations. No one should complain of the limits he has imposed on his activities. If strait-jacket limitations are necessarily imposed by the nature of logical analysis, the obvious conclusion is ' so much the worse for logical analysis.' It is clearly a limited instrument and its use should be restricted to its proper field : one does not look to the street musician who makes weird noises with a piece of wire strung across a board over which he draws any particular implement he might fancy, and expect his performance to give insight into a performance by Kreisler. The two worlds are so foreign to each other and yet they are equally real for the performers. So one must seek to assess whether logical positivism as the keynote of recent years has in fact destroyed the claim of the centuries of metaphysical construction.

The issue is, in short, whether experience is meaningful because it is verifiable—or whether it is verifiable because it is meaningful. The twentieth century takes the former position; religious history the latter. Historical thought and practice shows

that early metaphysics, particularly religious metaphysics, asserted that experience verifies common sense belief in a universe of form existing in space and time. Similarly craftsmanship and husbandry join with culture in demonstrating man's aptitude to imitate Nature in her unceasing fashioning of a world of form, shaped in material media and used for the enjoyment of life. This physical world of form is clearly but one level and one mode of experience within a fuller universe: whilst that experience itself warrants the expectation that life here is but the introduction to a ladder of life rising from the lower to the higher levels. Manifestation of form is thus made through a medium such as a primeval matter lending itself to developing levels of manifestation, until the conception of spiritual matter is reached in the higher regions where act and potency or form and matter are reciprocally adjusted to each other, as a means of enjoyment of a universe itself comprising all phases of experience which can be conceived from the process of mind in-form-ing matter.

Such a bald statement of the status of religious philosophy immediately passes beyond the realm of logical analysis and its limited attempt to interpret experience into a completely different realm of thought however speculative the venture may be. The comparative claims of these two fields can only be truly appreciated by careful reading of the historical background of the growth of the former out of the latter. But this growth also has to be studied for the parallel assessment of the status of scientific knowledge which also grew out of religious metaphysical thinking. Such a survey would thus offer two parallel themes, first the gradual emergence of the scheme of scientific knowledge via experimentation, and second the parallel development of logical analysis in all its varied forms starting, for example, with the vision of a *mathesis universalis* by men like Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz. It will be wise to pause to-day and see whether the emergence of these two movements from the same parent during the past seven centuries has in fact dethroned the parent to the extent generally claimed by logical positivists and by the more extreme scientific thinkers.

The Comparative Status of Man in Science and Religion

This aspect of our problem should first be approached through a historical survey of the relationships between religion, science and philosophy. Stated in broad terms, I would suggest that the main observation on the side of religious philosophy must be that, as authoritatively presented, its substance has remained basically unchanged as compared with the teaching of Saint Augustine in

the fifth century A.D., although its form has been appreciably tempered by, and adapted to, the parallel course of scientific thinking. The latter has, on the other hand and in quite marked contrast, developed beyond all recognition both in form and in substance. Religious philosophy manifests the phenomenon of the 'unchanging', weathering the storm, yet adapting its outward form to the climate of the age: scientific philosophy illustrates the contrast of flux through theory to theory, sometimes supremely sure of itself and its claims, yet quickly switching to the opposed notes of self-questioning and doubt both as to status and objectives. As would be expected, the joint history of the two strands reveals constant interaction between the contrasted philosophies: seemingly in opposition, they yet have affected each other in marked degree and will ever continue to do so: science affects the mood and form of religious philosophy—religion tempers the impersonal austerities and acerbities of scientific positivism.

Natural theology would to-day be called the science of religion, and as such it must itself pursue the scientific method, working through hypotheses tested in experience, and seeking to glean from all possible sources the means to develop those hypotheses as pointers along the road of man's spiritual growth. Science rightly does not hesitate to incorporate reasonable postulates into its working hypotheses; likewise natural theology matches the scientific approach by framing its own working hypotheses with the aid of certain tentative principles such as God, Spirit, Value, Mind, Will and Purpose, remembering always the need for careful definition of terms as a first step. Thus its approach must be through the study of language which quickly reveals the symbolic nature of man's universe—this itself being a mental world of concepts, which have been literally lived in experience and so fused into the structure of the individual organization which is partly intellectual, partly emotional and partly volitional in character. In this way, man creates for himself a symbolic universe which functions (in Whitehead's arresting phrases) through 'symbolic reference' between the 'poles' of 'causal efficacy' and 'presentational immediacy.'

But the question arises, of what is this mental universe symbolic? Professor Dingle in his recent lecture on 'The Sources of Eddington's Philosophy'[3] rightly castigates his hero for attempting to retain the Victorian inheritance of an 'external world' as an ultimate residue apart from experience, despite Eddington's own appreciation and masterly exposition of the implications of

[3] Cambridge University Press, 1954.

the new era of relativity. In defining the 'real,' it is essential to avoid the implication of any residue after all possible experience is abstracted (if that were possible) from the universe as conceived or enjoyed at all possible levels of existence, whether the conception or the enjoyment takes an organic, intellectual, emotional, volitional, spiritual or any other form in which the universe may possibly be 'lived.' The 'real' as so defined must be some form of experience, and the universe thus conceived is a complex of all actual or possible experience, with 'potentiality' as experience seeking 'realization.' 'Being' is manifest in relationships within experience: abstract all possible experience from the universe, and there can be no residual 'external world' because that would be a residue outside experience and therefore meaningless—a thought which shows clearly that a 'dead' physical universe, as asserted by believers in consciousness as a 'flicker' of an epiphenomenal nature, could have no possible meaning and still more certainly could not be 'observed.' Dingle bases his criticism of Eddington rather, if one reads him aright, on the mistaken attempt to regard such operations of physics as measurement to be symbolical of some aspect of an 'external world,' but the treatment deplored in the application of Eddington's physics should be equally deplored in the experts' treatment of the universe as seen from many other standpoints, including theology. The concept of 'existence' is a sore difficulty to-day because of its past associations with outworn beliefs in an independent external world. Rather, the universe is a complex of experience and its existence is exhausted or rather comprised in experiences and their relations. This new approach has marked affinities with the basic thought of Bishop Berkeley whose general argument applies equally to-day to show that the complex itself must depend on a Source and Focus which transcends, whilst yet being immanent within, the complex: this is the concept of God. Equally God must transcend, whilst yet being immanent within, the Space-Time Process which is the necessary matrix or 'receptacle' of the complex.

It is this emphasis on the fact of God which constitutes the hall-mark of natural theology, which must always seek to explain the universe through an hypothesis which combines with the emphasis on the immanent emergent process, an equal emphasis on the transcendent 'grace' deriving from the spiritual Source of religious experience. The difference of approach, as compared with the more limited treatment possible within the sphere of science, will manifest itself in an ultimate divergence of conclusions reached by the two, and we shall later summarise briefly

these points of divergence. Here it is desired to state summarily some consequences which must emerge.

The scientific challenge to man's innate sense of 'freedom' shows him to have risen from the level of the common organic sub-conscious to the status of '*homo symbolorum*' living through his own world of mental symbolism, and thence to that of '*homo sapiens*'; it is the claim of religious philosophy that his emergence is equally clear to the higher peak of 'spiritual person' when he is able by conscious choice to delay the response to sense-stimulus and redirect his activity within the sequence of the natural order to an approved end. This reasoning pre-supposes the 'man behind the machine,' but, bodily condition tempers the manifestation of the man; it is necessary to distinguish between the inner personality and the bodily conditions available for its manifestation. Moreover, like the indeterminacies of physical infinitesimals within the 'control' of statistical infinity, his freedom is yet compatible with the over-all control of a transcendent will, which is manifest in history as the Divine Providence.

Similarly, although the basis of man's symbolic universe is mathematical reason, this does not exclude religious intuition guided by spiritual reason. Mathematical reason discloses the pattern and structure of man's mental interpretation of his environment which somehow responds to his reasoning; equally, there are other valid strands, emotional and volitional, in man's symbolic universe. Religion is a valid medium for interpreting life parallel with science and culture. The best historical form of such a religious interpretation is the Christian *Logos* philosophy. This has every claim to serious consideration, just as much as the historical succession of astronomical cosmogonies. Both religious philosophy and astronomical cosmogony are subjective interpretations of relations discerned within experience; both demand the adventure of faith in search of higher understanding, and both may well have parallel status as presenting different aspects of a common situation.

Modern physics is not so guilty of the prevalent sin in its history of overlooking the status and limitations of its observers. This raises in acute form the problem of the Mind/Body concept. Religious philosophy faces this calmly, convinced that the brain is but the medium of exchanges between the 'inner man' and his environment. The universe is shown to be founded in energy, and this presupposes Will, Will functioning between its immanent and transcendent sources. In its physical aspects, the world is manifest as regulated by law and built up in specific forms of structure and pattern, as shown by the modern electronic

theory of chemical valency. Consequently it is difficult for religious philosophy not to insist that the universe is a habitat for beings at all levels of development: though simulating here a sub-stratum of 'solidity,' that is but a mode of human experience; the modes of beings of other or higher natures may well be totally different. The universe lends itself to the manifestation of Beauty in Form, but the beauty is read into it by the observer: thus the universe may justifiably be regarded by religion as a Universe of Form, offering 'objective' experience to life and consciousness at all possible levels of existence (both actual and potential) and operating through the processes of space-time. Space-time thus provides the setting for experience-in-the-making, but the Focus of the complex of experiences transcends this machinery of space-time, which necessarily functions within the limits set by the over-all Process: its prospects may well be 'everlasting,' but that would be simply because the process of Creation itself is everlasting as ordained by its timeless and eternal Source.

Biology emphasises the need for mechanism as the basis of physical environment and organic life; biochemistry and biophysics also reveal that this function of mechanism through chemical processes and other similar means, equipped with self-operating controls, is equally at the base of human life, with its capacity for higher intelligence and consciousness. But this is just what is to be expected, if all such processes and mechanisms are intended to subserve higher emergents, themselves possessed of potential freedom to control and direct the deterministic sequence to freshly-determined objectives. Distinction must thus be made between (*a*) so-called 'inanimate matter'; (*b*) the 'biological subject' within an organism; (*c*) the 'psychological subject' within soul-life; and (*d*) the 'super-ject' of spiritual life. History has emphasized the five strata within the universe of Matter/Life/Soul/Mind/Spirit, with the suggestion that Spirit is the 'Super-ject,' whilst the other strata are 'emergents' of the Process operating through the universe. From this standpoint, soul is seen to be the 'body' of Spirit, whilst the theory requires to be focused in the fact of God, as both transcendent and immanent. It is perhaps permissible to supplement this cursory statement by a paragraph summarizing the course of individual development, as gleaned from the bygone exponents of Christian apologetics.

Man is organic to nature. He slowly awakens through sensation to perception. He gradually becomes aware of himself as a subject apart from a world of 'objects' and his environment. In doing this, he identifies himself with his body, which serves as

his frame of reference: the habit becomes so ingrained that he has great difficulty later in realizing his body is only the instrument for his activity. It is in fact the mediating agency between him and his supposed 'external world,' which he only perceives in symbolic form, and so slowly builds up a mental and symbolic universe for himself. In doing this he steadily applies basic principles, which he draws, without recognising the fact, from his sub-consciousness, which is presumably the common source for all members of the human race. But this process of 'reminiscence' of basic principles (e.g. the capacity to appreciate space and time) must pre-suppose the fact of the 'subject' as prior to the experience, which he steadily learns to integrate as the succession of states of a unified subject. Reminiscence is thus no activity of the brain or the nervous system: it is *sui generis* and emphasises the higher status of that which becomes aware of itself as existing within, and using, the body. The stages of development are clear: pure egoity as a baby, passing through emotional development to increasing self-sconsciousness and also a dawning sense that selfishness must give way to service for others. This is the advent of the moral law, finding expression so far as possible within the limited personality. Then there comes, for some intellectual growth or skills in the arts and crafts, for others increasing service and devotion to 'useful works.' The 'intellectual monad' demonstrates the pattern of growth of concepts as the 'bricks' of the mental organization or 'mental body' which is steadily created by everyone for himself through his volitional, emotional, intellectual, cultural, and religious life. These concepts are really 'lived' and fused into the symbolic structure which should *ex hypothesi* serve as the vehicle of conscious activity when the physical body has served its period as a scaffolding for the building of the 'mental body' and is sloughed off at death. The brain is not the means of the inner activity of this higher self; the brain is simply the means whereby the inner self relates itself to, and is active in, the physical world. Language is the outstanding form of symbolism and communication, but religious and other forms of experience can rise above language. Likewise, the intellectual plods slowly by conscious and reflective thought over a sequence of points in building-up a constructive argument to its conclusion; but there are other kinds of thinking, which do not use the time sequence. One is the trained thinking of the super-conscious 'mental body.' The physical body is directed by the trained sub-conscious mind; the higher 'mental body' is likewise trained to think super-consciously and direct acquired skill, e.g. the trained so-called 'routine' functioning of a professional. Yet, there is the

'whole' and 'intuitive' thinking of the genius ('genial thinking' as Ebrard called it)—and we are all more or less geniuses—which grasps the situation as a whole and in a flash. Here we have the foretaste of spiritual process. Pain becomes more acute with growth of self-consciousness; this emphasises that the inner self is beyond the body, and the latter's limited capacity for experiencing pain, except as a warning. The 'inner self' is absolutely certain of itself; it recognizes above all that the right Will is its highest end. This consciousness is independent of the body and the world; objects only manifest themselves as effects, and the body becomes an 'object' in relation to the inner self. Man knows it to be his destiny (*a*) to become himself; (*b*) to attain a right Will; (*c*) to search after God, if haply he may find Him; and (*d*) to reflect the Love of God in his own love for his fellows. Yet there intervenes the fact of Sin. Man fails; he cannot lift himself up by his own bootstraps. He knows the need, for (*a*) a spiritual focus; (*b*) some source of 'grace' or 'spiritual energy'; and (*c*) the means of 'redemption' to overcome the evil that has inevitably developed within him and threatens to produce degeneration in his personality, if not eradicated. Reason is basic to life and should warrant the line of man's advance to these conclusions; yet, we find ourselves so steeped in logical process that we shy at individuality in thought, whilst welcoming it in friendships, art and even religion. It is individual experience which points the need for means to harmonize the rational, the irrational (at times desirable, e.g. in humour) and the spontaneous sides of our personality in its advance towards novelty, and to 'redeem' the blunders, the failures, the errors—nay, even more, to atone for the Sin which we have committed against the Light. This realization of his own inabilities is the hallmark of the personality of man and stamps him as having an origin and a destiny far transcending the physical world and the organic life with their necessary processes of deterministic sequence and mechanism.

Science and natural theology point religion a long way on the road towards understanding. They are companions right up to the limits open to science and natural theology; but there is that beyond which is open to religious experience alone. Here man believes that he enters into spiritual communion which brings him to the intuitive certainty that the Universe is primarily spiritual in character, origin and destiny, and that it is grounded in spiritual Values. This experience insofar as it is Valid in its own right, must transcend the scientific sphere, and even be only haltingly within the vision of natural theology. There is in the climax an ultimate divergence between science and religion which may be summarized thus:

(*a*) Science is a true guide to man's interpretation of the physical universe and life within its limiting features, but its status and scope are subordinate because it must end in notions which by their very nature are inadequate for, and even opposed to, those aspects of man's experience transcending his environment. Those inadequate notions suggest (i) an 'emergent process' through space-time as a self-sufficient matrix; (ii) an emergent and developing God who embodies the ideal; and (iii) acceptance of agnosticism as to man's fate and of uncertainty as to the outcome of the cosmic adventure, as between so-called 'evil' and 'good.'

(*b*) On the other hand, Religion can assimilate with advantage the fruits of the scientific adventure, subject to correction and development by reference to its own basic notions, themselves implicit in religious experience, viz. (i) Space/Time is not self-sufficient, nor can it be more than the framework for the process of Creation, which it subserves; (ii) that Creation is grounded in the Eternal God Who is beyond Space/Time; and (iii) the ultimate issue is assured: values will prevail: sin and evil are everlastingly being redeemed.

The contrast between these two positions is broadly that which obtains between the conclusions of A. N. Whitehead and Archbishop William Temple, respectively. The former points the contrast when he says: 'The task of Theology is to show how the world is founded on something beyond mere transient fact, and how it issues in something beyond the perishing of occasions. The temporal World is the stage of finite accomplishment. We ask of Theology to express that element in perishing lives which is undying by reason of its expression of perfections proper to our finite natures. In this way we shall understand how life includes a mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow.'[4] Temple in effect answers Whitehead. He sees the world as the creation of God and looks to man's destiny within that spiritual fellowship focused on Christ, which is to be experienced, here and now, in the religious life. And this whole complex of related spirits is the Supreme Value or Reality—the Love Divine. In God it begins, in Him it ends, and in Him moves whatever moves. His perfection is not coldly static; it is wrought out in struggle and agony and uttermost self-sacrifice. But neither is it precarious, for the historic process is the temporal form of an eternal perfection to which that process is essential.'[5]

[4] Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 221.
[5] Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 283.

THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN: ON GETTING THE QUESTION CLEAR

By Alasdair C. MacIntyre, M.A., Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion, Manchester University

ANY phrase like 'the nature and destiny of man' is apt to breed confusion. It carries with it all sorts of theological associations by which we may become entangled at the outset and so omit to start where we ought to start—at the beginning. For one thing, our title speaks of 'man' and yet we have to remember that to speak of man is always in fact to speak about men, about the whole variety and complexity of human life. Even to glimpse that complexity is to be warned against any over-simple generalizations. Secondly, we are, I take it, concerned to speak about human life theologically and it may be asked by what right the theologian speaks of man at all. The most hardened sceptic would admit that, if one can talk meaningfully of God, then such talk falls within the province of the theologian. But of man surely it is the psychologist and the social scientist who are competent to speak. At the least the theologian has the responsibility for relating what he says about man to, and distinguishing it from, the studies of the empirical scientist. With these preliminaries, therefore, we may define the task of this paper as being to distinguish the different kinds of question that can be asked about human life with the final aim of clarifying the nature of theological questions about man.

I want to begin by discussing three kinds of answer to the question 'What is Man?' about which there is nothing peculiarly theological, but which are of the highest importance to the theologian. The first is the answer that we should want to give if the question were interpreted as a request for a definition. What are the defining characters of a human being? How are we to use the word 'human?' Before we answer this question it is worth considering very shortly the character of definitions. It is important to remember that the fact that definitions can be neither true nor false does not mean that they are arbitrary. You may, if you like, decide to use words Humpty-Dumptywise and define the key terms of your discourse in entirely arbitrary fashion, but in so doing you will debar yourself from seeing how the way in which important terms are used serves to encourage us to see the world in certain ways. Evolutionary biology and recent work in the study of animal behaviour may make us conscious that the differences between man and other species are differences of

degree. But the differences are nevertheless so striking that we are right in our language to demarcate sharply the human and animal worlds. Not that there is necessarily some one characteristic which constitutes the essentially human, but rather that among the characterisics which men have we pick out some which taken together we incorporate in our definition of 'human.' If I may pick out just one of these characteristics, by means of which we both do in practice define 'human' and in so doing partly illuminate the point of distinguishing men from animals, it is that of using language. It is not just that language makes possible communication, society, a common human culture. It is also that we ought not to think of men as confronting their environment in such a way that they first have experieces and then record them in language. Rather the creative use of language, the pointing out of some one aspect of the world by giving it a name, is a necessary condition of enjoying any sort of complex experience. And, of course, it is because men use language that they can formulate rules, abide by them or break them, be answerable to one another and so create the fabric of the moral life. So the theologian must always recall in his enquiries that if he is speaking of man in any ordinary sense it is man with this kind of capacity that he intends. For by speaking of 'man' he must be taken to mean just this, unless he expressly defines 'man' in some private way of his own. It is partly a failure to be clear on this initial point of definition that clouds so much theological debate about human nature. That extreme pessimism which declares that man by himself is capable of nothing must face the logical dilemma that either words are being used in sense quite out of the ordinary or the statement is manifestly false. A moment's attention to the question of what we mean by 'man' ('a being capable of this and that etc.') would make it clear that in any ordinary sense the assertion is a flat contradiction.

Statements about human nature, however, may be intended by theologians simply as empirical generalizations. But if this is how they are to be construed then the theologian has nothing distinctive to say. We sometimes, for example, find Buchenwald or Hiroshima cited as *evidence* for the doctrine of Original Sin. But if this doctrine is an empirical hypothesis which events may confirm or overthrow, then it is part of the social sciences and not of theology. In fact, of course, if the doctrine is interpreted empirically it can only be as the truism that all men are wicked sometimes and some men are wicked most of the time, and to be aware of this one needs neither science or theology but merely a modicum of common sense. What strikes one as important, however,

when we put theological statements about man side by side with the hypotheses of the empirical scientist is the way in which the former are general and aphoristic while the latter are only of interest in so far as they are the product of detailed and particular investigation. Not that aphorisms may not have their place: the theologian who sees man as a dispossessed king or a thinking reed may strike the imagination as surely as those who tell us that man is what he eats or that 'a man is a man and neither a monk nor a monkey.' But we must never let the aphorisms get in the way of the empirical enquiry, and just as we may mistake theological utterances on man for empirical assertions so we may wrongly try to decide empirical questions by invoking theological assumptions. The most obvious example of this latter confusion is found among those who assert that certain religious practices are a sure panacea for certain social ills. It is often said, for example, that a national return to church-going would solve the problems of juvenile delinquency. But in fact there is no empirical evidence at all of a correlation between church-going habits, on the one hand, and non-delinquency on the other. Indeed if one counted heads in those surveys where any attempt has been made to indicate the religious background of delinquents one might find a slight majority of delinquents from religious homes. But, of course, we have no adequate surveys and what is important is that we should not go beyond the evidence in making sociological assertions.[1] Here the theologian can only learn from what the social scientist has to tell him.

A third candidate for the classification of the theologian's utterances on man may be the suggestion that the theologian, while not giving us additional information about human life, evaluates human life differently. But the theologian is no more privileged on questions of value than on questions of fact. And where questions of value are crucial in human life, the theologian *qua* theologian is never in advance of the conscience of his time. If Wilberforce attacked slavery, Luther had defended it two hundred years before and the bishops defended it in Wilberforce's own age. Theologians are sometimes prophetic, but they are sometimes obscurantist and, what is more important for us, there is nothing that sets apart their ordinary moral judgments from those of secular thinkers and makes them distinctively theological.

What then has the theologian to say about man that is distinctive? In order to answer this question we must first raise the more fundamental question of the distinctive function of theological discourse in general. And on this, of course, I can only hope to

[1] *Cf.* e.g. Paul Wiart's *Economic Factors in Michigan Delinquency.*

make a few rather inadequate points within the limitations of this paper. The theologian envisages the world and *a fortiori* human life within the framework of a myth. I want to use the word 'myth' neutrally and descriptively and indeed the word 'story' would serve my purposes almost as well. The difficulty with the word 'myth' is that it suggests imaginative power at the cost of truth. I want to stress here the imaginative import of myth and to leave the question of truth open. The paradox is that, while I am suggesting here an essential imaginative content to theology, the classical theological statements about man have largely gone imaginatively dead upon us. And this I think is because they have been abstracted from the only context in which they make sense. Theology can only begin to do its work of elucidation within an accepted context of belief in myth, within a framework by means of which life is envisaged in dramatic terms. For the theologian's myth is not just the relating of a cosmic drama, it is the relation of a drama in which we are all actors. *De te fabula narratur.* The drama with which we are concerned in our theology is, of course, that of the Biblical narrative. When I call that narrative a drama or a myth I do not mean that it is not also a hisory. But it is certainly not a history in the sense in which the results of modern historiography might be so called, nor are our grounds for believing it ordinary historical grounds. Believing that narrative, we see our lives in a certain way. The way in which the Bible speaks to us is very much that in which Nathan the prophet addresses David, first dramatically presenting a situation in which judgment is passed upon the protagonists therein and then saying to us 'Thou art the man.' What is the situation which the Bible presents? That in which, to quote Karl Barth, 'man is the fellow-man of Jesus Christ.' He is the image in the light of which we see ourselves, and see what God says to us. In speaking thus we speak already from within the Biblical myth. The great contemporary theological task—to which Barth has addressed himself—is that of seeing all our doctrines Christologically.

The presupposition of what I have just said is that Christian theology and the revelation which it sees in the Biblical narration stand or fall more or less as a whole. They do not consist of a series of individual truths among which we can pick and choose, but are a total dramatic vision. They are of course more than this, but they are at least this. Again, in giving this partial description of theology I am not offering a justification of it. This is an urgently necessary task, but it does not fall within the scope of this paper. But I am presupposing once again that Christian theo-

logy can be justified. If we accept these presuppositions, there are three points that can usefully be made.

First, the knowledge of man which Christian theology offers does not consist in a theory about human nature, but rather in directions to an ascesis through which men can see themselves in the light of the gospel narrative. What happens to men who try to see themselves in that light is usually treated as part of the theology of the devotional life, but is essential to that self-knowledge which is the climax of any theological understanding of man. So the knowledge to which the classical formulas point is never something finally grasped and achieved. It is rather the sign-posting of a road that we undertake than the mapping of a whole countryside.

Secondly, the view of human life that is derived from the Bible can be imaginatively compared with and matched against other views. This is not an abstract possibility; it is a task already undertaken and brilliantly achieved in the nineteenth-century Russian novel. If one wants to know what it is to accept or reject Christian faith and what the alternatives to it of an agnostic radicalism, of making a religion of revolution and so on are, then it is to Turgenev, to Dostoyevsky and to Tolstoy that one does best to turn.

Thirdly, to live out one's life in the light of a myth or story is not a strange and unfamiliar phenomenon. Recent writers on morals have perhaps laid so much stress on the status of rules that we may forget how insignificant the place of rules in the moral life may be when compared with the part played by the end of becoming a certain sort of person or living out a certain kind of pattern. So generations of ordinary people in England saw the world through the great images of the *Pilgrim's Progress*, and tried to live as though they were Christian and Christiana.

Finally, if I have stressed the affinity between the theologian's vocation and that of the imaginative artist, it is not because I wish to escape the issue of the validity of theological statement. But I do want to see theology vindicated as itself and not as something else. I can perhaps illuminate this by alluding again to Bunyan. We say, as Christian theologians, that death is not the end, that the resurrection of Christ prefigures a life after and out of death. If someone asks us to explain or to justify this doctrine, we should, I think, be wrong to try and offer empirical evidence, such as that which might seem to be afforded by psychical research. We would rather point to our trust in the promises of Christ in the gospel. Someone might argue that the promise of what is *per se* unintelligible can be of no value. If we wanted then to indicate the kind of intelligibility that that promise had for us, we could perhaps do no

better than to quote Bunyan's account of how Mr. Valiant-for-truth crossed the river. This, it may be said, is untypical theology. But while a theology of man that cannot justify itself intellectually must be unacceptable to us, a theology of man that lacks the power of grasping the total human imagination is not worth trying to justify.

MAN'S NEED OF GOD

By the Rt. Rev. G. F. Allen, M.A., Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford

IN most of the papers at this conference we are concerned with the nature of man. In this paper, while still thinking of man, I have been invited to direct your attention to Man's Need of God. If we are to do that, we must first put a question mark before all human thoughts about God, in order that we may be sure that it is God himself in his inmost being with whom we are concerned, and who is concerned with us. The reality of God may be far away when we use religious language, but use it in ways unworthy of the nature and being of God. The reality of God may be near at hand, where we do not use or even know his name, but yet in fact work out his purpose of love and truth.

Jesus himself makes this distinction of language and reality with an acute spiritual realism. The name of Lord may be used apart from the reality of reverence and obedience, for which that name should stand. 'Why call ye me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say' (*Luke* vi, 46). 'Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of Heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven.' (*Matthew* vii, 21). On the other hand many may in fact be obedient to the Love of God, although they are ignorant that it is God whom they serve.

> 'Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee anhungered, and fed thee; or thirsty and gave thee drink? . . . And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me' (*Matthew* xxv, 37 and 40).

This spiritual realism is the point of other parables; for instance the son who denied in word, but in fact fulfilled the Father's will is preferred before the other son, who gave a formal assent but failed to obey in action (*Matthew* xxi, 28-31. Cf. also *Matthew* xxv, 11-12. *Luke* xiii, 26-27.).

This distinction of word and reality is also found, deep-rooted in Jewish tradition, in the third commandment. The commandments, having first summoned men to monotheism and to purity

of worship, then give the warning : ' Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.' We might paraphrase this by saying : Beware lest you use the name of God for anything less than the reality of God. Our conventional manuals of devotion frequently take this third commandment itself ' in vain,' when they interpret it as meaning that we should not use the name God lightly in phrases like ' Oh my God ! ' This may indeed be part of its meaning. It has, however, a far more serious intention, which applies not to the light language of the everyday world, but to the use of religious language by religious people themselves. You shall not take the language of religion, and empty it of its real content. We take the name of God in vain, when we patter through prayers in our worship, and leave a congregation feeling that there is no real seriousness of purpose in our praying. We take his name again in vain, when in our sermons we succeed in making the things of God seem trite or tedious. Whatever the ultimate reality for which the name of God stands, it is certainly never something commonplace or boring. In our worship we have constantly thus used the language of religion, while emptying it of its real meaning : as a result in our whole contemporary society the language of religion has become like a debased currency, bearing the outward mark of its original value, yet depreciated and no longer bearing its original intrinsic worth. The Jewish people were well aware of the immense danger that the language of religion might thus become emptied of its meaning; it may have been because of this danger, that there grew up in Judaism a great reserve and caution over the use of the Divine name.

As a result of this depreciation in the meaning of our religious language, we are faced to-day with a world in which countless people need and seek the reality of God, yet do not know that it is God for whom they are seeking. Yet we may not turn this into a pietistic judgment, and say that if only they would come and join with us in our churches, all would be well. Unfortunately in our churches of all schools of thought they might also find the language of religion become trite and commonplace and emptied of its meaning. This is one aspect of the problem, for which in recent years we have coined the new term communication. The language of religion, which should be a pointer to the reality of God, has become all too often a barrier between men and God.

In perhaps the most outstanding address of the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches, Professor Hromadka from Czecho-Slovakia, challenged the all too easy assumption that we in the west have Christ on our side, because we use the

language of the Christian religion, and that Communism is the enemy of Christ because it rejects our language. In strong and challenging words he said,

> 'The history of the Church is the history of the never-ceasing wrestle between God and gods, between faith and paganism, between a genuine worship of God and idolatry.'

But this tension is never a straight issue between the Church and the world, but goes on within the Church itself.

> 'The struggle between Christ and anti-Christ is being fought within the Church, in her sanctuary, between the divine call to obedience and allegiance on the one hand, and the desire of the human heart to use the Church and cult for—I repeat—earthly ends on the other. A godless world is much less dangerous than a paganised Christless Church.'

In all our pastoral work we have to ask whether an apparent atheism may not be, not a denial of God himself, but a rejection only of infantile images and empty phrases, which men had come to mistake for the reality of God. We have to ask whether an apparent expression of faith in God may be, no genuine faith such as could move mountains, but only lip-service to religious phrases, which have lost their real content and meaning.

Let us now look at the other part of our title, the phrase Man's Need. Here also we must clear away certain possible misunderstandings. All too easily we may take man's need as the dominant, essential point, and bring in God as an afterthought, as a way of meeting man's need. To do this would be to turn man's need into the god which he really serves, and to turn the living reality of God into a means by which man hopes to satisfy his own requirements and desires. We do this for instance, whenever we seek to maintain an existing social order, and our own position of privilege and security within that order, and regard the forces of religion as a means for maintaining the kind of world in which we wish to live. How many sermons have been preached in recent years, how many articles written, how many pounds and dollars sought and received for the work of the Church, on the argument that we must seek a revival of religion, in order to preserve the existing social order against forces of revolution which might threaten it? It is possible, no doubt, that there is a judgement of God on the cruelty and intolerance of the revolutionary forces in our day. It is, however, also at least possible that God looks down in judgement also on the people of Britain and Europe and America, as we seek to build up an ever higher standard of living for ourselves, and fail to hear the cry of need of our neighbour amid the mass poverty of other continents and races and the suffering of refugees.

If we bear these points constantly in mind, and only if we do so, then we may go on to consider the reality of man's need for God. That need is so vast in our contemporary world, that we cannot do more than touch on it; let us however look at five places, where man is in need, and where only God can do for man, what man of his own striving can never do for himself. First, God alone can lift man out of his preoccupation with his own needs. This is the paradox inherent in our title. Man's deepest need is to cease to think so much about himself and his own needs, and to lose himself in the service of a Purpose beyond himself. There is a deep and abiding spiritual law in the saying of Christ, 'Whosoever would save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it' (*Mark* viii, 35). I sometimes think that this law of the spiritual life is manifest even more clearly for man in community, and that from there we may discern its significance in the life of each individual. A group of people are caught by some compelling vision and purpose. For the sake of realizing that purpose, they form, quite rightly, some society or organization to bind others with them for the achievement of their goal. The society lives and thrives, funds pour in, numbers grow, just so long as the society is living for a purpose beyond itself. The vision is the end or goal, and the society the means for its realization. The day comes when the purpose has been in part achieved, or when conditions have changed, and the vision is no longer relevant in its original form. The society however remains, and has acquired a certain will to live and a loyalty to itself. There is left the picture of a group of people, asking how the languishing life of their particular society can be revived. Now they ask; 'how can we find a new purpose for which to live?' Yet in asking that question they betray the fact that they are on the road of death not life, since the dominant motive in the society has now become the preservation of its own existence, not the vision it was called to serve. The society has become the end, and the vision a means toward its self-preservation. It may indeed happen that the society will come to life again, but this will only happen, if the vision it serves becomes once more dominant, and if the society is ready to die in the service of the vision.

This same spiritual law is manifest in the life of each individual. We can often observe a frustration and sterility in those whose secret motive is the advancement of their own importance, a vitality in those who careless of self are serving a vision beyond themselves. The same law holds true also in the life of the Church, and is manifest in a rise and fall of vitality in different periods of

Church history. We have learnt to say in recent years, Let the Church be the Church; and that is right, so long as we know what we are saying. It would be highly dangerous, if by it we meant, Let the Church live for itself and its own importance in the world, and be preoccupied all the time with its own finances and numbers and prestige. That is the road of death. The Church is called to worship God; it exists only as the servant of Christ and his kingdom. Quite literally the Church ceases to exist as Church, the moment it ceases to worship and obey its Lord in spirit and in truth. We may only say, Let the Church be the Church, if all the time from within the Church we are saying, Let God be God.

This same spiritual law will hold, whether the vision for whose sake we die to self be Christ and his kingdom, or some lesser purpose, or even some goal that is alien to the mind of Christ. Even an alien purpose may for a time lift us out of ourselves in selfless service, and so call forth our energies. If however it is untrue to the fundamental structure of our natures, it will in time set up tensions and strains within us, which will in turn lead to revolt against the vision. This too is a spiritual law which we can discern, both in the individual, and in the wider life of man in society. Only the fulness of the vision of Christ himself satisfies every side of our nature, and releases every latent power of life and love within us. If we say this, we must however also say that the purpose of God in Christ is wide enough to include every form of creative, loving work within his world, and so a vast range of lesser purposes. The God we worship in church, is not, thank God, confined to the church, but is Lord of all his world; he lays upon us through our worship an infinite variety of tasks within his world.

The second need of man, which man cannot provide for himself, and which only God can give, is forgiveness. Doubtless this point will speak more deeply to those who have on their conscience some actual memory of guilt or shame. With a greater maturity of conscience we recognise that our sins of omission are a matter of guilt and shame, not less than our sins of commission. We owe to the world a debt of love; we can never ourselves make up the poverty of our past love and the ever-growing debt of love unpaid. The sin of man transcends the individual, and has its effects in ever widening circles, both in the immediate community in which he lives, and on generations yet unborn. It is a plain description of psychological fact, that the sins of the fathers are visited on the children, as we can see in all too tragic ways in the temperament of children who have been denied the security of a settled and loving home. As the sin of man transcends the indivi-

dual, so also the forgiveness must transcend the individual and come from beyond himself. Ultimately the sin is an offence against the divine order of the world, and the forgiveness therefore can only come from the Author of that order. The scribes were right in their comment, 'Who can forgive sins but God only' (*Mark* ii, 7). In this saying the scribes all unconsciously point the way for our understanding alike of the doctrine of the Incarnation and of the Atonement. Our Lord declared forgiveness; only God can forgive; either Jesus is a blasphemer, or the very Word of God is present incarnate in the Christ. The decision, a blasphemer or the Word incarnate, can only come through an act of trust or faith; and of that we shall presently have more to say. Down the ages countless have believed and found, that God does in fact speak in Christ the word of forgiveness, thus bringing peace and new life to their hearts, enabling them to make a new start, and doing for them what they could not do for themselves.

The third place where God meets the need of man is through the guidance of his Spirit in day to day, hour to hour, moment to moment, decisions. Constantly we are called to take decisions, in situations where we cannot possibly ourselves know the full range and implication of our actions. At such moment of decision we learn that there is a Living God, who has a concrete, definite purpose for the whole of his world, and for each individual and each situation within it. We learn at first hand the truth of the Biblical phrases, 'The word of the Lord came unto me, saying . . .'; Thine ears shall hears a word behind thee, saying, This is the way, walk ye in it, when ye turn to the right hand, and when ye turn to the left' (*Isaiah* xxx, 21). 'The Spirit said unto him, Behold, three men seek thee. Arise therefore and get thee down, and go with them, nothing doubting' (*Acts* x, 19-20). As in this last incident of St. Peter and Cornelius, occasionally we are given a glimpse that the will of God which we are seeking to obey coheres with a single purpose that others are working out, in ways which on any human level we could not possibly have known. It is as though we were working on a vast jig-saw puzzle, and suddenly see that a few little pieces which we had placed together in one corner match and form one great picture with pieces that someone else had been fitting together in another corner.

Doubtless there are all sorts of dangers of abuse and misunderstanding in this trust in the guidance of God. To use another familiar metaphor, our minds are like a wireless receiving set, which we seek to tune in to the voice of the Living God, but from which we all too often hear distorting noises and phrases; and these we may take to be the Word of God, when in fact they come

from other motives and intentions in our own heart, or reflect the passing fashion of the world around us. There would seem to be two main principles over the guidance of the Holy Spirit. We must open our hearts to hear the word that convicts, if we would hear the word that guides. We must also be humble to hear the guidance of God in very little ways, if we are to receive his inspiration in greater matters. I suppose it is the experience of many preachers, as it certainly is my own, that sometimes we sit or kneel in prayer, asking what is the message of God for some particular occasion. For long our minds seem empty and arid. At last we learn again to let God be God, and allow Him to speak at the place of His choosing, not of ours. There comes to our mind the memory of some thought which we had sought to hide, where we need forgiveness, or the memory of some trivial task, like a letter unwritten, which we had been putting off. We hear and obey at the place where God chooses to speak; and then, and only then, there comes the vision at the place where we have been seeking inspiration from him.

The fourth place where God does for man what man cannot do for himself, is when he turns our despair into hope, our feebleness into faith and power. This was another lesson which I think many of us learnt again at the Evanston Conference last summer. It was very striking that the debates on the main theme, the Christian Hope, seemed most uncertain and unclear, when they were theorising about the theology of hope; that those who spoke most clearly and most strongly were those who were wrestling in action with the need of the world over such issues as racial tensions, the strife of nations, or the sufferings of refugees. As one delegate put it afterwards, it seemed that God was teaching his Church again the meaning of the saying, 'I will give her . . . the valley of Achor (that is the valley of trouble), for a door of hope' (*Hosea* ii, 15). This is the truth which St. Paul learnt so deeply;

> 'He said unto me, my grace is sufficient for thee: for my strength is made perfect in weakness. Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me' (*II Corinthians* xii, 9).

When we are faced with some task, which taxes to the very limit our utmost capacities, and when we feel that our very highest efforts can only lead to failure, then is the moment that we kneel and seek a power beyond our own, and the gates of heaven are opened. The New Testament is the record of men of very little faith and of very average ability becoming transformed and transfigured into men of dynamic power, through a strength which came to them from beyond themselves by the impact of the

incarnate and risen Christ. Faith is the quality of life, expressed in the saying which was used as the motto of the Eastern army in the last war, and which comes originally from the reply of Calonne to Marie Antoinette.

> 'That which is difficult can be done immediately, the impossible will take a little longer.'

It is the quality of life with which St. Joan went out and challenged and transformed the pettiness of faith and vision in the French armies of her day. We can never persuade ourselves into such dynamic faith, but only receive it when we obey a purpose beyond ourselves, and seeking a strength from beyond ourselves for the fulfilment of that purpose.

The fifth place where God does for man what man cannot do for himself is in the creation of community. As he alone can lift us out of our self-seeking, so he alone can lift us out of the petty rivalries and conflicts which come from a competition of selfish wills. There is a corporate, group selfishness, which is an even more sinister evil than the selfishness of individuals. This corporate self-seeking is more insidious because the individual may seem to lose his selfishness in the service of a group, yet still exercise a veiled pride and self-seeking in the rivalry of this group over against other groups. Thence comes the strife of nation against nation and race against race. Thence comes also the corporate pride and exclusiveness of the divided denominations; and the Church will have no effective message for the division of nations, so long as it demonstrates precisely the same pattern of corporate pride and rivalry within its own life. Only through some over-ruling loyalty can such strife be broken. Only in Christ do the barriers fall, so that we say,

> 'He is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of a partition between us; having abolished in his flesh the enmity, . . . for to make in himself of twain one new man, so making peace' (*Ephesians* ii, 14-15).

Fellowship and friendship can, of course, exist on a purely human or secular level without explicit faith in the love of God, and we may then say that the love of God is present though unrecognised. The community which the Church seeks to build should indeed take up and use an underlying community in the secular world. The parish system represents the tradition that the Church should bind together in a community of worship those who live in the same neighbourhood, and who therefore are bound together on a secular basis in a community of residence and work. A large part of our difficulty and frustration in parochial work to-day comes from the break up in town and village of this secular

community. In our cities parish boundaries may run down the middle of a street, or along the line of an old and disappeared canal, and no longer correspond to anything real in the community life of the neighbourhood; in our villages through the ease of modern transport people scatter for their work, for their education, for hospital treatment in time of sickness, for their recreation; and it is a common complaint that there is no longer any sense of community in the village. It is arguable in may places that we are trying to impose a religious community on a secular basis that has disappeared, and that our whole parochial system needs re-thinking and re-planning in terms of whatever are the new secular bases of community and fellowship in the modern world.

While, however, we must not underestimate the importance of community on the secular level, it is also clear that such secular fellowship is insufficient without a religious faith. There are many examples in our modern world, that when faith in the love of God weakens or disappears, faith in the worth of the individual under the love of God weakens or disappears. We are left on the one hand with the mass mentality, in which human life becomes cheap, human liberties disappear, and group makes war against group. On the other hand amid this mass mentality there is the isolation of the individual, who finds that there is no place so lonely as what a recent American writer, David Riesman, has called The Lonely Crowd.

In this contemporary situation we discover again man's need of the love of God. On the one hand God says to the mass man of the modern world, You may not deny the rights and responsibilities of the individual, for each individual is of infinite significance under the love of God. On the other hand God says to the isolated individual, You may not and need not live in lonely isolation, for in the love of neighbour you will find both your sphere of service and your sphere of friendship. To each alike he says, you may not live in rival groups and factions, for all the world is under my love, and the claims of neighbour transcend all barriers of race or nation or church.

We may notice further that the ethos of Catholicism and the ethos of Protestantism express these complementary truths. The Catholic ethos lays greater emphasis on the Church as the Body of Christ and the responsibilities of the individual within the community. The ethos of Protestantism lays greater stress on the salvation of the individual and the freedom of the individual conscience. It is the tragedy of Christendom that these complementary truths have split apart. As J. L. Leuba has pointed out in his important book, *New Testament Pattern*, the truths of the

Catholic and Protestant traditions are complementary and united in the first days of the Church, so that each can legitimately appeal to the New Testament, yet neither can refute the other by appeal to the New Testament. It is perhaps the greatest task of our time to heal the rift between Catholicism and Protestantism; and it is a task in which our Anglican Church has a unique responsibility, since most of all the Churches it has held the two traditions within itself. Only where we rebuild a Church that is both Catholic and Protestant shall we able to say at one and the same time to the mass man, Here is the fellowship where the freedom of the individual is respected and encouraged, and to the lonely individual, Here is the fellowship where you will find community and friendship. These tensions find a vivid, symbolic expression, which is by no means accidental, in the sacrament of Holy Communion. At one extreme the Catholic tradition denies the chalice to the laity; at the other extreme there is the Protestant celebration with a separate cup for each individual. The true *koinonia* of the Church is expressed, when the common cup of fellowship is given to each individual with the words, The Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ which was shed for thee.

We have traced man's need for God at five main places. Doubtless others could be added. We have, for instance, concentrated on man's need in this world, and not spoken of the world beyond death. Let us however now pass to another theme, which seems to be required by the title of this paper, if it is not so directly suggested by it. How does God reveal himself in answer to man's need? How must man respond, if he is to know the call of God?

To develop the theme of the self-revelation of God would require another whole paper. We can only suggest that God reveals himself to-day at the places and in the ways by which he has always done so. He reveals himself as Creator through the world he made.

> 'The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handiwork' (*Psalm* xix, 1). 'The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made' (*Romans* i, 20).

He reveals himself through the Word, spoken in conscience and in prophetic insight. He reveals himself supremely, when the Word spoken to the prophets is spoken in the incarnate Christ.

> 'God who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his son' (*Hebrews* i, 1-2).

Yet God is never to be identified with any object in his world, whether it be the written word of Scripture, or the outward and visible sign of the sacrament, or the human nature of Jesus on earth. To identify God with any object on earth is idolatry. He is and remains transcendant, even in the moment in which he is immanent. He is the ultimate subject of all being, and never an object or thing which we can hold in our hands or with our minds. Just because he is the Living God, he is at one and the same time the God who reveals himself and the God who is hidden; he is known in the moment of his self-revelation, yet if we try and hold him as an object of our knowing, we find ourselves saying with the prophet Isaiah,

> 'Verily thou art a God that hidest thyself, O God of Israel, the Saviour' (*Isaiah* xlv, 15).

Because this is the nature of God's self-revelation, our response can only be a response of trust or faith, and not a response of sight. 'We walk by faith, not by sight' (*II Corinthians* v, 7). It is this response of trust which is so difficult for our modern world, because it is so alien to our whole contemporary temper. We must close therefore by trying to suggest the nature of that faith, by which alone man will find, or be found by, the God whom he needs.

According to the Creation myth, man was given dominion over nature. As the Psalmist says, 'Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands' (*Psalm* viii, 6). It was legitimate and according to the divine purpose that man should exercise control over the natural world. He has gained scientific knowledge and control through the method of experiment, by which we put objects in a situation which we impose, and see whether or not they respond in the way we expect. The advance of modern science has been so spectacular, that man then comes to think that this is the only method of approach to reality, and that nothing can be real which does not conform to this approach. As an example of this, we may quote the early, if perhaps outmoded statement of Professor A. J. Ayer,

> 'We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purposed to express—that is, if he knows what observations could lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or rejected as being false' (A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 35).

Starting with that premise, he was bound to reach the conclusion that 'all metaphysical assertions are nonsensical' (*Op. cit.* p. 41).

Into this whole world there breaks, however, the biblical warning, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. God himself

cannot be known by those methods of tempting or testing or experiment, by which we know and control the objective world. His reality and his self-revelation do not conform to this approach, by which we verify a proposition by observation under conditions which we ourselves have imposed. I believe that this is the meaning of the temptation of Christ, when he banishes the devil of doubt with the Deuteronomic saying, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. The Messianic call at the baptism, 'This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased' (*Matthew* iii, 17) has to be accepted as factually significant in trust and obedience; the proposition cannot be verified, by observing whether or not the condition would be fulfilled, 'If thou be the son of God, command that these stones be made bread' (*Matthew* iv, 3). To attempt to prove the Messianic call would be to question and doubt the Messianic call; it would be to remain in the state of *peirasmos*, and *peirasmos* is the LXX translation for *Massah*, which is defined in the Revised Version margin as tempting or proving, 'because they tempted the Lord, saying, Is the Lord among us or not?' (*Exodus* xvii, 7). The method of tempting or testing is the proper method over against the whole objective world of nature, and the whole objective world of historical study and enquiry. In this objective world we may not substitute faith for accurate observation and honest study, and to do so would be to let faith degenerate into credulity. God himself, however, is not an object among other objects, and is not to be known by the methods which we apply to the objective world. The devil's suggestion in the Temptation story is the precise equivalent of our modern scientific and positivist approach, which says that unless a proposition can be tested and proved, it cannot be real. Our Lord's reply, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God, is the repudiation of that whole positivist position and the affirmation that there are realities which do not conform to that approach, but can only be known if they are first taken on trust. The method of testing applies to the world of nature, where man is given dominion: it does not apply to the world of God, where man is not in dominion but under dominion, and where therefore he must hear and trust and obey.

We may state these truths another way, by saying that the relation of man to God is never an I-it, or an I-object, or an I-thing relationship. The methods of scientific experiment are appropriate to the world of objects and things. God, however, is never one object amongst other objects, but the source of all Being. He is never a thing, but always the living God, as the Bible calls him. Over against his living reality life must respond

to life, and this response comes only with an act of trust and obedience.

A similar distinction must be drawn between the nature of faith and the nature of conceptual knowledge. In the realm of thought the canons of truth are the logical canons of non-contradiction. To make faith a substitute for logic would again be to let faith degenerate into credulity. In the whole realm of thought we must apply the methods of inductive and deductive, synthetic and analytical reasoning. Such reasoning may lead us toward the idea of God amongst our other ideas. God himself however in his reality and in his self-revelation does not allow himself to be known in that way. The Living God can never be one idea amongst other ideas held in the human mind. He does not conform to an I-idea relationship, as he does not conform to an I-it relationship. As he transcends all objects and things in the world of logical positivism, so also he transcends all names or words or ideas in any philosophic system. As Immanual Kant taught, our proofs and demonstrations of God may indeed lead toward God, but can never take the last step of trust in God. For this last step, we abandon knowledge to make room for faith.

Martin Buber has taught us again that the I-thou relationship is something distinct from the I-it or the I-idea relationship. The whole approach of faith or trust has become alien to our modern temper; but there is one place where we have never wholly lost it and may begin to recover it, namely in the relationship of love to another person. We can treat another person as an object, since they have an existence in the objective world. We can place their bodies on an operating table. We can apply scientific methods to their minds and characters with intelligence and reaction tests. We do not, however, know their real inner being in that way. If the lover asks, How can I prove the factual content of the empirical hypothesis, this person with whom I am falling in love is trustworthy, he might conceivably resort to the physicians of the body and ask for a medical report, or to the physicans of the soul and ask for an intelligence test. It is not however very likely that he and the other person will continue long in love with one another, if they adopt such an approach, for love by its very nature involves respecting the other person as another subject and not treating them as an object, and the realities of love can only be known if first we take them on trust. As the relationship of love transcends the I-it relationship, so it transcends the I-idea relationship. Every lover knows the difference between the idea they have in their minds of the other person, and the comfort

which the memory may bring in absence, but the entirely different experience and enjoyment which comes with their presence. The meeting of two persons in love is not an I-it, nor an I-idea, but an I-thou relationship; as such it involves an entirely different approach, not of observation and experiment, nor of analytical reasoning, but of mutual trust.

God is the divine I Am, the ultimate subject of all being. He addresses us as Thou, when he meets us with the word of call or judgement, 'Thou art the man' (*II Samuel* xii, 7). To know him we must trust and obey him in the moment of his self-revelation. This I believe to be the real meaning of the prayer of Our Lord, which we use so often and so often take in vain. With rare exceptions down the long course of history, popular religion turns God into a thing, an object of worship, an idol; theologians turn God into an idea, one thought amongst other thoughts in their minds. In one way or the other we lose the sense of God as the living, personal Thou. Having lost touch with the living reality of God, we can no longer understand the true biblical meaning of its antithesis, *massah*, *peirasmos*, temptation, the state where we want to put God to the test, because at heart we are doubting and questioning, Is the Lord among us, or not? No longer understanding this original meaning of temptation in this active sense as tempting God, we interpret it in the passive sense as the trials or testings which man may suffer on earth. Yet this is to miss the whole point of the prayer we so often repeat. In that prayer, as in the temptation of Our Lord Himself, the act of self-committal and trust and obedience, Hallowed by Thy name, Thy will be done, is set over against its antithesis, Lead us not into *massah*, that desert place of doubting and testing.

Lest there should be any uncertainty that this is the real meaning of the Lord's Prayer, Sunday by Sunday we sing from that book of ancient hymns, from which our Lord himself so often drew his own inspiration:

> 'O come, let us sing unto the Lord; let us heartily rejoice in the strength of our salvation. . . . To-day if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts; as in the provocation, and as in the day of temptation in the wilderness.'

The word temptation is immediately paraphrased and explained in its biblical, active sense,

> 'When your fathers tempted me, proved me and saw my works.'

This in turn is described as a loss of touch with God and of obedience to his will.

> 'Forty years long was I grieved with this generation and said; it is a people that do err in their hearts, for they have not known my ways.'

Inevitably the judgement follows:

> 'Unto whom I sware in my wrath, that they should not enter into my rest,'

for there can be no rest of spirit apart from communion with God. Here is man's deepest, in the end his only need.

> 'Thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless, until they find rest in thee.'

Deliver us therefore from the Satanic doubt; lead us not into temptation, *Massah*. Rather let our hardened hearts hear the voice of thy Spirit again, and trust and follow thee. May thy name be hallowed, and not taken in vain. Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth. Amen.

THE BIBLE AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF MAN

By The Rev. L. B. Cross, M.A., sometime Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford

IN any consideration of the Bible and its understanding of man, one must of necessity start with the Genesis story. It alone in the whole corpus of sacred literature, essays a description of man's origin and nature. Furthermore, it is on what I believe to be an entirely mistaken interpretation of this story, that theories of a Fall, and of Original Sin, have been built up. Elsewhere in the Old Testament there is never a hint of a fall; nor do theories of original sin or of original guilt, appear to have seemed worthy of either theological or ecclesiastical exploitation by Christianity's Hebrew ancestors.

What are the facts? The Priestly stratum of Genesis gives only the story of creation. In factual terms, male and female are described as made in the image of God. It is in the J. narrative of creation that details are given. Here man alone is made from the dust of the earth, and into the image thus formed is breathed 'the breath of life.' Adam is given the freedom of Eden; he is to dress, and to keep it, but of all its trees, he must not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. He suffers from loneliness. To satisfy his need for companionship, out of the ground animals are created, but they helped little. He was bored; even the beatific vision did not suffice. Woman was born, formed from man's ribs. The temptation follows; Eve is seduced, and Adam follows suit. They are expelled from the garden; Cherubim and a flaming sword guard the tree of life.

What are the essential features of this story? There is no hint of dualism, of two first principles, good and evil, warring against each other. The serpent is knowing, mischievous, crafty, but he is not the personification of evil. The so-called fall, resulting from the apple incident, raises rather than lowers the status of man, putting him in a new, if less facile, relationship with God. He advances thereby from *homo* to *homo sapiens*. That this is the intention of the story is made quite clear by the statement, 'and the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us,'[1] and also by the precautions taken to guard 'the tree of life.' Adam, and presumably Eve, had attained divine status: they were not made in it. The consequence of this new found status was hard labour; the price of knowledge, toil and suffering, not

[1] Gen. iii, 22.

only for Adam, but for his progeny also, and he lost the chance of immortality.

This simple and fascinating story, not wholly self-consistent, but pregnant with the fire of life, is no idle fairy tale, but a faithful, if imaginative, picture of the experience of every man. We are all born into a seemingly perfect world; that kindly providence the mother, our only companion. Gradually we become conscious of the need for other companionship, satisfying it at first with teddy-bears, and dolls, and toys. These soon pall, and cease to be 'helps meet for us.' We, like Adam, need to consort with our kind. Affection transfers from symbols of things, to things themselves, people. We become conscious of ourselves in relation to others. Repressions follow, there are things we cannot do which we would like to do; we taste of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. We begin to realise that we have moral and social responsibilities. Eden, we discover, was not the perfect world, but a child's playground. It is outside Eden where men live; it is outside Eden where men have the chance of developing into sons of God. Eve is not the villain of the piece, but the prototype of *homo sapiens*.

Nor are the lessons enshrined in this story unexpressive of Hebrew national and individual experience of human nature. As I have said, there is no hint of a fall, or any consciousness of it in the whole canon of Old Testament scriptures. As a nation the Hebrews show a striking spirit of independence, a marked sense of purpose and achievement, and a great pride of race. They were conscious of being a peculiar people, a pure stock, the result of selective breeding, survivors of the flood, of the seed of Abraham, snatched from Egypt, severed from the gentiles, God's supermen. With him they shared a covenant; from his point of view, they were 'one of us'; a relationship described in filial and marital terms. They might at times be stiff-necked, backsliding, at times follow other gods, and they paid for their independence. But the extent of their sin was the measure of their pride, their punishment the measure of God's respect for them. The problem of evil as such never worried them. Possession by evil spirits might account for physical and mental ill; an evil spirit in God's service might at times trouble them, but evil in general they considered to be the outcome of their sins; man's making, man's responsibility. It hardly seems to have occurred to them to blame some extraneous or inherent agency.

On the individual plane we find the same pride of personality, the same spirit of independence. To the question, what is man? a

psalmist replies 'thou has made him but little lower than gods,'[2] a reflection of the Priestly account of creation. That is the spirit of the psalmists when not in plaintive mood. 'I will give thanks unto thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made: wonderful are thy works; and that my soul knoweth right well.'[3] Man could stand the searching of God, and not be found wanting; 'search me, O God, and know my heart: try me, and know my thoughts: and see if there be any way of wickedness in me, and lead me in the way everlasting.' Here is a confidence in the nature of man which would bring blushes to the cheeks of the most hardened humanist, and these are no isolated passages. Man was made perfect and he could retain that perfection in communion with God. There are some bad lots in the Old Testament, but their badness is the measure of their failure to maintain standards of which they are capable; they are never excused for their failure. Solomon started with a perfect heart, but his philanderings were his undoing; David, despite his lapse, retained it to the end. So certain was Job of his integrity that he could challenge his creator. The second commandment envisaged the iniquity of the fathers being visited on the children, but a Jeremiah and an Ezekiel could deny that, and assert a doctrine of individual responsibility. Nor were the prophets in general considered as setting unreasonable standards, and the law, finical as it is in places, did not make impracticable demands. The Messianic figures, despite all that has been read into them, are human figures; their standards those of social justice.

The Hebrews were nevertheless conscious of living outside Eden, but there are few nostalgic dreams of its delights. They were conscious too of the sentence of hard labour, but they never blame Adam. Constant is the cry of the psalmists, 'why do mine enemies triumph over me?' 'why do the wicked prosper?' It reflects a national as well as an individual mood. Suffering was not always traceable to sin, or its reverse to goodness. For the most part their evils were accounted for by sin; chivalrously the sufferer took the blame with the pain. Despite Job, and murmuring to the contrary in Ezekiel, God is never blamed, though on occasions he is asked to explain. Criticism is left to the atheist with his facile answer, 'there is no God,' or to the agnostic of Qoheleth's type. Perhaps it was because the sense of sin was so real that it provided a ready answer to the problem of suffering. The sense of sin was very real, but it was actual sin, not inherited sin, which worried the psalmists. Parents might be blamed, but in

[2] *Ps.* viii, 4.
[3] *Ps.* 139, 14, and 23 *f.*

doing this, they were not expressing a belief in original sin, but in racial wickedness. 'Behold, in iniquity was I brought forth; in sin hath my mother conceived me.'[4] 'The wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as soon as they are born.'[5] Like Isaiah, the psalmists dwelt 'in the midst of a people of unclean lips.'

The sacrificial system went some way to provide for technical offences, and the keeping of the law was some compensation for its breaking, but, as Jeremiah with his vision of a new covenant realised, there were sins more grievous to the soul than was the effectiveness of these palliatives to wipe out. The soulful cry of the psalmist expresses the feeling of every penitent sinner conscious of affronting a Holy God, conscious too of the betrayal of his own better self, and longing for a renewal of communion with his soul's most intimate friend. 'I acknowledge my transgressions: and my sin is ever before me. Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, and done that which is evil in thy right. . . . Hide thy face from my sins, and blot out all mine iniquities. Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me. Cast me not away from thy presence; and take not thy holy spirit from me. Restore unto me the joy of thy salvation.'[6] So deep was the sense of sin, that it called for a new creation, but a new creation which would restore the heart and the spirit to their former state, and thus revive the joy of salvation. There was nothing wrong with human nature as such; only the misuse of it was at fault. The frailty of man is a constant theme in the psalms, and running parallel with it is the knowledge of God's mercy, his loving-kindness, and readiness to restore that fellowship which is man's highest reward.

Despite, however, the joyousness of some of the psalms, the feeling of well-being, the sense of sin forgiven and fellowship restored; despite, indeed, evil and suffering unexplained and unrequited save by the reversing of fortune's wheel, death overshadowed all. To the question, what is man? other psalmists reply, 'Man is like a breath, his days are as a shadow that passeth away,'[7] 'O remember how short my time is: for what vanity hast thou created all the children of men! What man is he that shall live and not see death, that shall deliver his soul from the power of Sheol?'[8] Here is the real and only tragedy in human nature.

[4] *Ps.* li, 5.
[5] *Ps.* lviii, 3.
[6] *Ps.* li, 1 *f.*
[7] *Ps.* civl, 4.
[8] *Ps.* lxxxix, 47.

Knowledge of good and evil may have placed man 'but little lower than gods,' but, he was debarred from the 'tree of life.' All the glory of men, all the shame of the wicked crumbled and mingled in the dust of Sheol, 'Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.' There is the same melancholy tone about the passing of all the great figures of the Old Testament, excepting those who were translated. Nor was this melancholy always the outcome of self-pity: death meant separation from God; 'the dead cannot praise Yahweh, nor those that go down into silence.'[9] Though a few of the later psalmists expressed a growing confidence in the hope that such is man's communion with the God on earth, death ought not to part it, the common belief was that in this life only could his presence be enjoyed. Though some might live to four-score years, death was the end to which all came. Human nature might be frail, the real tragedy was that it was mortal.

While the majority of men enjoyed freedom to do good or ill, there were those for whom this freedom was considered to be restricted, men on whom the spirit of God seized. They were possessed for a special purpose, Joseph, Moses, Balaam, Samson, Saul, David, a long line, good, bad, and indifferent types. The spirit's influence varied in its effect: at times the spirit was evil. In this same category of spirit-possession must be placed the prophets. Amos could liken this sense of divine compulsion to a man fleeing from a lion, running into a bear, and escaping, only to be stung by a scorpion in his own house. Jeremiah could speak of being called from the womb, curse his birth, and accuse God of arbitrary enticement to a life of strife and suffering. A similar experience, though more voluntary, was that of the Suffering Servant. To the prophets, Israel herself was as clay in the hand of a potter, her rebellion like the saw magnifying itself against the hand of him that held it. Nor is the Old Testament lacking in ideas parallel to the New Testament birth-stories. God used malleable material in effecting his purpose, his choice fell on the young; the babe Moses, Samuel and Jeremiah from the womb, Saul the callow youth, David the shepherd boy, the Messianic child. In all this there is something dynamic, portentous, terrible, more to do with the nature of God than man. Call it possession, predestination, incarnation, what you like, but it did not change the nature of the man. The clay was still clay, the saw retained its teeth, and used them. Jeremiah and Job protested, likewise Moses and Elijah, even David retained his knowledge of evil, and made good if subtle use of it, Isaiah volunteered; the ideal

[9] *Ps.* cxv, 17.

figure the Suffering Servant alone was passive. Whatever we may think of these intrusions of the spirit, it is important to notice their abnormal character. Without exception they are represented as special emergency measures; their purpose, national defence, the preservation and enlargement of the Covenant. They no doubt resulted in closer communion with God on the part of the individual, but that was not their primary purpose: even the figure in Psalm II is begotten to kingship, not with a nature which was divine. For the ordinary mortal, and for the ordinary purposes of living, human nature could fulfil the demands of its creator.

Turning now to the literature of the period between the two testaments, a period of less material or spiritual confidence, and one in which Judaism was constantly subjected to extraneous influences, we find far-reaching development in thought. Its most striking feature is the emergence of the problem of evil as such. To this problem many answers were given, but the main development took place along two lines. The first, influenced largely by Oriental dualism, possibly Zoroastrian, associated evil with the machinations of evil spirits. Enoch identifies these with the offspring of the illicit union of 'the sons of God' with 'the daughters of men' in Genesis vi. Their function was to work evil in the world, but within a limited time, challenging even the sovereignty of God. To counterbalance them was a host of good spirits, angels, charged with the divine interests and with the protection of men. In each case this influence was, for the most part, extraneous, though possession was not uncommon. Human nature was no longer the captain of its own soul, but a prey to supernatural powers, a pawn in a cosmic struggle. The second and more common line of thought was based on Genesis III. In this we are confronted for the first time in Jewish literature with a doctrine of a fall; the origin of evil is traced back to Adam. The Eden story assumes a significance it had never held before. The Apocalypse of Ezra laments that either the mind or man were ever created: 'it would have been better if also the dust had not been, in order that the mind might not have come into being from thence';[10] 'it would have been better for the earth not to have produced Adam, or when she did produce him that thou hadst instructed him how not to sin . . . Oh, what hast thou done, Adam!' Baruch similarly laments, and says that Adam's sin was the starting point of evil, bringing death and suffering to all men, making man 'a danger to his own soul, even to the angels he

[10] *Esdras* vii, 63 *f.*

became a danger.'[11] More explicit, and adumbrating a doctrine of original sin, are the words : ' for there is in us the evil heart which hath caused us to err from these (commandments), and led us into corruption, and hath shown us the ways of death, and made known to us the paths of perdition, and removed us far from life; and this not of a few, but of all who have been.' This ' evil heart,' this ' evil root,' ' grain of evil seed ' is stronger even than the law.[12] Human nature is essentially depraved.

These doctrines of a fall and of original sin, these neurotic and depressing views of human nature, did not, however, pass without protest; nor were they generally accepted. ' Though Adam first sinned,' writes Baruch, ' and brought untimely death upon all, yet of those who were born from him, each one of them hath prepared for his own soul torment to come, and again, each one of them hath chosen for himself glories to come. . . . Adam is therefore not the cause, ' save only of his own soul, but each of us hath been the Adam of his own soul.'[13] Official Judaism of the last century B.C. admitted the presence of ' an evil influence ' in human nature, but claimed that it could be overcome by a study of the law, and by good works, ' Woe to the dough of which the baker (God) must himself admit that it is bad.'* Other, and more optimistic views on the origin and nature of man find expression in the Wisdom Literature. Ben Sirach writes, ' He clothed them with strength like his own, and according to his own image made he them.'[14] ' God created man for incorruption, and in the likeness of his own proper being made he him; but by the envy of the devil, death entered into the world.'[15] Here also we find the view that the soul pre-exists, ' I was a goodly child, and a good soul fell to my lot; nay, rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled.[16] It is in this literature too that the great doctrine of wisdom, ' the breath of the power of God,' precursor of the Johannine Logos doctrine, finds expression. It was the elixir of life through which alone human nature reached its own perfection, ' passing into holy souls she maketh men friends of God and prophets.'[17]

These developments did not go far into the realm of metaphysics, but they show that the questions of the nature of man and of individual responsibility were looked upon as urgent. The

[11] *Baruch* lvi, 10.
[12] *IV Esdras* vii, 48.
[13] *Baruch* liv, 15 *f.*
* Num. Rabba xiii.
[14] *Ecc.* xvii, 3.
[15] *Wisdom* ii, 23.
[16] *Wisdom* viii, 19.
[17] *Wisdom* vii, 27.

great majority of men had sinned; could they fairly be blamed? This looking round for scapegoats did not, however, lower the standard of ethical teaching. That God still demanded the good life, and that man was still capable of achieving it, is presupposed in most of the literature of this period. There was added inducement however. Teaching on the origin of evil, and on its depredations on human nature, was counterbalanced by the emergence of belief in a future life. In this period access to the tree of life was restored, paradise regained. For the righteous there was unimagined glory to come, for the wicked the fires of hell. God's goverance of his creation was thus vindicated, the high destiny of man assured.

In the light of these quite astonishing developments, we may now turn to Paul on whom they had enormous influence, and whose writings were the quarry in which Augustine discovered his Piltdown man. The theories of the Apocalyptists and of Wisdom writers had offered explanations of much that was questionable in human nature, but they had left the real heart of the problem unsolved; 'Who shall deliver me from this body of death,'[18] Paul was obsessed by a sense of sin, his own sin, and that of the world. He had no doubt in his mind as to when or whence it came; it was through Adam, it came with the fall. He does not quite commit himself to a doctrine of the essential depravity of human nature, but to that of its actual depravity. After the fall, sin was inherent in human nature. 'As through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned.'[19] Adam's immediate progeny were in a particularly unfortunate position, for, while they possessed the knowledge of good and evil, the potentiality of sinning, they had no means of distinguishing between them, therefore, till the law came, sin could not be imputed to them. Nevertheless they all died; 'death reigned from Adam until Moses'[20]; a kind of primaeval massacre of the innocents. 'I had not known sin except through the law: . . . but sin, finding occasion, wrought in me through the commandment all manner of lust: for apart from the law sin is dead. I was alive apart from the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died; and the commandment, which was unto life, this I find to be unto death.'[21]

This is the hopeless situation which Paul envisaged as having been the lot of human nature since Adam. It had all been righted,

[18] *Rom.* vii, 24.
[19] *Rom.* v, 12.
[20] *Rom.* v, 14.
[21] *Rom.* vii, 7.

however, through the life, death, and resurrection of Messiah. How exactly Paul thought this to have been accomplished by Messiah need not concern us here. By his coming 'in the likeness of flesh of sin and for sin,' and through his death, God had 'condemned sin in the flesh.'[22] The scourge of the old Adam had been wiped out from the flesh by the new Adam. Human nature had been restored to its full pre-fall status. What was more, it had not been left neutral, man 'a danger to his own soul'; it had been infused with a new power—grace. Sin was being replaced by righteousness in those who believed in Messiah, and who identified themselves, as needs must, with his death. It was as though God had breathed again into man the breath of life. 'For if by the trespass of the one the many died, so much more did the grace of God, and the gift of grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, abound unto many . . . for as through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one man shall the many be made righteous.[23] Human nature was being renewed unto knowledge, not the old knowledge of good and evil, but 'knowledge after the image of him that created him.'[24]

Paul had gone a step further than his mentors, he had explained how evil had been finally eradicated from human nature. But it still persisted. There was the rub; Paul knew it only too well. Sin ought not any longer to have been possible for those 'in Christ,' but it was. His answer to this problem was that of the apocalyptists; all would come right in the end. It was in the next world that the new creation would be inaugurated by Messiah. This had already been done, for Jesus, its first fruits, had been raised from the dead. What had happened to him would happen to those who believed in him. Meanwhile, they were 'justified by faith,' later, they would 'be conformed to the image of his Son that he might be the first born among many brethren.'[25]

When we turn to the Synoptic Gospels we find ourselves in a less dramatic and saner climate. As in Paul, however, the legacy of apocalyptic is to be seen, though it follows a different line of thought from the one he followed. Demons there are in plenty, but there is no hint of a fall. The devil, where he appears, is essentially the tempter. There is no suggestion of evil inherent in human nature, or that, excepting in the case of disease, man is willy-nilly a prey to the designs of evil spirits. As in the Old Testament, the problem of evil as such is not considered. Free-

[22] *Rom.* viii, 3.
[23] *Rom.* v, 15.
[24] *Col.* iii, 10.
[25] *Rom.* viii, 29.

dom to do good or ill is assumed, as also is the tendency towards the latter rather than towards the former. Jesus dubs his generation as adulterous and sinful : the chief hindrances to the good life are those of the parable of the sower; preoccupation with other things, especially riches, apathy, lack of conviction, and general weakness of character. Jesus appeared to take an extremely optimistic view of human nature, teaching that absolute standards of perfection are attainable, especially through good works, though, may be, not in this life. 'If thou wouldst be perfect,' he says to the rich young man, 'go, sell that thou hast, and give to the poor.' His standard of perfection was that of childlike innocence and trust; the unforgiveable sins, arrogance and lack of sincerity.

So optimistic does Jesus' attitude towards sin appear, that it might almost seem light-hearted. But he knew well what sin was, and the travesty it could make of human nature : that it did that was his criticism of it. His understanding of human nature was profound. His relations with outcasts, with the fringe of human society, show a delicacy of feeling, and an unbounded sympathy which could only have come from one whose own experience had led him to analyze its every virtue, and its every vice, in the clear light of his own spiritual insight. His emphasis was not on sin, but on forgiveness. Difficult as the saying is, 'there shall be joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine righteous persons, which need no repentance,'[26] it nevertheless sums up Jesus' attitude towards the sinner. He was constantly saying that sort of thing. He seemed to delight in what looked like the essential unfairness of God. Justice is ignored in favour of generosity. It is the large-heartedness of God which Jesus constantly teaches, a large-heartedness which is only limited by our capacity to profit by it. Human nature itself was no obstacle to perfect communion with him.

Whatever interpretation we may like to give to the ransom passage, to the Matthean words of institution, to the echo of the Suffering Servant, and to the few sayings which suggest the necessity of Jesus' death, whether we treat them vicariously or not, that interpretation must be in the light of Jesus' teaching on sin. and on his own, and God's, attitude towards the sinner. There is no hint in these gospels that human nature as such needed changing, or that it had got into the hands of the devil, or of any other unauthorized person. Any vicarious or substitutionary interpretation of these passages, isolated as they are, and some of them of doubt-

[26] *Lk.* xv, 7.

ful authenticity, must surely first show some such view of human nature patent or latent in these gospels before it can claim acceptance. Jesus had no illusions about the prevalence of sin in human nature; neither had he any as to its capacity to repent. There is every indication that he thought that few would repent, for such was his understanding of man that he realized that only man's self-giving could make him a true child of God.

There are one or two passages, particularly in Matthew, which presuppose that Jesus taught a doctrine of election, but these also are isolated passages, and seem to conflict utterly with the whole spirit of his teaching as reflected in these gospels: 'every plant which my heavenly Father planted not shall be rooted up'[27]; 'many are called but few chosen.'[28] Any doctrine of election based on arbitrary choice is impossible to reconcile with any view of the moral governance of the universe, and destroys any significance which good or evil may have for human nature. Exclusiveness in general is foreign to the teaching of Jesus. A recently published essay on the Fatherhood of God[29] claims that this relationship of God to man applied and applies only to those who accepted Jesus as Messiah. It is easy, with the help of a concordance, a sharp pair of scissors, and no imagination to claim this sort of thing; can we assume, as apparently the writer does, that the multitudes to which the Sermon on the Mount was preached were converted? There is no evidence for that, yet Jesus is represented as speaking to them of 'your Father.' The test of fatherhood entails more than the examination of a title. The teaching of Jesus as given in the Synoptic Gospels is hard to reconcile with ecclesiastical dogma.

Whatever we may think of the origin of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel, it does make the main part of the book intelligible. Its author's main interest is clear: it is in the nature of Christ, but this is with a view to its impact on the nature of man. Like Paul, he views human nature in the light of a creation which has gone wrong. We are back at Genesis again. 'He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. He came unto his own, and his own received him not.'[30] It was a creation which the eternal Logos had come to put right. This he did by becoming flesh, and giving to man that authority which man had lacked in the first creation, but which Adam and Eve had taken upon themselves, the authority to become 'as gods.' 'But

[27] *Mt.* xv, 13.
[28] *Mt.* xxii, 14.
[29] *Studies in the Gospels*, ed. D. E. Nineham, 1955.
[30] *Jn.* i, 11.

as many as received him, to them gave he the authority to become children of God.'[31] This authority, this reversal of the Fall, was gained by the same means as that which had been taken by Adam; through knowledge, but it was God-given, not serpent-given knowledge: 'to them that believe in his name: which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.'[32]

It is clear that the mind of the author of both prologue, and of the main part of the book, if, for convenience, we may assume one author, is steeped in dualistic philosophy, and that his soteriology is gnostic in sympathy. He is therefore not interested in human nature as such, and little can be learned from the Fourth Gospel about it. There are only two types, the fleshly, and the spiritual; one is of this world, the other is not of this world. How creation went wrong he does not say, though there are hints of the machinations of the devil: how it was put right he is quite clear, following, as he does, the Pauline idea of a new creation, the renewing of man's nature. This was not a negative process, by killing sin in the flesh, but by the positive one of partaking of the heavenly food; 'except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, ye have no life in yourselves'[33]; partaking of a flesh which had been given for the life of the world.[34] He avoids Paul's problem of the time lag between the abolition of the old, and the coming of the new creation, by affirming that eternal life is here and now. This he substitutes for Paul's 'justification by faith,' though some such idea, 'believing into,' is part of his soteriology. 'He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not to judgment, but hath passed out of death into life.'[35] This kind of teaching is typical of all gnostic systems based on the presuppositions of dualism, the separation of light from darkness, spirit from flesh, the heavenly from the earthly. The process of separation was not by merit, but by election; 'no man can come to me, except the Father which sent me draw him'[36]; 'I manifested thy name unto the men thou gavest me out of the world: thine they were, and thou gavest them to me.'[37] It is not extraordinary that the author of the Fourth Gospel makes no mention of forgiveness, of repentance, of mercy;

[31] *Jn.* i, 12 *f.*
[32] *ibid* i, 12 *f.*
[33] *Jn.* vi, 53.
[34] *Jn.* vi, 51.
[35] *Jn.* v, 24.
[36] *Jn.* vi, 44.
[37] *Jn.* xvii, 6.

the words are not mentioned, for they were not in his scheme of things. There was no need for them when the issue was so clear cut, and the divine choice so arbitrary. Human nature was wholly bad or wholly good, men were of earth or of heaven, there were no intermediate types. Despite all this travestying of human nature, there is much in the Fourth Gospel which taps in human nature 'a well of life springing up into life eternal.'

There is little more we need say in summing up. Obviously there is no one Biblical understanding of man. The Bible's great value from that point of view is the diversity of types, and the variety of human experience which it reveals. It gives us a cross-section of all human society. Ben Sirach's summary is admirable: 'Let us now praise famous men, and our fathers that begat us. The Lord manifested in them great glory, even his mighty power from the beginning.'[38] Human nature is the vehicle of the divine purpose on earth, and worthy of its high calling. All Biblical writers did not, however, share Ben Sirach's optimism: perhaps they were more realist than he. Many felt that human nature was not capable of the demands made upon it, because it was no longer what God had intended it to be. Beginning with the apocalyptists, they expressed their ideas of how this had come about in dramatic, if crude, forms. Crude, however, as some of these forms may be, they were the expressions of deep religious experience, deep religious experience of the limitations of human nature, and of man's yearnings to be 'as God.' Both the content, and the expression of thought, travelled far from the primitive story of Genesis, to the mystical sayings of the Fourth Gospel, but the problems and the aspirations of each were the same.

[38] *Eccus.* xliv, 1.

THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN THE NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS

By The Revd. Dr. S. G. F. Brandon
(Professor of Comparative Religion in the University of Manchester)

I

IN the deepest recess of a cave in southern France a strange figure is painted upon the rocky wall. It is a figure partly animal and partly human—the creature has the skin and antlers of a stag, but its posture is that of a man apparently in the act of dancing.[1] Its general appearance has suggested to many scholars that it is a representation of a man, disguised as an animal, performing some magical dance, probably imitative of the animal concerned: consequently, the painting has become known as that of the 'Dancing Sorcerer.' There are certain features, however, about this curious picture which have caused other scholars to think that it has some even greater significance, and two distinguished French prehistorians have seen in it what might fairly be described as an embryonic deity.[2] If this surmise be sound, then we should have in this figure mankind's earliest conception of deity, because the painting is a product of Palaeolithic culture, dating from about 15,000 B.C. Personally I am of the opinion that to describe the figure as an 'embryonic deity' is perhaps to go too far in precise formulation for a product of the mind of Palaeolithic Man, and I think that it is safer and more helpful to see in the figure of this so-called 'Dancing Sorcerer' a pregnant expression of the experience and aspiration of these earliest representatives of our race yet known to us. Here surely we have a revelation of Man's dawning consciousness of his own position in the world of his experience. We know from the general testimony of his cave-art that Man in the Old Stone Age was intimately concerned with the animals of his environment: they were in the first place his chief source of food and he knew that his life depended vitally upon them, but he also admired and respected them for their strength and agility, for their fecundity and virility. There was

[1] The cave is known as that of the Trois Frères, in the département of Ariège. For a photograph and drawing of this figure, which is partly painted and partly engraved, see the Abbé Breuil, *Quatre Cents Siècles d'Art pariétal* (Montignac, 1952), p. 166, see also pp. 176-7.

[2] Breuil, *op. cit.*, p. 176; P. Wernert, 'Signification des cavernes d'art paléolithique,' in *Histoire Générale des Religions* (ed. M. Gorce et R. Mortier, Paris, 1948), t.i. pp. 95.

thus a curious ambivalence in his attitude towards them — he admired and respected them for those qualities which they had in greater abundance than he, yet he knew that, despite his comparative weakness, he, Man, was superior to these mighty beasts. And in the so-called picture of the 'Dancing Sorcerer' we surely have an expression of this attitude, for in this composition the unknown artist has sought to depict a figure which had the attributes of a powerful animal and yet was essentially a man.[3]

The revelation which this ancient painting affords us of Man's awakening consciousness of his own status in the world of nature is paralleled by the testimony of his burial customs. As a trait which marks off *homo sapiens* as different from the other animals is this significant fact that he alone carefully buries his dead. Time does not permit here of an anlysis of the various forms of Palaeolithic mortuary practice,[4] and it must suffice to say that the evidence points indubitably to the fundamental inability of these first men to accept the fact of death as the termination of the life of the individual—in some vague and illogical way they instinctively believed that the dead lived on and required the tendance of the living.

We see then from our brief examination of these two pieces of evidence that at the very dawn of human culture Man was already showing that for him that complete immersion in the moment of living, which is characteristic of other forms of life, was not sufficient nor possible. He was indeed 'self-conscious,' and already, within the measure of his mind, was concerned with his future, i.e. his destiny. The source of this 'self-consciousness' would seem to reside in Man's awareness of Time—of course, the human mind at this remote period would have been incapable of any appreciation of the temporal categories as such, but there is much evidence to show that men were then already much concerned with that flux of experience which produces of the concepts of Past, Present and Future and which generates within the human soul that craving for security from destructive change.[5]

[3] In their book *Les Hommes de la Pierre Ancienne* (Paris, 1951), H. Breuil and R. Lantier are inclined to regard such a figure as the 'Dancing Sorcerer' as representing 'la tradition plastique d'êtres mi-humains, mi-animaux, maitrês des animaux et aussi des hommes. Ces figures sont des représentations mythiques . . . Peut-être les a-t-on considérés comme des ancêtres (pp. 327-8).

[4] On this subject see generally Th. Mainage, *Les Religions de la Préhistoire: L'Age paléolithique* (Paris, 1921); P. Wernet, 'Le culte des crânes à l'époque paléolithique,' and 'Les hommes de l'age de pierre représentaient-ils les esprits des défunts et des ancêtres?' in *Histoire Générale des Religions*, t.i.

[5] Cf. S. G. F. Brandon, *Time and Mankind* (London, 1951), pp. 15-26.

II

The ancient cultures of Egypt and Mesopotamia give us our next most significant glimpses of Man's evaluation of his own nature and destiny.

In Egypt it would seem that the basic human quest for security, both in the physical and the spiritual spheres, produced respectively two different types of gods. For health, long life and prosperity the ancient Egyptian served a variety of local and state deities such as Horus, Re, Min—they assured him of victory over his enemies, a good harvest and abundant herds; and in art they are generally depicted holding the *ankh*, the sign of life, to the nostrils of their protégès, thus conferring upon them the boon of longevity.[6] But, though he sought earnestly for long life, the Egyptian knew that he had one day to die. For succour from the grisly possibilities of this awful experience he turned to a god who was strikingly different from those deities whom he served for the good things of this life. This god, by name Osiris, was not represented as a splendid powerful being, but as an embalmed corpse; for it was believed that this Osiris, who had lived long ago, had suffered at the hands of an evil enemy and had died, after which he had been raised to life again. And it was believed further that by magical assimilation to this dying-rising god a man might become one with him in his passion and death, so that in turn he should participate with him in his resurrected life.[7]

The ancient Egyptian, accordingly, was able by virtue of his faith to view life with a kind of practical optimism. He sought to extract the maximum pleasure from this present life, and he believed that there were powerful gods who could give him a good lot here; he did not yearn to die, but he was assured that through the saving grace of Osiris and the efficacy of the mortuary ritual he would survive death and enter upon a new life. This faith, however, was not devoid of ethical considerations and based only upon a trust in magic, because it was also held that after death a man would be judged before Osiris, his heart being weighed against a feather, the symbol of *maat*, the goddess of truth.[8]

[6] Cf. H. Bonnet, *Reallexikon der aegyptichen Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1952), pp. 218-225, 418-420; H. Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago, 1948), pp. 185, 197, 207-9.

[7] Cf. Bonnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 568-576, see also pp. 344-5, 347, 349 sq.; J. Vandier, *La Religion égyptienne* (Paris, 1949), pp. 44-53, 81-2, 93-100.

[8] Cf. *The Book of the Dead: Facsimile of the Papyrus of Ani*, 3 (Brit. Mus. 1894); Bonnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 334-341; A. H. Gardiner in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (ed. J. Hastings), V, pp. 476b-479.

This view of human destiny was complicated by a curious psychology. The Egyptian believed that human nature was compounded of several psychical constituents, which he called the *ka*, the *ba*, and the *akh*,[9] and which remind us of our own imprecise concepts of soul, spirit, personality, self and so on. But it is to be noted that in the Egyptian conception of individual being the material body had an essential part and that existence apart from the body could not be contemplated : hence the elaborate mortuary practice of ancient Egypt whereby it was sought to preserve the body from destruction by embalming and safeguarding in many coffins, hidden in rock-hewn tombs deep below ground.[10]

In striking contrast to the practical optimism of the ancient Egyptian evaluation of human destiny is the estimate of Man which flourished in the sister civilization of Mesopotamia. According to this view, which found classic expression in both the celebrated *Epic of Creation* and the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, the gods had created mankind to serve them, but in so doing, they had withheld immortality from their creatures. Hence, as the advice is given to the hero Gilgamesh, only a *carpe diem* attitude towards life is possible for Man :

> Gilgamesh, whither runnest thou?
> The life which thou seekest thou wilt not find ;
> (For) when the gods created mankind,
> They alloted death to mankind,
> (But) life they retained in their own keeping.
> Thou, O Gilgamesh, let thy belly be full ;
> Day and night be thou merry ;
> Make every day (a day of) rejoicing ;
> Day and night do thou dance and play.
> Let thy raiment be clean,
> Thy head be washed, (and) thyself bathed in water.
> Cherish the little one holding thy hand,
> (And) let thy wife rejoice in thy bosom.
> This is the lot of [mankind . . .].[11]

Unfortunately for their own peace of mind the ancient Mesopotamians were unable to conceive of death as the complete annihilation of the individual, which would seem to have been the logical

[9] Cf. Bonnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 357-362, 74-77, 4 ; J. Sainte Fare Garnot in *Anthropologie religieuse* (ed. C. J. Bleeker, Leiden, 1955), pp. 17-20.

[10] The Egyptians' concern for the body finds eloquent expression in the Middle Kingdom tale of Sinuhe, see A. Erman, *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians* (London, 1927), pp. 14-29. Cf. Sainte Fare Garnot, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-3.

[11] Translated by A. Heidel, *The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 70. Cf. T. Jacobsen in *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man* (ed. H. Frankfort, Chicago, 1946), pp. 208-212, *Before Philosophy* (Pelican Books), pp. 223-227.

conclusion of their anthropology. Instead they believed that death wrought an awful change in a human person, because thereupon he became an *edimmu*, a ghoulish being which could terribly afflict the living, especially if they lacked in their mortuary service to him.[12] It was the fate of the dead to descend into a place which is grimly called *kur-nu-gi-a*, i.e. 'the land of no-return,'[13] which is described as

> '. . . the house in which he who enters is bereft of li[ght]
> Where dust is their food (and) clay their sustenance;
> (Where) they see no light (and) dwell in darkness;
> (Where) they are clad like birds with garments of wings;
> (Where) over door (and) bolt dust has spread.[14]

And in this 'land of no-return' there is no difference between the condition of the good and the wicked, for a common fate enfolds all.

What were the factors which inspired so dismal a view of the human situation constitutes one of the abiding problems of Mesopotamian studies, especially when comparison is made with the kindred culture of Egypt.[15] Up to a point it may reasonably be claimed that the inhabitants of ancient Mesopotamia made a more realistic assessment of experience than did their contemporaries who lived in the Nile Valley. But why this should have been so is unknown, and it is to be noted that both peoples trusted in the efficacy of magic to solve the problems of life. So far as the Mesopotamian concept of deity reflected a common evaluation of the forces which conditioned human life, it appears that the gods were regarded as only having relevancy for the individual while he was alive in this world—they assigned to him his destiny year by year until the time came when no assignment was made and he had to die, for he no longer had a part in the divine ordering of things here.[16] It is consonant with the difference between the Mesopotamian and Egyptian eschatologies that in Mesopotamian religion there was no saviour-god equal to the Osiris of Egypt—the ancient vegetation deity Dumu-zi or Tammuz, who

[12] See the series of texts given by E. Ebeling, *Tod und Leben nach Vorstellungen des Babylonier* (Berlin u. Leipzig, 1931). Cf. S. Langdon and R. Campbell Thompson respectively in *Encyc. of Relig. and Ethics*, IV, pp. 444-6, 568-570.

[13] Cf. Ed. Dhorme, *Les Religions de Babylonie et d'Assyrie* (Paris, 1945), pp. 38-9.

[14] From the myth of *The Descent of Ishtar into the Underworld*, translated by A. Heidel, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

[15] Cf. F. M. Th. de Liagre Böhl in *Anthropologie religieuse*, pp. 44-7.

[16] Cf. M. David, *Les Dieux et le Destin en Babylonie* (Paris, 1949), pp. 23, 26, 39-40, 45.

personified the annual death and revival of Nature, never became the centre of a powerful mortuary cult and his name seems generally to have been invoked in substitution rituals to secure deliverance from the ills of this life.[17]

III

It will be well now to turn our attention to the most significant estimate of Man and his destiny among the Indo-European peoples of the western part of the ancient world.

In the Homeric poems there first finds expression a view of life which, whatever be the artificiality of its origin, certainly became an abiding tradition of Greek thought. This view is essentially a pessimistic one : according to it the lot of the individual in this life was divinely predestinated for good or ill; but, whatever its quality, this life was the only span of existence which the individual could expect, because at death his *psyche* alone survived, and, descending into Hades, became an *eidōlon*, an insubstantial shadow of his former self, and was bereft of consciousness.[18]

This dismal view of human destiny would seem to have been based upon a realistic appraisal of man's life as it was apprehended by a primitive mind. It is significant that no attempt was made to explain Man's lot *vis-à-vis* the gods,[19] and in this fact we surely see that the Homeric gods are primarily personifications of the diverse manifestations of power which Man met with in the world of his experience—in other words, these deities represented existential entities and not the projections of human hopes and fears, so that the question of divine justice in relation to Man's lot no more arose than does the question of the moral aspect of electricity with us.

This pessimistic evaluation of Homer can be traced on through Hellenic culture in the works of Hesiod,[20] the great

[17] See the texts given by Ebeling, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-56, 65-9.

[18] Cf. E. Rohde, *Psyche* (Tübingen, 1921), II, p. 141, n.2; R. B. Onions, *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge 1951), pp. 59, 94-5.

[19] *Iliad*, xxiv, 525-6, contains a complaint against the gods for spinning 'the thread for wretched mortals, that they live in pain,' but no attempt is made to explain the reason for this divine action. It is significant that in the famous passage about the πίθοι which immediately follows (xxiv, 527-533) no comment is made upon the arbitrary act of Zeus in assigning different lots to men who are not distinguished from each other in any way and so conceivably meriting the particular fortune which they individually receive.

[20] *Works and Days*, 42-83, 106-201.

Athenian dramatists, and Herodotus;[21] it finds pathetic expression in funerary epitaphs;[22] in the philosophies of Epicurus and the Stoics it was set forth in terms of what then appeared the best scientific thought of the day.

There was, however, another line of interpretation in Greek thought which was at least as ancient and as long-lived, although it may not have been Indo-European in origin. At Eleusis there were celebrated mystery-rites, probably deriving from Aegean religion, which offered to those initiated into them the assurance of immortality after death and a happy lot in the next world.[23] Here we have to do with a form of primitive thought and action, akin to that which we have already met in the Osirian mortuary ritual of ancient Egypt, whereby it was believed that salvation could be attained by the practice of a specific magic, which was essentially associated with the *mythos* of some god or divine hero. What part of the psycho-physical organism of the individual person was regarded as essential and in what form it survived death, according to this Eleusinian faith, is not known. But later in Pythagorean and Orphic doctrine, both of which probably derived from foreign sources, the idea of the soul as an entity independent of the body and by nature spiritual and immortal, became established. This dichotomy of the individual into body and soul finds eloquent expression in the famous saying: *sōma-sēma* ('the body a tomb'), it is the premiss of the doctrine of metampsychosis or the transmigration of the soul, and it was fundamental to the philosophy of Plato.[24]

What may be described as the Orpheo-Platonic anthropology was destined to exercise a profound influence upon the thought of Graeco-Roman society, and through that in turn upon Christianity and the *Weltanschauung* of the Western World. In terms of this doctrine, however various were its specific forms, the destiny of the individual man was regarded as infinitely transcending his span of existence in his physical body here on earth. Moreover, the ills of his present condition were explained as due to some misfortune which had happened prior to his incarnation,

[21] e.g. i, 30-34.

[22] Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, II, pp. 379-380; J. W. Mackail, *Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology* (London, 1925), p. 161 (xxxiii), see also sections xi and xii.

[23] Cf. N. Turchi, *Fontes Historiae Mysteriorum Aevi Hellenistci* (Roma, 1923), pp. 79-30; V. Magnien, *Les Mystères d'Éleusis* (Paris, 1950), pp. 114 sq.

[24] *Cratylus*, 400B, in Turchi, op. cit., pp. 31-2. Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, II, pp. 134-6; *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, p. 921 ('Transmigration'); A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (Paris, 1953), III, pp. 27-32.

and, grave though the current situation was, hope was held out that salvation could be achieved and the immortal soul, redeemed and purified, be restored to its proper state of glory.

Before turning to examine the Hebrew view of Man, we must briefly notice that which came to prevail in ancient Iran and which is usually associated with Zoroastrianism, because the Iranian concept, besides being significant in itself, exercised a considerable influence upon Hebrew thought.

The *Gathas*, in which Zarathustra's teaching is preserved, because of the difficulty of the language employed, still remain the most obscure of documents to interpret. However, there seems to be general agreement among the authorities concerned that Zarathustra taught that the whole cosmos is the battleground on which the forces of Good and Evil struggle together and that in that agelong conflict mankind is involved.[25] The destiny of the individual is, accordingly, conditioned by the part which he chooses to play in this conflict: hence judgement and retribution will follow this life so far as the individual is concerned. The outlook of this faith is optimistic, because not only are there powerful good beings to succour the righteous, but the ultimate victory of the Good is assured. So far as it is possible to follow the development of Iranian thought, it would seem that the original *Weltanschauung* envisaged the power which is effective in the universe as an equipoise of the forces of creation and destruction, and was embodied either in one god or in two eternal spirits.[26] Such a view was undoubtedly a simple deduction from the facts of human experience and the resultant dualism was accepted without any consciousness of a moral issue being involved therein. It was the genius of Zarathustra, as it would appear, which perceived the moral inadequacy of this dualism and solved it by proclaiming that it was the duty of man to align himself with the positive principle, the creative force, which he identified with Ahura Mazdah, 'the Wise Lord.'

IV

The unravelling of the factors which variously operated in the gradual evolution of the Hebrew idea of Man is a long and complicated task, so that only the salient features of the process can

[25] Cf. J. Duchesne-Guillemin, *Zoroastre: Étude critique avec une traduction commentée des Gâthâ* (Paris, 1948), pp. 151-3; G. B. Gray in *Cambridge Ancient Hist.*, IV, p. 208; Ed. Mayer, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* (Berlin u. Stuttgart, 1925), II, pp. 59-60; E. Herzfeld, *Zoroaster and his World* (Princeton, 1947), I, p. 318, II, p. 412.

[26] Cf. G. Widengren, *Hochgottglaube im alten Iran* (Lund, 1938), pp. 383-393; L. C. Castarteili in *Encycl. Relig. and Ethics*, V, p. 111a; R. C. Zaehner, *Zurvan: a Zoroastrian Dilemma* (Oxford, 1953), pp. 54-79.

be sketched here. Its theme runs together with that of the gradual adjustment of the primitive Yahwism to the prophetic doctrine of a God of justice and mercy, as well as of omnipotence. In short, Yahwism was by origin and nature an ethnic faith, of which the two poles of concern were Yahweh, the god, and Israel, the nation. Within this nexus the individual only had significance in so far as he was a member of the nation; of his destiny as an individual nothing was said, beyond that at death he passed down into Sheol, which was the Hebrew equivalent of the Mesopotamian 'land of no-return,' and where he would be outside the sphere of Yahweh's concern. The most that he could look for, therefore, was that he would be blessed for his piety by material prosperity in this life and that after his death his name would live on in Israel through his posterity. The inadequacy of such a fate became increasingly apparent as the prophets proclaimed Yahweh as the God of Justice, and the tension between the two concepts is to be seen in its various facets in the books of *Jeremiah*, *Ezekiel* and *Job*.[27] A solution of the problem was long in coming, indeed it had not been wholly completed by New Testament times as the famous passage of *Mark* xii 18-27 shows. This solution took the form of a belief that finally, when the 'Day of Yahweh' came, the dead would be raised to life again and judged according to their works and so consigned either to eternal bliss or eternal damnation. The mode of this resurrection is of fundamental significance for our understanding the Hebrew concept of Man. The dead would be raised to life with their physical bodies, since to the Hebrew mind Man was a psycho-physical organism and could not be imagined as existing apart from his physical body.[28] It must be noted too that, since Hebrew religion remained essentially an ethnic faith, the Hebrew view of human destiny was basically related to the peculiar destiny of Israel, and so in that sense it never really contemplated the individual except in so far as he was an Israelite.

According to its terms of reference this paper should only be concerned with ideas of Man and his destiny in non-Christian religions; however, having pursued the theme through those cultures which in the ancient Near East preceded the emergence of Christianity and so provided a cultural heritage for the new faith, it may be useful briefly to comment upon the primitive Christian view in this context.

[27] Cf. Brandon, *Time and Mankind*, pp. 61-120; R. H. Pfeiffer, *Intro. to the Old Test.* (London, 1952), pp. 692-707.

[28] On the subject of Hebrew psychology see A. R. Johnson, *The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel* (Univ. of Wales, 1949).

As a result of the obliteration of the original Jewish interpretation of the faith in the overthrow of Israel in A.D. 70, Christianity emerged in the last decades of the first century as a soteriology in which were fused together concepts of diverse origin.[29] The individual man was regarded as the incarnation of an immortal soul, which was in a dire condition owing to inherited guilt and the burden of its own actual sins. As such it was an object of the wrath of God and also subject to the domination of Satan, the consequences of which meant eternal perdition, which was conceived of in various forms. From this awful doom salvation had been provided by means of the vicarious sacrifice of Jesus Christ. The exact *modus operandi* of this process of salvation is not clear, but the rite of baptism was a basic factor therein, and, as formulated by Paul (*Rom.* vi 3-11) the rite consisted of a ritual assimilation of the neophyte with the Saviour in his death and resurrection. This Christian soteriology was distinguished by its relation of the destiny of the individual to the cosmic purpose of God, because the ultimate act of the drama of salvation comprised the Second Coming of Christ, the end of the present cosmic series, and the General Judgement. Accordingly, the Christian doctrine of Man, despite its theory of original sin, may be reckoned as optimistic, since it held open to the individual the possibility of achieving a state of eternal felicity; it was, moreover, fundamentally teleological, since it regarded the time-process as the field in which the purpose of God was gradually unfolded and accomplished and in which each human being had his or her part.[30]

V

Time does not permit of even the briefest comment on the doctrine of Man in Islam and the culture of China : it must suffice to say that in the former the status of Man is completely conditioned by the concept of Allah as an arbitrary potentate with absolute power, while in China human destiny has been regarded as essentially linked with the rhythm of Nature's life. To complete the balance of our survey some comment must be made on the idea of Man and his destiny which has prevailed in India, because that idea represents an interpretation fundamentally different from that which became current in the West as the result of Christian influence.

[29] Cf. Brandon, *The Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church* (London, 1951), chap. X ; *Time and Mankind*, pp. 165-6.

[30] Cf. *Time and Mankind*, pp. 170-2, 182-3.

So far as it can be estimated from the extant documents there arose in Indian society somewhere in the period 800-600 B.C. the view that consciousness of individuality was a basic illusion from which came all the ills of life. The view found expression in the twin doctrines of *karma* and *samsara*, according to which the craving for individual existence led to an endless cycle of births and deaths, with all its consequent suffering, the entail of one life for good or ill being carried over to the next.[31] The fundamental cause from which the whole of this dreary process arose was the error committed by all of mistaking the phenomenal world for reality, whereas it was *maya* (illusion). And the way of salvation lay in recognizing this error and realizing that the individual self had no substantial existence but was one with the Cosmic Atman or the Soul of the Universe.[32]

This original Upanishadic interpretation of human nature and destiny has inspired the various Hindu systems which have been worked out to achieve the salvation which the doctrine envisages. Buddhism, although it separated from the body of Hinduism proper, was founded upon an approximate estimate of the human situation and sought a solution in similar terms.

It is easy to criticize this Indian estimate of Man on both scientific and moral grounds, and this has often been done by Western scholars. Our purpose, however, is not to assess the truth of these various concepts of human nature and destiny by some criterion of our own devising, but to evaluate them as significant attempts which men of other ages and cultures have made in order to understand the complex of life's experience as a whole. In this light then the Indian estimate of Man serves to remind us in the West that it is possible for intelligent people, living under different climatic conditions and inheriting a culture native to such a climatic environment, to reach an equation of human life which differs radically from our own. We in the West, brought up as we are to think in terms of the Christian doctrine of Man, instinctively regard personality as the highest form of life and think of the achievement of human destiny as something which must conserve the integrity of the individual as such. But that such an evaluation must of necessity follow from experience is seen to be contradicted by those who lived their lives and meditated upon their experiences in the plains of northern India, for to them conscious-

[31] Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upanisads* (London, 1953), pp. 113-117; M. Anesaki and R. Garbe in *Encyl. Rel. and Ethics*, XII, pp. 429a–430b, 434a–435b.

[32] *Cf.* Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-131, also 78-79.

ness of individuality and the desire to preserve it appeared as the source of the suffering which besets human life.

VI

At the conclusion of such a survey the question inevitably poses itself—what does all this mean? . . . from these many and various and often contradictory ideas which men have held about their common nature and destiny can anything be inferred as to the significance of human experience? It is tempting to reply quickly, and there is much justification for such a reply, that it all adds up to ' a tale, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.' But there is an alternative to this cynical verdict, which would seem to be a truer evaluation of the matter. As we survey Man's attempt from Palaeolithic times to understand his place in the scheme of things, it becomes increasingly apparent that there is that in the constitution of the human mind which prevents its owner from living a life of bovine content and which causes him ever to be seeking for some kind of security. We have already briefly noted what this factor is, namely, Man's sense of Time, or to be more explicit, his consciousness of the inevitability of change. Through this sense Man becomes painfully aware of his own insecurity in all manner of ways, but above all by his anticipation of his own mortality. Thus among all other living creatures Man is unique by his possession of a faculty which robs him of the anodyne of immersion in present experience and renders him ever anxious of the future. The consequences of this faculty may be regarded by the secularist as the inevitable price which Man has had to pay for his superiority over other forms of life, but they may with equal reason be viewed by the religiously-minded as evidence of Augustine's insight when he exclaims : ' Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee.' [33]

[33] *Confessions*, i, 1.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN IN THE EARLY CHURCH: AN HISTORICAL APPROACH

By W. H. C. Frend, D.Phil., F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S.

IT has been said with some justice that there is no more fundamental debate in the world to-day than that about the nature of man.* A mere ten thousand years have passed, a speck in the scale of time, since man took the first halting steps towards controlling nature. At this epoch, existence in settled communities, cultivating edible plants and pasturing animals gradually began to replace hunting as his main means of livelihood. But with that step man was on his way to life in cities and in nations. To-day, he has acquired the means of destroying life itself and he is reaching out his ambitions beyond the planet on which he lives. Meantime, the different theories of the nature and destiny of man are of immediate importance to the inhabitants of the world. Over nearly half the globe the ruling political philosophy subjects the individual to the needs, not of a particular community, but of a Plan designed to operate far beyond the lives of the men and women who may be executing it. The Plan may demand, for instance, the construction of the Stalin Canal to link the river on which Moscow stands to the Rybinsk sea. It is completed, but at the cost of a quarter of a million lives. The fulfilment of the objective was all-important, and man was merely the implement and, as these figures show, an expendable implement. Man is despised, regarded as having neither individuality, sacredness or worth. He lives, works and dies the servant of a material aim.

On the other hand, we in the West are handicapped in our efforts to counter this materialist view of man by our own intellectual uncertainties. In practice, we too sometimes subject human life to the needs of an abstract objective on an enormous scale. Passchendaele and Hiroshima are lasting reminders. More serious, however, is the inability which many of us feel of accepting whole-heartedly the assertions of traditional Christian theology, without knowing how precisely to modify or replace them. 'Thou madest man a little lower than the angels. Thou hast crowned him with honour and glory . . . Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet' (*Psalm* 8). Is that really true? What precisely, even in the language of symbolism, are the angels with whom man is contrasted, and is it sense to suggest that the rapidly expanding universe is placed under the domination of a species

* David Cairns, *The Image of God in Man* (S.C.M. Press, 1953), p. 9.

on an outer planet near the edge of the Milky Way? We are not wholly convinced by re-statements of the traditional position,[1] and it is hard not to sympathize with Sir Llewelwyn Woodward when he speaks of his gradual alienation from the Christian faith. He writes sadly how 'the sea has come in between me and this known and well-explored country of personal religion, cutting me off from intercourse with long-familiar things . . . The interlocked structure of history and logic on which Christian doctrine is based and the visible Church founded can no longer satisfy the mind. The tide is now at full flood. No apologetics, no "modernism", no "jettisoning of non-essentials" can turn this cosmic event. There is no remedy.'[2] These then are the challenges, materialism or drift, resignation and fatalism. Let me say at once that the remedy does not lie in papering over inner scepticism by an ostentatious submission to orthodoxy. On the other hand, only if we must accept the traditional teachings of the Fathers, as a sort of 'law of the Medes and Persians' valid for all time, need we resign ourselves to the gloom of the eminent historian I have quoted. If, however, we place the doctrine of Man as taught by the Fathers in its historical perspective, and see why people in the later Roman Empire thought as they did, we shall be in a better position to understand the strength and weakness of the traditional doctrines. Dogma can only be understood and evaluated within the framework of history. By so doing we shall be taking the first step towards establishing a doctrine of Man which will satisfy the mind and spirit of man to-day.

Under the challenge of Gnostic dualism, the view of man upheld by the Greek-speaking Church in the first three centuries A.D. was optimistic. The Gnostics,[3] as is well known, were teaching the divorce of God from creation, of the spiritual from the fleshly, of the saved from the rest of humanity. Creation they ascribed either to some contrary power, or to a primal catastrophe (a Fall outside Time) which destroyed the previous harmony of the heavens. The visible world, including man, was the result of this catastrophe, and the great majority of mankind were under the power of demons who dwelt in the planets and lorded over the world. Among a few fortunate ones, however, a spark of Divinity survived, and it was for their sake that a Divine Saviour was sent

[1] Such as E. L. Mascall, *Man: His Origin and Destiny* (Dacre Pres, 1940), and Gerald Vann, O.P., *The Heart of Man* (Geoffrey Bles, 1944).

[2] E. L. Woodward, *Short Journey* (Faber & Faber, 1942), pp. 217-19.

[3] This summary is based on L. Duchesne, *The Early History of the Church* (E.T. i, ch. xi) and F. L. Cross (ed.), *The Jung Codex* (Mowbrays, 1955).

by God with a message of salvation. Through divine illumination these predestined few would be brought to remember their true selves, and so, armed with divine Gnosis, would be able to make their way through the spheres that circled the earth back to the kingdom of light. These 'Spiritual Beings' could not sin and, conversely, no amount of good works would aid any who were not predestined to salvation. There was no hope for the world, and the hall-mark of sin was the act of propagating the human species.

It was against this dualistic view of the universe and determinist view of man that Irenaeus, Clement and Origen fought. It may be said at once that it is no accident that in the fifth century the Pelagians received far more support in the East than in the West, for in a less crass form their conflict with the African Church had many points of resemblance with that which the Greek Fathers had waged against Gnosticism. The answer which the latter gave to the Gnostics was that man was made in the image of God (*Gen.* i, 27), and as such possessed an immortal soul and the means of willing its salvation. The Fall may have darkened that image, but it had not extinguished it altogether. Gradually, through the teaching of the Patriarchs and Prophets, and through the truths established by the Greek philosophers, mankind had reached a stage in which God in his love for man was once more able to take the supreme step of reconciliation. Human history was seen as a vast *praeparatio evangelica* centred on the Incarnation, leading back to the Creation and forward through the work of the Church to the final stage when God and man would be fully reconciled. Then, God would be all in all. The Incarnation took place in order that man might resume his natural place in the divine order. As both Irenaeus[4] and Athanasius stressed,[5] God sent His Son into the world in order that man might through the Church become divine. God became visible that man might share His immortality. Perhaps even at some point the human soul might become so pure through its striving towards union with Christ that it could not sin.

This scheme of human salvation demanded the acceptance of the reality of Christ's manhood, and of the validity of both the Old and New Testaments. It also preserved to man his free-will, either to accept or reject the divine message. It was up to the individual to take the first essential step towards conversion to Christianity, namely, the rejection alike of parental custom and

[4] Irenaeus, *Adv. Haereses* iii, 19, 1; iv, 20, 2 and iv, 33, 4.

[5] Athanasius, *De Incarnatione*, 44.
See also C. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, Oxford, 1913, Lecture viii.

the worship of demons, and to submit himself to baptism. Conversion, as Clement of Alexandria stresses, is open to all. It was madness to remain in ignorance when truth was within reach.[6]

This view of man based on his sacred character, his dignity and his freedom is part of the permanent heritage of the Greek Fathers. Nowhere is it more clearly seen than in the life and work of Origen. It is an extraordinary piece of good fortune that the newly-published papyrus containing Origen's *Discourse with Heraclides*[7] should include his own idea of man, apparently taken down by shorthand writers as he spoke. Origen had just been disabusing Heraclides and a number of assembled bishops of the perils of Monarchianism and had stressed the necessity for orthodox belief in the humanity of our Lord. A bishop named Dionysios gets up and asks Origen, 'Does the soul have blood?' Origen perceives that what was really worrying his hearers was the fear that after death the soul stayed in the tomb with the body, an idea based on a false interpretation of Leviticus xvii. 'The soul of all flesh is the blood.' He proceeds to give them his own view of man, defining how it was to be understood that man was made in the image of God.[8]

In each individual there were two 'men', typified by the Pauline 'old' and 'new' men. Each part of the exterior human body had its counterpart in the soul. 'The exterior man has eyes; the interior man is said to have eyes also.' For it is written, 'Lighten thou my eyes, which I shall never close in death.' By observing God's precepts we require a more acute vision in the eyes of the mind as well as the body. This much could be attained by man, but through Christ alone (Origen does not use the word for Grace) would spiritual truths become frankly apparent.[9] Thus, the blood of the soul is merely a type for 'the vital virtues' that sustain it. Constant effort was demanded of the Christian. 'God,' Origen told his colleagues, 'does not *give* us immortal life. He places it before us. It is for us to hold out our hands and in practising the good in our actions to take hold of life and to place it in our soul.'[10] Life on earth was but the shadow of the glorious life with Christ to come, but even so, God comes to meet man. The resurrection of Jesus Christ was the type of the resurrection of all humanity.

[6] Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* (ed. Butterworth), ch. 10.

[7] Ed. J. Scherer, Cairo, 1949 (Publications de la Société Fouad I de Papyrologie, Textes et Documents, ix) under the title, *Entretien d'Origène avec Héraclide et les Évêques ses collègues, sur le Père, le Fils, et l'Ame.*

[8] Origen, *op. cit.* x (Scherer, 144).

[9] *Ibid.* xvi-xvii (Scherer, 154 f.).

[10] Origen, *op. cit.* xxvii (Scherer, 172).

We do not know the effect of these statements on his audience. We do know, however, that this balance between human free-will and divine grace leading the soul to eternal rest with Christ was an inspiration and a fighting creed to Origen himself. Here in this text we see the real man behind the theologian. 'Thus,' he says, 'I want to die for the truth. Thus, that which is called death, I despise. So let beasts, crosses, flames, tortures, let them all come, for I know that immediately on my death I leave my body. I rest with Christ. For that let us struggle and fight.'[11] Behind Origen's allegorizations lay a profound belief in man, and the confidence that man guided by the Holy Spirit could understand spiritual truths, above all, the spiritual truths contained in the words of the Hebrew Prophets. Earth and human life might be a pale reflection of spiritual reality, but they were a reflection and not its negation. Here, man was in a process of education. That was the purpose of the world, and when it was completed man would once more be wholly with God.

For a century after his death in 253 Origen's ideas were the ideas of the Church in the East. As is well known, both sides in the Arian controversy were to a greater or lesser degree his disciples. Meantime, however, in the West, and in particular in Roman North Africa, a different theology had been developing, and one that included a harsher and less hopeful view of the nature of man. In the East the main formative influence in Christian theology had been Hellenistic Judaism. There, the Church's interpretation of Scripture, its Apologetics, its liturgy and its organization were all a faithful continuation of the ideas of the Israel of the Dispersion. However, in Africa, the Jewish Dispersion had gained little foothold beyond Carthage and the coastal towns. It is still an open question whether Christianity first penetrated Africa via these Jewish settlements from Alexandria, or through the large African colony in Rome. The dominant religion, however, was Semitic. There seems now to be no doubt that the Punic religion of Baal-Hammon and Tanit, which in the Roman period became thinly disguised as the cult of Saturn and Caelestis, was in essentials the religion which the first Phoenician colonizers had brought with them to Carthage in the ninth century B.C.[12] In contrast, however, to the Semitic religions of Palestine and Syria the Carthaginian cult had retained most of its primitive and ruthless features. The keynote had remained the blood sacrifice, but it was not until the second century A.D. that the lamb finally re-

[11] *Ibid.* xxiv (Scherer, 166).

[12] See Gilbert Charles-Picard, *Les Religions de l'Afrique antique*, Paris, 1954, chap 1.

placed the human victim, and even then the formula, 'vita pro vita, sanguine pro sanguine', found on third-century inscriptions leaves no doubt that the lamb was a ransom for the human blood which the god had demanded.[13] In the robing of the Christian martyrs Perpetua, Felicitas and Saturus in the priestly garments of Ceres and Saturn for their deaths in the amphitheatre at Carthage in March 203, there may be an example of a recrudescence of human sacrifice even at this period.[14] The martyrs were playing the parts of priests who were themselves sacrificed according to primitive Semitic custom. There was, too, a strong element of dualism in Phoenician religion which seems also to have been present at Carthage, the idea that the world resulted from the union of two eternal principles, namely, Chaos and Spirit, manifested in light and darkness.[15]

The religion of Saturn and Caelestis dominated North Africa in the second and third centuries A.D. In remote Numidian villages, as well as in Carthage, the god's dreaded commands were heard in dreams and the blood sacrifice of Molk (Moloch) was carried out.[16] The effect on the minds of the inhabitants was one of fear and fatalism. They felt themselves to be the abject slaves of an all-powerful and often vengeful deity, and this subconscious dread persisted, as Augustine points out, as late as the fifth century.[17] The common African names of Donatus, Rogatus, Fortunatus, Honoratus, Servus Dei, etc., are all translations of Carthaginian names, such as Hannibal, Hasdrubal, Iatanbaal, implying complete dependence on the divine will.[18] With this attitude towards life was associated a profound belief in astrology and in forces of positive evil such as the evil eye. African graves, both pagan and Christian, often include the exact hour of death as well as the day, month and year. Life had been ended when the demons decreed it should.[19] All this contributed to the prevalence of a sombre view of man's existence, unrelieved by classical humanistic influences.

This pagan background has been mentioned because Christianity in North Africa was merely one incident in the religious history of the country. In many ways its impact was that of a

[13] For these inscriptions, see J. Carcopino, *Les Aspectes mystiques de la Rome païenne*, Paris, 1942, 39-48.

[14] *Passio Perpetuae* (ed. Knopf), 18.

[15] *Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica* (*Pat. Grae.* xxi, 76 A) i, 10.

[16] J. Carcopino, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[17] Augustine, *De Consensu Evangelistarum* i, 23, 36 (*Pat. Lat.* xxxiv, 1058).

[18] W. H. C. Frend, *The Donatis Church*, Oxford, 1952, 79.

[19] J. Carcopino, *op. cit.*, 224.

transformed popular religion rather than a new religion. The basic beliefs of the North Africans remained unchanged from Saturn worship through the five hundred years of Christianity to Islam. It is therefore not surprising to find that the questions which interested African Christians differed from those that interested Christians who had absorbed the Hellenistic-Jewish background of Asia Minor, Antioch or Alexandria. The Logos and the relationship between the human and divine within the Son-Logos were not questions which caused much stir in Africa. On the other hand, the fearful influence on humanity of the one supreme deity was never far removed. Africans were interested in the question of the relationship of God to Man, and this question involved finding solutions to the problems of Evil and Original Sin, of Grace and Pre-destination. Each division among the African Christians, whether Donatist, Catholic or Gnostic-Manichaean, had their own answers to these problems. It is well to bear this in mind, for the theology of St. Augustine, which has had so vast an effect on Western Christian thought, is the product of the African religious tradition.

The extent to which the Eastern and African approaches to Christianity were diverging, even at the beginning of the third century, is clear from the respective views of Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian regarding the attitude to be adopted towards pagan thought and society. To Clement, philosophy was a schoolmaster to bring the Greek mind to Christ, as the Law brought the Hebrews (*Stromateis* i, 28). It was one of the achievements of the human spirit, assisted by the divine Logos, appropriate to a particular stage in man's development. To Tertullian it was nothing of the sort. The philosophers were ' the patriarchs of the (Gnostic) heretics ',[19A] and he goes on to demand, in a well-known passage— ' What is there in common between Athens and Jerusalem? What between the Academy and the Church? Away with all projects for a Stoic, Platonic or " dialectic " Christianity ' (*De Praescriptione* vii). Thus, African Christianity, like African paganism, starts with the rejection of humanistic values. Where the Greek sees a gradual education of humanity from the Fall to the Incarnation, the African sees a rigid separation between the Christian and the rest of humanity, and Tertullian was in no doubt that the rest of humanity was doomed to eternal punishment.[20] Moreover, the Church itself was even more exclusive than the number of baptized members. In his final surviving work, the *De Pudicitia*,

[19A] Tertullian, De Anima, 3, *C.S.E.L.* xx, 302.
[20] Tertullian, *De Spectaculis*, 30.

written against Pope Callistus between 218 and 222, Tertullian would restrict the true Church to 'spiritual persons',[21] the elect who would attain to Paradise, and in practice, as he shows elsewhere, he believed that only martyrs were to be found there (*De Anima* ix). Associated with this narrow view of human salvation went a strong belief in divine retributive justice. His criticism of Marcion was that the heretic's God was too loving.[22] God required appeasement, including the supreme blood sacrifice of the martyr's death.[23] Baal-Hammon had asked no more. The reason was the universal sin of mankind. All humanity was involved in Adam's fall.[24] Soul and body had been inseparably joined in Adam, and the souls of each individual reached back to their origin in the First Man.[25] *Tradu peccati, tradu animae.* The human race was a brotherhood of souls, of which, however, only a small part was destined to be saved. Tertullian's own career, passing through orthodox Catholicism, to Montanism, and then to the tiny sect of his own shows how narrowly he conceived the circle of the Elect. Already in his theology we encounter the idea of Original Sin, of Traducianism in its most material form, of the contagion of evil, and of predestination to Grace which were to be developed by Augustine. African theology was already casting its shadows forward to the Augustinian doctrine of Man.

In the century and a half which separates Tertullian from Augustine, these ideas were to have practical application in the life of the African Church. They lie at the root of the African case in the controversy over Rebaptism between Cyprian and Pope Stephen in 256, and they are one of the chief theological causes of Donatism fifty years later. In Cyprian's time, the immense importance attributed to baptism was due to belief in Original Sin[26] and to the view held by the African clergy that the Holy Spirit dwelling in the baptizer was passed on to the baptized. If the celebrant was a heretic or in deadly sin, he could not possess the Spirit, and what he transmitted was not grace but guilt.[27] Evil was contagious, and the evil of an apostate bishop could infect his congregation, just as the sin of Adam stained all humanity.

[21] Tertullian, *De Pudicitia*, 18.
[22] Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem* i, 27.
[23] Tertullian, *Scorpiace* vi.
[24] Tertullian, *De Anima* xl; *De Carne Christi* xvi
See R. E. Roberts, *The Theology of Tertullian* (Epworth Press, 1924), ch. viii.
[25] Tertullian, *De Anima*, 9.
[26] Cyprian (ed. Hartel), *Ep.* lx (defence of Infant Baptism).
[27] Cyprian, *Ep.* lxv, 2 and lxvii, 3

Two generations later, Donatus and his colleagues broke with their opponents on precisely this issue. The sin of Felix of Apthungi's apostasy was passed on to Caecilian at his consecration as bishop, and from him to all those who remained in communion with him. It is no accident that at the conference of Carthage in 411 the Donatists asked for a ruling whether Adam's sin had infected the human race.[28] They wanted to point the analogy of Caecilian's fall. It was a dangerous question, and the Catholics saw to it that it was left unanswered. The Donatist view of sin was linked in a coherent system to their doctrine of the Church. Their Church was a 'sealed fountain' or 'choral garden' of *Canticles* to which only the 'pure and righteous' were admitted. The vast proportions of the baptisteries found in Donatist churches testify to the importance they placed on this rite which cleansed the convert from sin, and admitted him among the Elect. It was the baptizer 'giving in sanctity' that availed for the salvation of the baptized.[29] They were the Elect, safe in the Ark of the Church while the heathen and heretics perished in the flood.[30] The Donatist leaders, to use the words of their martyrologists, were 'preelect and predestined to salvation'.[31] More than one of their bishops felt himself to be the object of irresistible divine grace.

Thus, Augustine appears on the scene as the heir of a long line of African religious tradition. Already the main features of Augustinianism, the doctrine of Original Sin and the Fall, the narrow view of Redemption, the idea of Predestination, the physical nature of universal human corruption, and the all-pervading necessity of Grace through baptism, had been implied in the theology of Tertullian, Cyprian and the Donatists. Augustinianism is the logical next step. What makes Augustine difficult to interpret is that his doctrine of man is not linked to his doctrine of the Church, for he had come to his conclusions by way of ideas to which the Donatist majority was completely opposed, namely, Manichaeism and Neo-Platonism. He himself rejected the Donatist case as historically unsound and too provincially minded, yet his own final views of man and the Church were just as exclusive.

Augustine spent ten formative years of his life between the age of nineteen and twenty-nine as a Manichee. As a young man the

[28] *Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis* (Migne, Pat. Lat. xi) iii, 313.

[29] Petilian of Constantine, cited by Augustine, *Contra Litteras Petiliani* ii, 3, 6 and iii, 8, 9 (Migne, *Pat. Lat.* 259 and 333).

[30] The Ark is a favourite subject in Donatist art. See the present writer's 'The Revival of Berber Art', *Antiquity*, 1942, 344, pl. i.

[31] *Passio Marculi* (Migne, *Pat. Lat.* viii, 760), 'Ille (Bishop Marculus) namque olim praeelectus et praedestinatus a Domino.'

problem of evil had fascinated him, and this probably more than any other single cause drew him to Manichaeism.[32] The Manichees had a clear-cut view that evil was a substance co-eternal with God.[33] The universe was the product of a great primeval catastrophe in which elements of the Divine Kingdom had become imprisoned in evil. The purpose of history was the gradual restoration of these divine elements, and the liberation of the spark of divinity which resided in the soul of every man. The human body, however, belonged to the demonic world. It was wrong to propagate the human species, and sexual desire was the principal manifestation of evil. The world was not a place to reform, or even to carry out creative work. The sooner it was brought to an end the better. The doctrine of man, if ultimately optimistic in that there was an element of Light in everybody, involved a practical pessimism and extreme resignation. The religion of Augustine's early manhood was largely the off-spring of Gnosticism, and included the same ideas of humanity which were abhorrent to the Greek Fathers. We may therefore expect to find wide divergencies between Augustine's doctrine of man and that held in the East. He was, moreover, out of step even with some of his Western contemporaries, such as Ambrose.[34]

In Africa, the Manichees claimed to be a Christian community. They justified their views by an appeal to the docetic and dualistic elements in the Pauline epistles. Religious debates with them tended to be battles over the meaning of Pauline texts.[35] It is very interesting to find the great Pauline passage on Grace (*Eph.* ii, 1-18) quoted in full by Augustine's Manichaean friend, Fortunatus, in support of an argument that freedom to live merely meant freedom to fall.[36] These ideas sunk deep into Augustine's consciousness, to be reproduced thirty years later as Catholic orthodoxy in refutation of the Pelagians.[37] From his Manichaean days

[32] Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* i, 4 (*Pat. Lat.* xxxii, 1,311).

[33] In general, F. C. Burkitt, *The Religion of the Manichees* (Cambridge, 1924), is still the best standard work in English on the subject. Also *Cambridge Ancient History* xii, 504-514.

[34] St. Ambrose's doctrine of Man is illustrated in *Hexaemeron* vi, 6 and 7 (*Pat. Lat.* xiv, 255-257).

[35] See the present writer's 'The Gnostic–Manichaean Tradition in Roman North Africa', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* iv, 1, 1953, 22.

[36] Fortunatus, cited by Augustine in *Contra Fortunatum, Manichaeum* i, 16 (*Pat. Lat.* xlii, 118). 'Libera facultas vivendi non datur, nisi ubi est lapus, secundum Apostoli rationem, qui dicit' (then follows the quotation of *Ephesians* ii, 1-18).

[37] Cf. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* xiii (*Pat. Lat.* xliv, 889), 'Nam si se ill a (gratia) subtraxerit, cadit homo, non erectus sed praecipitatus libero arbitrio'. Also *De Correplione et Gratia* ii, 3 (*Pat. Lat.* xliv, 917).

Augustine derived the idea of the hopeless wickedness of humanity, of the enormity of the sin of concupiscience, and the attribution of evil qualities to 'nothingness'. The Manichaean 'clod of wickedness' (βωλὸς) is transformed into the Augustinian *massa peccati*.[38]

On the other hand, his conversion through Neo-Platonism back to Christianity also had a profound effect on his theology. He learnt that God was Spirit, that all things were ultimately derived from God, that evil was not a positive force, but the progressive deprivation of God's presence, and that the Manichaean challenge that God was either 'not good or not omnipotent' was fallacious.[39] The universe ultimately formed a harmonious whole, in which what was nearer to the Divine will had its part alongside that which was more remote. From St. Ambrose (or possibly Marius Victorinus) he realized that God was a God of love, and that the Incarnation was the supreme proof of God's love towards man.[40] Beauty, Harmony and Love were the attributes of the Godhead. These things he desired to know and to contemplate.[41] The Fall was not a primal catastrophe, but had been due to the disobedience of man. All this saved Augustine from the complete pessimism and determinism of some of his contemporaries, but he was never able to reconcile the conflicting influences in his thought, and in the end, despite all, it was the dualistic and determinist trend that prevailed.

There is no single work that contains a systematic exposition of Augustinianism.[42] As a Christian bishop, Augustine's ideas on Free-Will and Grace matured over a period of a quarter of a century, first in friendly correspondence with Ambrose's successor at Milan, Simplicianus in 397, then in reasoned criticism of the views of Pelagius and Celestius between 412 and 418, and finally in the long period after 419, which ended with his death, in increasingly bitter controversy with the most persistent of all his opponents, the acute, sincere, pertinacious but essentially small-minded, Julian of Eclanum. But already in 397 Augustine had reached the main conclusions which he was to hold for the rest of

[38] E. Buonaiuti, 'Manichaeism and Augustine, *Harvard Theological Review* xx, 1927, 117-127.

[39] Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* iii, 9, 24 (*Pat. Lat.* xxxii, 1,283).

[40] *Confessions* vii, 9, 14. See J. J. O'Meara, *The Young Augustine* (Longmans, 1955, 157).

[41] *Soliloquies* i, 7 (*Pat. Lat.* xxxii, 872).

[42] The best summaries are contained in J. Tixeront, *History of Dogma* (E.T., New York, 1921) ii, 432-505; A. Harnack, *History of Dogma* (E.T., London, 1898) v, ch. iv, and E. Portalié, 'Augustin', in *Dict. Theol. Catholique* i, 2, 2,357 ff.

his life. His fundamental idea was that everything flowed from God, and therefore that each smallest act by any individual towards good could only be so directed if assisted by God. Left to itself the will was unable to resist the thoughts that entered the mind. Evil was not a positive force, but simply lack of goodness, and without grace there could be no positive move towards God, that is, no goodness. 'Without grace,' Augustine told Simplicianus, 'it is impossible to resist concupiscience.'[43] Concupiscience, the product of original sin, was stronger than the human will. Years later, in the *Revisions*, Augustine looks back on this particular work and records how he had long pondered over the problems of grace and free-will, and that grace had prevailed.[44] So too, his letter to Simplicianus contains the view of man as part of a 'massa peccati', and of the predestination of only a limited number of the elect to salvation.[45]

So, even without the Pelagian controversy, Augustine would have left his mark on the doctrine of man. But, at this stage, he was saying no more than many other African clergy, both Catholic and Donatist. When, in 411, Pelagius' disciple Celestius sought admission to the ranks of the Carthaginian clergy, his statements of belief were condemned out of hand without Augustine's intervention. Pelagianism was in flat contradiction not only to Augustine's personal views, but to the traditional theology of the African provinces. The effect of the ensuing Pelagian controversy was both to throw into relief and also to emphasize the contradictions in the ideas which Augustine had always held. He was now nearly sixty, not an age to change his views, and twelve years of continuous strife with the Donatists had left him a controversialist who thought that to concede his opponents a single point was to concede their case. This was his undoing. He would not leave well alone. His system gradually becomes harsher, more logical and more inhuman. In 412, for instance, in *De Spirtu et Littera* lviii, he grants that Christ died for all men. Had he not reiterated to the Donatists that God's promises to Abraham were promises to everyone? 'In thy name all nations shall be blest.'[46] But during his debate with Julian of Eclanum, 'all' is gradually whittled away. Some men from all nations, and all conditions would be saved, but not all men.[47] Then, owing to the persistent mis-

[43] *De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* i, 12 (*Pat. Lat.* xl, 107).
[44] *Retractationes* (ed. Bardy) ii, 1, 1.
[45] *De Div. Quaest. ad Simplicianum* i, 22 (*Pat. Lat.* xl, 122).
[46] Augustine, *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani* i, 2, 2.
[47] *Contra Julianum* iv, 8, 42; *Enchiridion* xxvii and ciii.

translation of *Rom.* v, 12,[48] Original Sin becomes literally transmitted by Adam to the human race, and Adam's fault is exaggerated out of all recognition.[49] Having once told the Donatists that the sins of the fathers did not descend on the children,[50] he wrote in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscientia* ii, 15, that children possessed sin because their parents procreated them in lust. Unregenerate humanity was capable only of 'splendid vices', because the root of its existence was tainted.[51] They belonged to the Kingdom of the Devil, and along with the fallen angels were doomed to eternal punishment.[52] In his final work, the *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* i, 9, mankind is represented as a mass of sin waited on by death, incapable of raising itself to the good. The Incarnation indeed removed the gulf between God and man, but for the majority this was small comfort. Grace was for the predestined few.[53] It was not a matter for the human will to decide who was saved and who was condemned; salvation was not thanks to human merits but according to the inscrutable justice of God.[54] Human history was the unfolding of Providence, but man was a passive instrument, incapable of furthering or hindering the Divine Plan. Here fatalism is unrelieved. How, we may well ask, did Augustine reconcile this view of man with his statement in *De Trinitate* that man was a rational substance composed of soul and body?[55] Twice in his lifetime, however, Augustine had felt himself snatched from the devil. It was not surprising that these experiences are reflected in his theology of Grace.

Yet, as Julian of Eclanum pointed out, there was little difference between Augustine's 'irresistible Grace' and the Gnostic or Manichaean concept of Fate.[56] and little, too, between Augustine's system as a whole and Manichaeism.[57] Both relegated man to the rôle of a cipher. As Bigg has pointed out, it made no real difference whether his doom was fixed by arbitrary decree or had been stamped upon his nature by the Creator.[58] It was Gnosticism

[48] Augustine's exposition of the famous ἐφ'ᾧ clause is contained in *De Peccatorium Meritis* i, 11; *Enchiridion* xlvi and *Contra Julianum* vi, 75.

[49] *Enchiridion* lxv, *De Correptione et Gratia* x.

[50] *Psalmus contra Partem Donati* (*Pat. Lat.* xliii, 30). Written in 393.

[51] *De Civitate Dei* xiv, 21-25.

[52] *De Civitate Dei* v, 12; *Contra Julianum* iv, 26.

[53] 'Certus numerus', *De Correptione et Gratia* xiii, 39 (*Pat. Lat.* xliv, 940).

[54] *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* xiii (*Pat. Lat.* xliv, 889).

[55] *De Trinitate* xv, 7, 11 (*Pat. Lat.* xlii, 1,065).

[56] Augustine, *Contra Duos Epistolas Pelagiani* ii, 9, 10 (*Pat. Lat.* xliv, 577).

[57] Julian, cited by Augustine, *Contra Julianum, Op. Imperf.* iii, 177 and iv, 42.

[58] See C. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, 339.

without the consolatory belief in conditional immortality. Moreover, if man's nature was evil, the creator of the world must be evil also.[59]

The answer, however, was not Pelagianism. Julian could score his points and lay bare the weaknesses and even absurdities in Augustinianism. Augustine, nonetheless, had a firmer grasp of human nature. He knew that not every human act sprang from free-will, from nicely-balanced decisions of for or against. The Pelagian had no satisfactory explanation for the prevalence of evil and misery in the world, for the effects of emotion on human activity, or for man's dependence on some Power outside himself.[60] Pelagian Man stands in isolation, whereas Augustine understood the basic solidarity of the human race. Outside society man is not truly human. On the other hand, if Christ died for all men, it must be within human power to benefit by Christ's example. This Augustine failed to appreciate, just as he failed to realize the meaning of God's love towards each individual creature. Rightly, Julian stressed that the virtues of non-Christians were real enough, just as real as their faces.[61] It is no accident that Pelagius, in upholding the uniqueness and dignity of man, was better understood in the East than in Rome or Africa. He was at one with the tradition of Clement, Origen and Theodore of Mopsuestia. It was not merely the Nestorian Christ who was 'the natural saviour of the Pelagian Man.'[62]

The Pelagian controversy is one of the great landmarks in the development of the Christian doctrine of man. Yet we should be mistaken if we were to allow the view of either party to dominate our own religious life. There is no need to follow Calvin or even Barth and Brunner. I have tried to show how completely Augustinianism belongs to fourth-century North Africa, that it is the culmination of traditions of thought which stretch back into the pre-Christian past and continue into Islam. That world was utterly different in its ways of thought from our own. First and foremost, its ideas were related to a static view of the universe, with the earth as the centre and man as the central point on earth. This was accepted in East and West alike. As the Christian Platonist, Nemesius of Emesa, wrote at the beginning of the fifth century,

[59] A Harnack, *History of Dogma* v (E.T., p. 217).

[60] Pelagius' view of free will, for instance, pre-supposed man's independence of God, Augustine, *Contra Julianum, Op. Imperf.* i, 78-82.

[61] Charles Gore, *Church Quarterly Review* of 1883, p. 298, is the author of this famous judgment. See also B. J. Kidd, *History of the Church to 461*, Vol. iii, ch. iv.

[62] Augustine, *Contra Julianum* iv, 26.

man was created so as to form a link between the material and immaterial world.[63] Moreover, Reality was imagined to exist in thought-forms of which existences and activities on earth were but mirrored reflections. It was believed that everything on earth corresponded in some way to an eternal pattern in the heavens, so that the whole purpose of man's existence was an imitation or conformity with heavenly reality. These ideas dominate Augustine's view of Divine and human justice and of the relation of the Elect on earth to the Elect in the *Civitas Dei*. There was no place for evolution. Augustine's system presupposed that Adam came into existence as a perfect man, endowed with all human virtues, and the possibility of living perfectly in accordance with God's will besides.[64] His failure to do so was the measure of the enormity of his sin.

Men in the later Roman Empire had tried to solve the riddle of the universe from *a priori* reasoning. They had failed to apply themselves first to the more pedestrian but vital question of *how* the universe works. Indeed, they despised this approach. 'Moses,' says St. Ambrose, 'described the things which bear on our eternal hope, but he did not think it his duty to tell us how much air was occupied by the shadow of the earth, when the sun leaves us at the close of day to illuminate the lower part of the heavens, or how the moon is eclipsed when it passes into the region of the earth's shadow. These matters do not concern us.'[65] But we cannot begin to answer ultimate questions of purpose until we have some knowledge of how the object of our enquiry works. We know now that Augustine's basic assumptions about man's place in the universe were wrong, and hence his ideas about the nature and destiny of man remain unproved suppositions, theories 'on paper' only. This is the real 'sea', to use Woodward's expression, that divides us from the age of Augustine and Chalcedon. No theory of Man can command assent to-day unless it takes account of two ideas which were completely unknown to the Fathers of the Church, namely, the evolution of man and the expanding universe. Whatever else we may believe, it is abundantly clear that the universe was not made specifically for man,[66] and that there is no inherent reason why the human species should not eventually give way to a different form of life, just as the dinosaurs of the Jurassic and

[63] Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis* i (*Pat. Graeco-Latina* xl, 512-513).

[64] Augustine, *De Libera Arbitrio* iii, 20, 55 (*Pat. Lat.* xxxii, 1,297).

[65] Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* vi, 2, 7-8 (*Pat. Lat.* xiv, 244-245).

[66] Celsus (Origen, *Contra Celsum* iv, 73) is to my knowledge the only writer who makes this criticism of Christian anthropocenticity in later Roman Empire.

Cretaceous ages gave way to the smaller but better adapted mammals of the Eocene period. Failure to grasp the change which has come about in ideas of the nature and destiny of man through the increase in knowledge of human history and human life and to apply the results in theology is to court disaster. No revival of a Logos theory, or of an actual Fall into Sin in Time can command assent. However forcefully theologians argue from Thomistic or Augustinian premisses, we shall have the feeling that they have little to tell us, for the world in which their masters lived is not our world.

What then is the permanent value of the theories of the Eastern and Western Fathers concerning man? The political theory of Plato and Aristotle provokes a similar question, for here, too, we are judging the thought of men whose world was ruled by assumptions wholly different from our own, by the City State, by society based on slavery, and the geographical limits of the Mediterranean. We take all this into account, and yet we come to the conclusion that the science of politics reaches back to these two great Athenians. So it is with our views on the nature and destiny of man. If we place Origen, Augustine and Pelagius within their historical context, we can assess the real value of their thought. The 'sea' becomes a bridge and not a divide. We can trace the beginnings of both modern Liberalism and modern Determinism in these far-off controversies. Thus, to the African Church and Augustine we owe the ideas of the solidarity of mankind linked not through human progress but through human sin, of the impersonal element in history, and of philosophic determinism. From Pelagius comes the concept of human liberty and human virtue stepping over the barriers of creed and class. From Origen, perhaps the greatest thinker of them all, we find the classic defence of the sanctity of man, and the view that man is endowed with the means of expressing from one generation to the next that which we may call the 'image of God' within him. Such is the legacy of the Fathers for our problem, and it is no mean one. We owe to them the symbolism of our religious language. We have still to justify the use of that symbolism by solid thought on the nature and destiny of Man as we see it to-day.

THE MORAL STATUS OF MAN

By H. D. Lewis, M.A., B.Litt., Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion in the University of London

IT has become a common practice for philosophers to-day to begin any enterprise they undertake with a careful look at the Oxford Dictionary, and in this way to start out on their course with their feet securely planted on the firm ground of common-sense or science — or so it is thought. It is nice to be in the fashion, and with this aim in mind I began the preparation of this paper by reaching for the shorter Oxford Dictionary, thinking that it would do for the time being, and duly looked up 'man'. But the result was rather disappointing, for the Oxford Dictionary wisely refrains from any ambitious definition of 'man'. It says only 'human being', 'member of the human race'. Not to be daunted so readily, I turned the pages over for 'human', only to read 'of, or belonging to, man'. There I gave it up, but the caution exhibited by the compilers of the dictionary is not without significance. The neighbouring words 'hum' and 'hull' admit of having their meaning displayed in substance quite succinctly in a few words as 'murmuring noise' and 'frame of ship'. This is quite enlightening to anyone not familiar with these words. But how would you attempt a comparable definition of man, who will take up the challenge of the psalmist in this way and attempt a ready answer to the question that has recurred so insistently throughout the ages and to which such diverse answers have been offered in the past?

It might be thought a reasonable way out of our difficulty to define 'man' as a rational animal. This would still leave us with some further difficulties about 'animal'. But our course bristles with difficulties in fact long before we get to this stage. For are there not rational animals besides human beings? Are not dogs intelligent? The view used to be held quite confidently that they are not, that they are some species of machine, perhaps, or an assortment of instincts and reflex actions held together by associations of images. That view may commend itself to philosophers already committed on other grounds to some preconceived theory, as seventeenth-century thinkers accepted some very strange notions about the human animal also. But no one amusing himself with his dog or watching a dog wondering whether his master intends to take him out for a walk and which way he proposes to go can lightly dismiss the claim that in some respects brutes have the exercise of intelligence very similar to our own. We do not need

the apes of the psychologists to tell us this, although some of the accounts of the extraordinary achievements of some of these near neighbours of the human race are exceptionally intriguing and worthy of careful pondering. Perhaps the best attack on the problem of intelligence in brutes is that of Professor Price in his most valuable *Thinking and Experience*, and we may along the lines he takes, or by some similar course, discover perhaps some day how the intelligence of brutes works in relation to our own, and even more just why it is that it stops so very sharply at a certain point, bearing in mind the shrewd observation of Bradley that the hardest question is not why animals can do what they manage to do, but why, being capable of so much, they are unable to do more. But whatever progress may be within our reach in dealing with these and related questions to-day, it is evident that we have no easy task to draw an absolute hard and fast distinction between animals on the basis of the possession of intelligence by human beings. In some way we share this quality with others.

There are similar problems at other levels. We speak quite glibly of super-human powers. But just what has a power to be in order to qualify for this description? Suppose we discovered certain creatures inhabiting another planet, and suppose further that we found these to be immensely more advanced than ourselves, capable of understanding and controlling their physical environment far more completely than we can reasonably expect to do within an appreciable time and exercising other powers of mind, such as telepathic communication and the production of other para-normal effects which we are only just beginning to investigate. Grant them powers of effecting causation at a distance and directly, and permit them likewise supreme skill in the inducement and cultivation of esoteric experiences of various sorts such as oriental mystics claim to acquire in some measure by arduous asceticism and contemplation — would you then say they were superhuman beings? Just at what point would you draw the line between being a superbly clever man and being superhuman? The question has perhaps, you may think, something to do with mortality, and no doubt we are getting somewhere near the centre of things here. But what are we to say of the dead in after life? Are they not still human? If not, can they have survived as identical persons at all? I shall not attempt here a clear answer myself to this fascinating question of 'superhuman' powers which we are apt to take too lightly as if it presented no problems, for I do not think we could get really far with it without raising some very difficult and fundamental philosophical questions. I leave it with

you to turn over in your minds or to commend to your philosophical acquaintances as a somewhat neglected question whose examination might be very rewarding.

But I do want to make the further suggestion that bears more directly on my topic, that the point where we would cease to recognize genuine affinity with ourselves is certainly reached when we encounter creatures to whom basic moral distinctions do not apply and who do not, like ourselves, feel guilt or remorse at any time or consider their conduct and that of their species open to moral praise or blame. If there be creatures endowed with intelligence — sprites, fairies, angels or what you will — who are merely the agents of some powers other than themselves, however superb their skills and extensive their influence, however speedily they course Ariel-like about the world, I believe we would certainly regard them as radically other than ourselves and lacking something which gives its most distinctive character to the life we know. Even here strict definition presents considerable problems, for babes and idiots do not exercise moral responsibility, we do not hold them accountable for what they do and they know nothing of moral struggle. In the case of babes perhaps we could get over our difficulty by regarding them as incipiently moral, unless we take the somewhat bold course which some people are prepared to take of regarding babes as a species of brute or, as it is sometimes put, 'a mere animal'. It would be strange, however, to say that a mental defective is not a man or that he does not share our eventual destiny. Our course here, I think, must be to stress the non-moral worth of which such persons are capable, and sometimes capable of appreciating in a high degree — kindliness and affection and sometimes artistic sensibility. But if we take this course, then we cannot regard the exercise of responsibility as a *sine qua non* of membership of the human race, unless again we think of some initial or incipient capacity for responsibility. It seems clear, however, that if we met an entire race of beings, none of whom were capable of exercising ultimate moral responsibility and who were incapable of appreciating its real nature, we should at least feel that an enormous gulf had been set up between them and ourselves, and that on the deeper issues that concern us throughout our lives we should not be able to communicate with them. Deviation within the species is one thing, although it certainly raises hard, if suggestive, questions for the logician. But without attempting, on an occasion of this sort, to cope with the problems of precise definition, I think it not hard to elicit agreement on the point that few things determine more the distinctive character of human existence than our exercise of responsibility.

The case of the saint may perhaps be quoted against us, if we think of a saint as being, among other things, beyond the possibility of falling into temptation or experiencing it sharply. That there are good men who have certainly passed beyond the range of many temptations which affect others of us is true, and the expectation we all have is to attain, by the grace of God, to that state of blessedness in due course. But if we do attain it, it will be as those who have been schooled in the first place in the present 'vale of soul making', who have become saints by being first sinners and whose experience of triumph and blessedness would not have the quality it has, had it not been preceded by struggles and tensions of the kind which give its more distinctive quality to our present existence and our encounter with one another. It is in any case extremely unlikely that anyone should attain in our present earthly existence that stage of perfection in which his character is so set in the way of whatever presents itself as the right course that he is never tempted to deviate from that course. Temptation of some sort we shall always encounter, however much certain sins lose their hold upon us. And it seems to me that it is in virtue of being the sort of creatures who know the good but do not always and inevitably love and do the highest when we know it that we have the experience which gives its particular savour to our present life. Whether, as I think might well be the case, we can define 'man' on the basis of our exercise of responsibility or need to be more flexible in exact definition, the importance which the distinctively moral qualities of our activities have in determining the total nature and conditions of our present existence is outstanding, and if we learnt of creatures surpassing us in all manner of ways and even free altogether from the limitations of embodied existence, yet if we felt that they also knew something of moral trial and temptation and the bitter pangs of remorse, we should, I think, feel that the basic affinities were greater than the differences. And if this is the case, there can be few things of greater importance for any questions concerning the status and destiny of man than this of our moral or responsible nature, and few things more in need of preserving in our thoughts in times when various factors conspire to obscure is as they do to-day.

I have said already that we cannot regard even the 'higher animals' (other than man) as morally responsible. Whether they can be said to appreciate anything of an evaluational kind is a more difficult question. They clearly cannot appreciate worth reflectively — for the simple reason that they do not reflect. But brutes are certainly conscious of pleasure and pain, and this is one of the

main sources of our duties towards them. It does not seem to me preposterous to suppose that they have also some kind of incipient aesthetic sensibility. Is it fanciful to suppose that the bird on the wing or uttering its song finds aesthetic enjoyment in its activities? Should we draw an absolutely hard and fast line between such enjoyment (or even the pleasure of discovery) and the corresponding attainments at the human level? Is the affection of an animal altogether different from that of human beings — and if it is not, what consequences follow, and what modifications should we make of our estimates of their relative significance and destiny? Should we revise, on this basis, the ideas we generally hold in the West about the possibility of animal survival? These are, I believe, worthwhile and important questions which we are not a little apt to overlook. But whatever the problems that arise in this way, and whatever modifications we need to make of our normal views, whatever common assumptions we need to reconsider, one thing seems to me quite beyond serious doubt, namely, that moral praise or blame such as we apply to human beings does not apply to other animals that inhabit this globe.

Some persons would challenge the very sharp bifurcation I am making here. For does not a dog sometimes show every manifestation of guilt and remorse, does he not slink away when he has incurred his master's displeasure and assume what we commonly describe as a hang-dog look; does he not look at us with shame in his eyes? Certainly all this happens, and it should in some ways bring the animal kingdom closer to ourselves and deepen what I believe Albert Schweitzer really intended to describe by the term 'reverence for life'. But however readily we may admit all this, and however far we carry our concessions, we simply cannot regard the allegedly guilty behaviour and reaction of brutes as even incipiently guilt in the proper sense, notwithstanding that there may be interesting historical continuities. Brutes are certainly not capable of the sort of reflection which would enable them to appreciate absolute distinctions of right and wrong; they can know in a measure what is expected of them, but that is quite another matter; they can be distressed at finding that they have not done what is expected, but this could not possibly present itself to them in the form of a lapse from duty, for the latter is a very special kind of failure to do what is expected. Most of the apparent manifestations of guilt in sub-human creatures are in fact due to punishment of some kind which they have undergone, although it is perhaps doubtful whether 'punishment' is the right word here. We certainly can discipline animals and very young children by infliction of pain when they misbehave or offend us, whether or

not this is proper and really expedient. And this will induce recognisable reactions like the 'hangdog' look. But that is not responsibility and guilt. There are no doubt close connections between guilt and punishment, but the former is logically prior to the latter, and in order to regard any creature as morally accountable we must know more about him than that he is educable in the sense that his behaviour is modifiable by infliction of pain or rewards. Something beyond this, and of quite a distinctive character, enters in when properly moral accountability appears.

This may seem obvious to many of you, but it is undoubtedly worth stressing at the present moment. For not only have there been, even in the work of writers with a fine sense of the uniqueness of moral distinctions, many confusions about the proper relations of punishment and guilt which it would require more space than I have now at my disposal to unravel, but there are also very deliberate attempts to account for moral distinctions on the basis of educability through punishment and to assimilate human accountability, to that extent, to the misbehaviour of brutes and the distress they exhibit if discovered. Ethical writers of standing to-day affirm that the main difference between the kleptomaniac and the thief, for example, is that the conduct of the one is modifiable by punishment, that of the other not. Punishment becomes, on this basis, 'social medicine', to use the term in which the same debate was conducted some time ago, and there is nothing involved in morality on this view other than capacity to yield to the treatment. There are, no doubt, refinements of the position which would need to be noted in a full ethical study. But I am sure I do not travesty the position held by some leading moralists of to-day in the account of the view I am ascribing to them. Some are more open than others in accepting the implications of their view, and they assure us that an ethical change of attitude is needed such that we no longer praise or blame except as a practical utilitarian device, and do not regard ourselves as proper objects of condemnation; feelings of remorse are unreasonable and unhealthy, and now that we understand matters better we shall, so it is argued, substitute for these regret or pity and their opposites congratulation and elation of the sort which it is fitting to have for some non-moral achievement. And in holding this view, philosophers are, whether wittingly or not it is hard to determine, echoing attitudes which are being extensively adopted in practice, and which may have many repercussions on our penal systems. It is only too common to-day to find the criminal regarded as an object of pity rather than of condemnation, a person who is unhealthy perhaps, but no worse, a subject mainly for clinical treatment, a

misfit to be handed over to the psychologists. There are some estimable elements in this change of attitude; it reflects the humanitarianism which is replacing the brutality of other periods, and it also shows that we are shedding the Pharisaism of compounding for the sins, perhaps much graver than those of the prisoner in the dock, for which we have a mind ourselves by damning those more public overt transgressions to which we are not inclined and which would not be likely to profit us. The Scriptures warn us to judge not, and there is plainly something morally objectionable in the censoriousness of those whose minds are always on the faults of others. I also believe that a sound view of the nature of moral distinctions and accountability shows that it is peculiarly difficult to form close estimates of moral worth in any appraisal of the conduct of others, for the force of the temptation has to be put into the reckoning, and this it is very hard for anyone to judge other than the agent himself. But warnings of this sort take away not one whit from the gravity of moral wickedness; that does not become less real because hard to judge in others, or because it is not for us to be passing judgment on the lapses of our fellows. To deplore crime merely as socially inexpedient or a nuisance and to treat our own lapses as mere psychological defects and ourselves, in our apparent wickedness, as merely 'cases' for the psychologist is to countenance the worst indignity that human beings can suffer, to inflict on the criminal something which may prove much worse in the long run than excessive or brutal punishment; it is to associate ourselves with the general depersonalizing of human relations which is ever a recurring danger of the vast industrialization of life to-day, it is to encourage totalitarianism, overt and disguised, in short to set ourselves travelling thoughtlessly along the comfortable highway which leads, all the more terribly if imperceptibly, to the horrors of *Animal Farm* and *1984*. Ill indeed may we fare if we forget that the road to this hell may also be paved with good intentions.

To examine all the factors which tend to the debasement of moral personality in the modern world would take us very long and lead us into many different fields of enquiry. But from most investigations of the kind we would find ourselves coming back sooner or later, as will already be plain, to the agelong but quite crucial question of moral freedom. I have ventured to protest elsewhere against attempts to isolate this question from other issues concerned with moral obligations. I believe that our views on most ethical questions are bound to be radically affected by the views we hold about freedom as a postulate of moral responsibility, and

there can be no doubt that one of the reasons why so many are inclined to-day to doubt the distinctiveness and ultimacy of moral responsibility and to assimilate it to legal notions or reduce it to purely utilitarian terms, is that they cannot accept the conditions which seem to be postulated by the more traditional notions of guilt and accountability. They believe that the freedom in question is an illusion and that the attempt to make sense of it arises largely from trying to cast around for a notion of responsibility which in some ways resembles legal accountability, but in others differs radically from it. The freedom which is closely akin to legal liability could survive the surrender of genuinely open choice, although freedom in a less ultimate sense would still be presupposed. Absolute free choice, it is thought, is impossible; and therefore we must conclude that there is something bogus about the notions which seem to require it.

This is a challenge we must take up if we are to think clearly about ethics and restore confidence in ourselves as moral agents — with all that this involves for other activities and attitudes. Philosophical argument has therefore a very important part to play here in our maintenance of the right view of our human status, and I regard it as a most encouraging sign that issues like that of ' moral freedom ' which had fallen into some neglect are now being revived again. It appears also that the main features of the problem are more clearly discerned than they used to be. The most that I will venture to stress about the problem here is that I am convinced that no freedom other than that which allows an absolute possibility of doing something other than what we actually do, will suffice for ethics.[1] Freedom is an ambiguous word, and it has many uses, but where moral accountability is concerned we must be free in the sense that, given all the circumstances at the time of acting, our action could have been other than it was. This does not mean that any action can be expected from any man at any time. There is an obvious continuity in conduct and we rightly count on one another in many ways. But there are some occasions

[1] It is not very widely known what admirable recent statements of this view are available. For example: *Ethics*, Vol. III, by Nicolai Hartmann; *Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism*, by C. D. Broad; *Scepticism and Construction* (chaps. 4 and 5), *In Defence of Free Will*, ' Is Free Will a Pseudo Problem? ' (*Mind*, October, 1951), by C. A. Campbell; ' Freedom of the Will ', by W. G. Maclagan (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume XXV, pp. 178–200); ' Free Will and Punishment ' (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. III), by J. D. Mabbott; *The Theory of Morals*, chap. xv, by E. F. Carritt. I have myself advanced similar views in my *Morals and Revelation* and in ' Freedom and Responsibility ' (*Question*, Spring, 1952).

on which our formed character at the time prompts us to a line of conduct opposed to what we consider to be our duty. On those occasions and no other, and within those limits of conflict between duty and interest, we have the one break in the continuity of events. In other regards some form of determinism holds sway over our lives, although by no means the mechanistic determinism of the materialist. My thoughts are in a very important sense my own, and I must appropriate as a part of myself what I am to appreciate, as a plant absorbs its nutriment from its environment. But when all this has been said, and when we have spoken eloquently about 'self-determination', we all know that we cannot think otherwise than we do at a particular time or summon up emotions at will. We may cultivate beliefs and emotions, but only if we choose to do so. It is only choice that is ultimately free, and the only sort of choice which does not depend on the sort of persons we are at the time of making it, is the choice required by the challenge of a duty which is opposed to what we most want to do on the whole. To exhibit these conditions of moral accountability, to remove misunderstandings of them and answer objections or counter mistaken philosophical notions which undermine our confidence in the truth of the moral ideas in question, is an outstandingly important part of the function of the moral philosopher in contemporary society, and it is one he has to discharge, not only in the interest of clear philosophical thinking on its own account, considerable though the worth of that is, but also as a contribution to the adoption by us of the right social attitude and our appreciation of our own destiny and place in the universe.

There is an equally important moral here for theologians. For it must be admitted that a great deal of traditional theology is entirely out of accord with what we normally take to be basic conditions of moral responsibility. The logical implication of that attitude has, moreover, been carried out ruthlessly by powerful and influential religious writers of recent times. It has been urged that man is a wholly corrupted creature and that his very efforts to do good only betray his total incapacity for goodness; the more we struggle against our wicked nature the more, so it is very commonly argued to-day, are we enmeshed in the toils of it. There is no escape, save to the extent that acknowledgment of an utterly desperate situation induces us to cast ourselves upon the mercy of God and seek thereby to escape the inevitable doom of inevitable sin. Salvation begins with despair, and the first and most urgent step to be taken in the redemption of man from the terrible destiny which naturally awaits him is to induce with all possible haste and

intensity the sense of utter despair by which he shall realize that no effort of his own will avail to do anything other than sink him deeper in the mire. This, as some writers and preachers commend it at least, is the famous theology of crisis, the 'preacher's theology' which is to bring us, by vilification and denunciation, hasting back from our social enterprises and puny philanthropy and our ridiculous, indeed contemptible, confidence in reason, to acceptance of a form of salvation by faith of which the only tangible manifestation appears to be the strident proclamation of it. This may not be how the authors of this theology of crisis intend to be understood, although I for one find it hard to give any other meaning to their main declarations, but it is certainly how the rank and file of their followers interpret and use their teaching. A curious and very paradoxical consequence of adopting this attitude is that an outward emphasis on 'deed' and history, and on the work of Christ as a 'mighty act', loses the semblance of all that we normally associate with such terms; the history in question is not the history we normally study, the Jesus of History is merged in the elusive Christ of the evangelical scheme, and the commendation of the notion of salvation by acceptance of doctrine is allowed to disguise its hollowness and remoteness from our real situation as creatures of time and a historical process by masquerading clamorously as the theology of the 'deed' and 'act'.

Reinforcement of this is found in the insistence on the transcendence of God of which we have latterly acquired a profounder appreciation than at almost any time. One of the major advances of thought to-day is the understanding which shrewd religious philosophers and outstanding theologians alike have helped us to attain of the peculiar and absolute 'beyondness' of God. The infinite is not an extension of the finite but its condition, and of this I cannot say more now except that I consider the recognition of it the beginning of wisdom in religious thought, there being few more promising signs of the times to-day than the refinement of our appreciation of the way we should think about God. But if this is an achievement whose importance for culture and civilization in general as well as for specifically religious understanding probably far exceeds in importance anything we can appreciate from the midst of the situation in which we now find ourselves, it is almost equally tragic that its implications should be understood in terms of the ruthless denigration of man and the denunciation of human effort and its exclusion from the process of religious redemption. Surely there is something to be reconsidered in a theology which induces a biblical scholar to disparage the Sermon on the Mount from his pulpit and dismiss it contemptuously with

the observation (highly doubtful, and at the very least misleading, to my mind as a matter of scholarship) that St. Paul takes no account of it.

There is, I am willing to admit, something of great importance to be preserved for the enrichment of religion from the religious life of the past which is reflected in the doctrine of total corruption and inevitable guilt. But to understand what it is to-day we have to begin almost the whole of our religious thinking afresh, to disentangle carefully those strands in the religious experience of the past which present expressly religious elements from the ethical factors which appear along with them in a total religious experience, and having done this, to re-examine the outstanding religious utterances of the past, and the dogmas which reflect them, with careful heed to the interplay of moral and religious processes. This will mean a much more strenuous effort and a greater adaptation of our minds to the needs of a new cultural situation, together with a much more radical revolution in religious thought, than the search for acceptable modifications of traditionalism or some comfortable 'middle way' between extremes of liberalism and so-called orthodoxy. It is not a compromise we need but a new effort to understand religion better from the roots, and the time is peculiarly opportune for this, for not only has there been lately much clarification of obscure concepts, but many of the problems with which contemporary culture presents us converge on the question of the immanence of the transcendent in historical processes. The renewal of lively interest in religion among intellectuals reflects these advances, and we need, as preachers and religious thinkers alike, to take the fullest advantage of our opportunity. It is a very real one, with far-reaching consequences for our civilization, and it is well worth our while to remind ourselves that there are struggles and triumphs in the intellectual field, and feats of patience and endurance, which stand comparison in the total religious enterprise with the greatest acts of practical self-denial and the most moving manifestations of pious earnestness. Far be it from me indeed to suggest that we can make progress in religion by sitting back in comfort to think about it in detachment. It is the thinker who is also committed and is torn by the strains and tensions of the full demands of religion upon him in the modern world who can properly understand religion. But to understand is not to multiply obscure pronouncements and formalize these in elaborate systems. It is an achievement that taxes us to the full and calls for the effort of quiet concentration and much straining of imagination in creative work. This also has its heroism equal to any in the glorious story of martyrdoms and pious asceticism.

But if we are to match up to this challenge to-day, we must begin by firmly discarding ideas not compatible with notions of worth and moral distinctions which we feel bound to accept in our ordinary moral thinking. If theological doctrines seem not consistent with what moral experience and careful ethical thinking also require us to hold, then it will not do to discard or denounce the latter. Despair may indeed in some forms be a genuine element in religion, and it is probable that no one lives profoundly who does not know despair and desolation of soul. But none of this involves the abandonment of all human worth or of those very evaluations we need to give significance to religious assessments and declarations in turn. The fresh enterprise of thought to which we are committed in religion to-day requires us to pay due heed at every stage to the dignity of man and the awesome rôle which every one of us has, high and low alike, as an agent solely responsible for the choices he makes in a moral situation, however much our lives may be moulded from outside us in other ways. Here we stand alone, and it is largely in virtue of this peculiar aloneness of the moral life by which the image of our Creator is most resplendently evident in our natures, that we are able to enter into the special relation with God which is possible for man and come to eventual fulfilment of our destiny in the enjoyment of his redemptive love.

To reflection on many of these matters we have been stirringly summoned by the existentialists. They are of many brands, and some, like the pseudo-philosophers ironically rebuked in *The Sophist*, seem to be relying mainly for their effect on imposing upon us by deliberate obscurantism. Little of their writing is clear and systematic, and some philosophers (Professor Paton, for example) seem to give them up in despair for that reason. But they nonetheless appear to have a flair for arousing, by some kind of involved allusiveness, a profound concern for the issues that affect most our destiny as human beings. Crucial questions become alive in their pages, however hard it may be to reproduce closely what they say about them. One such issue is freedom. The existentialists have said very strange things about freedom, and one has sometimes the impression that they are thinking of some obscure once and for all choice of our total existence and history. The choice of one person is also represented sometimes as if it were at the same time the choice of the whole of humanity, or at least of one's community, in some unspecifiable 'solidarity'. There has also been much confusion between the choice which consists in deciding what we ought to do, and the anguish

which this involves, and the decision to do the right when we think we know it. But in spite of all this we have been induced by these undisciplined writers who have given free rein to their imagination and feelings in lieu of systematic thinking, to regard the issue of man's accountability as one which needs to be considered in relation to our understanding of ourselves as creatures of Space and Time, immersed in the stream of becoming, and yet with a reach which, from within this very process of becoming and its inevitable frustrations, extends beyond itself and stakes some claim which is not to be met entirely within the historical process. It is sensed at least that the issue of freedom lies at the centre of any meaning we may give to ultimate questions about the status and destiny of man. In this I believe the instinct of the existentialist is sound, however unimpressive his reasoning.

An adjustment of view to which this points seems to be that we should lay less store than has been the custom in fairly recent times on arguments from ethics to religion. The attempt to establish the case for religion on the basis of arguments of this kind is notoriously difficult, and the sponsor of such attempts has to meet some extremely difficult questions about the autonomy of ethics which religious persons jeopardize at their peril, little though they seem to appreciate that at the moment. It is not so much an abstract or *a priori* move from ethics to religion that we need as the finer apprehension of the moral life, with its core in the crucial choices each individual has to make, as the scene *par excellence* of the personal encounter of man and God.

To appreciate this we need to have a clearer grasp than we have at present of the true significance of the recent emphasis on an I-thou relation and of a process of divine disclosure culminating in the supreme revelatory events recorded in the Gospels. For this purpose we need to understand better how religious experiences occur and how they are validated, and to this end we require especially to consider how a secular or finite content may be transmuted into a religious one in which some significance the transcendent has for us is made evident to us in severely finite terms. As we succeed in doing this we shall learn to recognize certain experiences as being expressly charged with religious meaning, and on the basis of this recognition be able to discover the religious significance of outstanding events in the past and of the extension of these into many contexts in the full life of a community. Incidental marks of religious processes will become familiar to us in the same way. We shall then be able to detect a distinctively religious strand in the course of history from consideration of which the eventual significance of the remainder may be judged.

This is not, as so many recent writers on religion and history have supposed, a matter of drawing certain general conclusions on the basis of what history appears to be to the purely secular historian. The attempt to prove religious doctrines such as those of grace and providence, or the alleged inevitable sinfulness of man, from the secular study of history has strained the ingenuity of several writers. But they have been singularly unsuccessful, the thinness of their case being evidenced by the artificiality and downright fallaciousness of much of their reasoning, and by the obscurantism to which they have recourse at the end. It is not what we can impose in the way of a religious pattern on independent historical material that counts, but the appreciation of distinctive individual experiences as the scene for the intrusion of the divine into human affairs, and the importance this has for the whole of life. To achieve the latter aim, not in the sense of being subject to such religious illumination as men have had at all times in history, but in the sense of understanding its operation at the level required by our present cultural attainments and with the sophistication which we cannot now avoid, is a vast undertaking, and it constitutes the hardest part of the intellectual religious enterprise to which I have already alluded as being especially required of us now. The close of this address is not the place in which to attempt this. But if we are successful in this project we shall find in it, I submit, our main clue to the proper formulation of the question of man's status and destiny and the terms in which an answer may be found. We shall be spared the impossible task of seeking to discover enough about the universe at large by general speculation to find in that way our precise place in the whole of it, the bane of much bad metaphysics in the past; and we shall learn instead to enter into certain relations with God and find ourselves part of a community in which God has specific dealings with men and makes Himself known to them thus in the context of their own lives, enriched by the similar experience of others and its place in our traditions and history — and in this we shall find the assurance and enlightenment we need and the true significance of the historic religious conceptions by which men have made their religious life secure and articulate in the past. Devout reflection on this to draw out its full significance and warrant rather than *a priori* speculation on the basis of general features of experience is the way of insight for us into the significance a human life derives from what lies beyond itself.

But the process of encounter and disclosure, of which we now need more reflective awareness, must have its dynamic character maintained by the continued vitalizing of the processes on which

it supervenes. Of these the appreciation of value in general is one, for without this the colour and variety of life as humanly lived would largely disappear, the drama of existence being deadened in proportion as our sense of worth is dulled. But few things influence us more in our general appreciation of value and our responsiveness to it, than our confrontation with situations of moral perplexity and the tensions of our own moral choices; and it is, moreover, at this centre of our ethical existence that there occurs *par excellence* the alerting of our faculties which provides the heightening of our appreciation of various features of exceptional situations by which they come to stand out for us, in association with the enlivened consciousness of the transcendent, as the aspects of present existence which relate us to what is beyond it. Of the full nature of this revelatory process, of the way it is sustained and extended by the integration of distinctive moments of illumination with others and with the remainder of individual and corporate experience, and of the part our responsiveness plays in this to make it a more complete and living encounter, there is no space to write effectively now. That it is a limited disclosure, even in the fullness by which it becomes absolute at its own level, needs no stressing. It does not provide all that ambitious metaphysics has sometimes hoped to achieve. But it does provide the insight and assurances we need, and that in terms of an intimacy and closeness of personal divine presence which independent general speculation does not bring; and if it does not answer all our questions but only keeps us continuously initiated into a mystery which also remains irremediably elusive, have we not been warned of this by prophets and seers at all times, and by our Lord himself? Sufficient for us as for St. Paul is His grace, the grace which is not merely consistent with freedom, although quite distinct from it, but which also presupposes it as an indispensable condition of its own operation. It is in the fullness of our stature as moral beings, capable of genuine lapses as well as triumphs, that we have most of all the redeeming experience of the Eternal in the flux of time.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF MORALITY

By J. A. Hadfield, M.B., M.A.
Lecturer in Psychopathology, University of London

IT will be recalled that a century ago there was a fierce controversy in the religious world arising from the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. The theory of the evolutionists that different species of animals and plants came about by the process of natural selection appeared to be a direct threat to the authority of the Bible which stated that the world was created in six days and that God created 'two of every kind. Male and female created He them.' There were not wanting theologians and religious people who rose up in wrath against the biologists, anxious to save the tottering Ark of the Lord as though the Lord were not capable of saving His own Ark.

That controversy is now over; on cooler reflection the issue was decided by the theologian's acceptance of the main facts of biological and geological science, for we have come to realize that the life history of the earthworm is not of great importance to religion and that for moral and spiritual values it does not matter very much whether the earth was created in six days or six million years.

In this last half century we have been confronted with threats from another source, namely this time from the science of psychology; and there were many folk, scientists as well as religious people, who were as violent in their abuse of Freud as our forefathers were of Darwin. Even now the mention of his name produces a sneer on the faces of those who know nothing about Freud except apparently that he discovered sex.

The threat of the new psychology was to both morals and religion. On the religious side the new teaching said that belief in God was simply wishful thinking; and that God was a projection of a father complex. People, it was said, had the need of a God just as in childhood they felt the need of a father, and therefore man created God in his own image. I do not propose to deal with this problem which I touched upon when last I addressed this Conference twenty-five years ago, but which has been more adequately dealt with by Prof. Grensted in his Bampton Lectures.

The main threat of the new psychology was in the sphere of morals. It was said that in dealing with 'disorders' rather than 'sins' it took away man's sense of responsibility, that it encourages libertinism and that it reduces everything to low motives.

The outcome of this controversy was similar to that of biology. But there was this difference in the two controversies, that whereas the facts of biology have only a remote connection with the moral and spiritual life of man, psychology is much more intimately connected with morals because they are both concerned with the life and conduct of man—psychology being concerned with the *nature and causes* of behaviour, ethics with *ends;* psychology with what *is;* ethics with what *ought to be.*

We maintain in this paper that the new psychology, rightly conceived, is not only not incompatible with morals, but that it has a most important contribution to make to morals, first in its ability to cure moral disorders like jealousies and sex perversions, but also in the light it throws on the origin and nature of moral conduct.

The science of psychology can be a most useful handmaiden to morality, but it does not help matters to start off by calling her a slut.

Criticisms of the New Psychology

Let us first deal with the criticisms themselves. One of the main criticisms brought against the new psychological approach is that in dealing with moral disorders as diseases it is taking away man's sense of responsibility. On the contrary in so far as modern psychology is able to cure many disorders of behaviour previously incurable, it is not destroying but restoring to man his sense of responsibility, and his moral freedom.

I refer to such behaviour problems as bad temper, jealousy, sexual excess, sexual aberrations, despondency, lack of confidence and weakness of will. The conventional method of dealing with these problems is by the exercise of will, by pulling ourselves together when we don't know what to pull together. The exercise of the will is, of course, necessary to life, but its sphere is obviously limited. There can be no question that many of these disorders are quite beyond the control of the will. Many successful men are the victims of silly phobias like the fear of travelling in a tube train; many strong women turn pale at the sight of a mouse. Similarly there are many pious men who are the victims or revolting perversions, and kindly men who are the victims of bad tempers or jealousies. All these would give all they have to be rid of 'the body of this death.' But their will power is quite impotent against these disorders. These are beyond the control of the will because being repressed they have become *dissociated* from the main body of the personality, and have now been formed into unconscious 'complexes,' as they are called. The will on the other hand can operate only on what is conscious and has as little power over

what is dissociated as we have over the beating of the heart or as a schoolmistress has over a bad boy she sends out of school and who retaliates by throwing stones at the windows. What psychological treatment does is to bring them up into consciousness after which they can be controlled and re-directed to the uses of the personality as a whole: so it cures men of their disorders. Far from taking away a man's responsibility, by releasing these repressed impulses it gives him freedom to exercise his responsibility and to use them, whereas before he was under the compulsion of his passions. Analysis does not exonerate a man from the exercise of his will, but by bringing the repressed impulses under its control it makes his will effective.

This leads to the further objection that modern analysis encourages libertinism.

Freud taught that the neuroses were due to the repression of natural impulses, particularly those of sex and aggression. The very natural conclusion was that if we wanted to avoid becoming neurotic we must not repress our natural impulses but give free vent to them. There have been not a few people who took full advantage of this supposed teaching of Freud as an excuse for their libertine practices and indeed some doctors have encouraged it. But Freud, of course, taught no such thing.

The misunderstanding arose from the use of the word 'repression' which Freud used in a technical sense of an *unconscious* process, which was quite different from the term 'restraint' or 'self-control,' which are conscious processes as necessary to our mental health as they are to our everyday life. Even psychologists do not go about hitting everyone who gets in their way.

What then do the the leaders of the new psychology say about this practical problem? It is true that Freud has shown that neuroses are due to the repression of natural impulses such as sex and aggression, and that the liberation of these are necessary to cure. But if Freud spoke of the release of primitive emotions as necessary to cure, he also spoke of *sublimation*, which is the re-direction and transformation of primitive impulses to higher ends, and he held that social progress comes about from the suppression of the sexual instincts. Jung again has often been quoted as saying that those of his patients who have neuroses after midlife are neurotic because they have no religion, no philosophy of life. Adler has more specificially stated that the neuroses are due to false ideals. In face of all these opinions it is obvious that those who make the new psychology an excuse for their libertine tendencies are barking up the wrong tree! So too are those who criticize the new psychology on those grounds.

Let us then turn from these criticisms to a more positive consideration of what modern psychology has to tell us about the natural basis of morality.

Morality has three main sources :

(*a*) *Sociological.* In the first place morality consists in conformity to the *mores* or customs of the community;

(*b*) *Psychological.* Morality is the pursuit of ends and aims, which are as necessary to mental health as they are to morality;

(*c*) *Religious.* Morality is obedience to the law and will of God.

It is with the first two that I am here concerned.

Theologians make a distinction between natural religion and revealed religion, the religion which comes by the light of nature and that which comes by revelation through great teachers inspired by God. So we may distinguish natural morality from revealed morality. There is indeed a natural as well as a divine source of morality and it is that which is the subject of our present study.

Before embarking on my subject proper, there are two preliminary comments I should like to make, particularly in view of the fact that I shall be dealing with with naturalistic sources of morality.

In the first place, let me put myself on the side of the angels by saying that I consider religion and religious institutions to be the most potent force for morality in our community. I do not think that is open to question. Indeed, there is no other body of people whose function it is specifically to propagate moral principles except the moral philosophers, and they do not reach the common man. Indeed, one of the reasons why many people are not religious is because of the high demands of morality made upon them. Without religion and religious institutions, the higher and more positive forms of morality would be in a very bad way. Nevertheless, there are as well naturalistic sources of morality.

The other comment I should like to make is that, in finding a naturalistic basis for morality, it must not be thought that we are denying its value or even denying a spiritual source. It is an old fallacy to hold that to explain a thing is to explain it away; but even religious people have this fear and therefore this objection to science. On the contrary, it is only by a knowledge of the laws of nature and obedience to those laws that we can get power over nature. To understand the laws of physics enables us to wrest the force of electricity from nature for our use; by understanding the laws of the hive and obeying its laws we can extract an ample

supply of honey from the bees. If we go against those laws, we shall get badly stung. It is the same with human nature. Only by the understanding of the laws of human behaviour and obedience to those laws can we get power over human behaviour not only for the cure of disorders of behaviour but for their prevention and for the development of sound morality as well as of sound mental health. We need therefore have no hesitation in examining these laws and principles, and our moral practices will be the richer for our endeavour.

The Sociological Argument for Morality

The sociological argument is simple. We live in a community and derive enormous advantages from being members of that community. Society provides us with protection and security, armies to defend us against the invader, and policemen to defend our homes. The isolated peasant starves and perishes in years of drought and famine, whereas the civilized community draws its food from all over the world. The community provides us with warmth, clothing, and medical services in illness, not to speak of music for our pleasure, and books for our edification, all of which benefits come to us by belonging to a community.

But if we enjoy these priviliges we have certain obligations towards other people in the community. If society protects our property against those who try to steal from us, then it places upon us a duty and obligation not to steal from others who have the same rights. If we don't want other men to seduce our wives, or other women our husbands, then it is our responsibility not to seduce the wives or husbands of others. If we want people to be trustworthy we must prove ourselves trustworthy. Privileges must always carry responsibilities and our 'rights' must depend on our obligation to respect the rights of others. That is the simple and natural basis of morality, without which there can be neither stability for society nor peace and happiness for the individual.

If on the other hand we are prepared to enjoy these privileges without acknowledging our responsibilities to others, the community claims the right to punish us by denying us these privileges and ostracizing us from the community—whether by imprisoning us or by taking from us in fines some of the money which we have made through society or simply by ostracizing us, expelling us from our club or in not speaking to us, in order to induce us to accept our obligations.

When once these customs are established they become generalized into principles. It is no longer that we must not steal our neighbour's ox, ass or wife, but this is generalized into the

principle that honesty is right, stealing is wrong; marital fidelity is right, infidelity is wrong; it is right to tell the truth, wrong to lie. Thus are established principles of right and wrong which apply at all times and in all places. Acceptable modes of behaviour become generalized into what we call the 'virtues' which we pursue for their own sake, and try to live up to in practice. Generosity and truthfulness are now virtues and are right irrespective of whether we receive privileges in return or not. Thus it is that morality, from being simply conformity to the customs of a community, becomes transformed into *the pursuit of right ends and aims*. From being a sociological problem, morality becomes a psychological problem.

The Psychological Argument

The psychological argument for morality is that ideals, ends and aims are as necessary to mental health as they are to morality. The aim of the analyst is primarily the abolition of the symptom whether it be a neurosis like a hysteric pain, anxiety neurosis, or whether it be a disorder of character like bad temper or sexual perversion. This comes about by the release of the emotion which, being repressed, can emerge only in the form of a symptom, repressed self-pity appearing as a hysteric pain, repressed hatred as a phobia of hurting or poisoning, repressed fear in the soldier as a paralysis giving him a means of escape. The release of the repressed emotion produces a cure of the symptom.

But the aim of the analyst is something more than the abolition of a symptom; his aim is the mental health of his patient, and by mental health we mean the full functioning of the whole personality. This means that all the native and acquired instincts and potentialities of the individual should be liberated, and used for the ends and aims of the personality as a whole; that is to say that the personality should be a functioning whole. For this purpose, not only is release and freedom for our native impulses required; but the harmonization of these native impulses is equally necessary; and since they are dynamic processes their harmonization can be brought about only by their *direction to a common end*.

Freedom of the primitive emotions is as necessary to true morality as it is to mental health. Ideals, ends and aims, on the other hand, are as necessary to mental health as they are to morals. Freedom and discipline are both necessary to morals and to mental health, for there can be no freedom for the personality without discipline, and there is no true discipline without the exercise of freedom. Licentiousness, by which we mean the free expression of the emotions without discipline and direction to the

ends of the personality as a whole, is alien to both morals and mental health, for it robs the personality of its freedom to pursue its aims. The personality can be free only in so far as it disciplines and directs its impulses. Licentiousness and repression are equally destructive of both morality and mental health.

We must turn, therefore, to the question of the source of our ideals and to what are the right ideals.

The Source of Ideals

Ideals and standards of behaviour come, as we have seen, by *tradition*, for tradition is the embodiment of the experience of of the race and transmits the morals or *mores* of the community the most important of which are embodied in the laws. They also come from *teaching* apart from tradition, like the teaching of Philosophers and Prophets who deal with principles and not merely with rules and laws.

But there is a force inherent in human nature even more potent for the development of ideals than tradition, teaching or punishment, a force which leads us to accept ideals and standards of behaviour, namely that of *identification*. Everyone is aware of the fact that a child about the age of three tends to impersonate and identify himself with others. 'I'm the baker!' 'I'm the engine driver!' 'I'm daddy preaching a sermon'—or 'beating the dog!' This is not merely a process of imitation of action, which belongs to an earlier age, nor simply suggestibility and taking over the moods and ideas of others, but it is an identification in which there is a complete impersonation of the other's personality which is taken over and incorporated into the child's own personality. In adolescence it takes the form of hero-worship; later we identify ourselves with our country, our ideals, with the society in which we live and with our religion or God. The saying of St. Paul: 'For me to live is Christ', is a supreme expression of identification.

This process of identification has not received the attention it deserves. It is of as profound importance for ethics as it is for mental health, for by its means the child takes over not only the actions but the ideals and moral standards of those round about, incorporates them into his personality and makes them his own. From saying 'I'm a brave boy like Daddy,' he scraps his Daddy and says 'I'm a brave boy.' Bravery has now become a moral standard he adopts as the guiding principle of his life, which he consciously pursues irrespective of his father, or indeed of the many demands laid upon him by others.

We observe then that by a purely natural psychological process we adopt moral (or immoral) standards of an abstract nature. This psychological process comes to conclusions similar to those of the sociological process we have already discussed, although approached from a different angle. The boy by identification and incorporation turns bravery into an abstract moral principle: it is right to be brave, wrong to be a coward, right to be modest, wrong to brag—or he may say: it is fine to be cruel and bully, wrong to be 'sentimental.' The point is that he inevitably adopts standards of right and wrong for himself by this natural process and thereafter adopts them as his guilidng principles in life. This process by which abstract moral standards are adopted is as inevitable as it is natural in human psychology.

Let us consider the results of this incorporation of the Super-Ego or 'Ego-ideal' (as psychologists call the more consciously pursued ideals).

In the first place it means that *his personality now becomes a duality;* on the one side are his natural impulses, on the other side the incorporation of the moral standards of others into himself. This is the duality between what psychologists crudely call the 'Ego' and the 'Super-ego.' Both the mental health and the morality of the individual depend on how far the Ego-ideal thus adopted is capable of using and directing the nature impulses of the Ego, without liberation on the one hand nor repression on the other.

This incorporation of the ego-ideal by identification with others further produces *self-consciousness*, by which we mean the consciousness of one part of his personality by the other; it also develops *self-criticism*, the natural impulses of the Ego criticised by the moral standards of the Super-ego. This is the natural basis of conscience which is the judgment by the moral Super-ego on the native impulses of the Ego. It further gives rise to *self control*, this being the control of these native impulses of the Ego by the moral demands of his moral self or Super-ego.

The effect of these psychological discoveries on moral issues is profoundly important, but we can take two illustrations only, namely Conscience and Altruism.

Conscience

Conscience as we have seen is the judgment that the moral self passes upon the natural self. It is doubtful whether the human being has an inborn sense of right or wrong as such; an infant of one or two years of age certainly gives no evidence of it. But there is no doubt that by this natural process of identification there is

established in human nature the ingredients of morality, a mechanism which makes the acceptance of moral standards, good or bad, inevitable; so that if a child had no moral teaching at all it would still develop moral standards in itself. There is, in fact, a natural morality in human nature, apart from any that may be revealed. Moreover the *nature* of this moral self and therefore of its judgments or conscience will largely depend upon the nature of the person or persons with whom we identify ourselves, and whose standards we therefore incorporate within us.

This natural evolution of conscience explains why it is that conscience is not always an infallible guide. A man in following his conscience may do great harm and may afterwards realize that he was mistaken in his judgment although at the time he was following his conscience. The fact is that conscience can be morbidly formed; sometimes it is too easy-going, sometimes too strict, sometimes too censorious and intolerant, sometimes too absent!—according to the identifications we have made earlier in life. A conscience requires education like every other function of the human personality.

Altruism

But there is another issue that is affected by this process of identification, namely, that of altruism. The fact of altruism has baffled moral philosophers in the past and many attempts have been made to explain it, including the theory of 'enlightened self-interest.'

What are the Right Ends?

Why does a man with a family dive into a swift current to try to save another man's child? Why does a mother sacrifice comfort, health and life itself for her sick child? To call it enlightened self-interest is to stretch the imagination a bit too far, although this may play a part. The man for instance might say 'Perhaps *I* may be drowning some day! and I should hope someone would save me.' But that alone is a remote possibility, whereas his action puts him into a present danger and enlightened self-interest would certainly come to the conclusion 'The risk is too great. Let the child drown!'

We have seen that in the process of identification the child becomes so completely identified with the other's personality that for the time being he becomes that person. When he says: 'I am Daddy driving the car,' he incorporates his father's personality so completely into himself that for the time being he *is* his father. Indeed, it may be said that for the time being *he is more his father than he is himself*. We see then how this applies to altruism. The

mother is so completely identified with her sick child that she lives in the child's life, suffers the child's suffering, shares its wakeful hours, herself struggles for air in its hard breathing and undergoes its distress, irrespective of her own interests. Through these hours of pain and suffering she is more the child than she is herself, so completely is she identified with it. Yet all the time she retains her own individuality in that she can comfort her child, attend to its wants and ease the pain which she herself feels. The man who saves the child might identify himself with the child's father and say 'I too am a father, and if my child were drowning I should like to think someone would be ready to save him.' More likely he identifies himself with the drowning child, he feels in imagination the terror of the child with the same intensity of horror, and dives in without a thought of his own safety or indeed of his own family. Recently a man with a family lost his life trying to save the life of a drowning boy. The Coroner commented on the foolishness of the man's action. A lady of note, asked her opinion, remarked, 'I should hate to think that before my husband dived in to save a child, he turned round to count his own children!' In such identification therefore we have a natural explanation of altruism which can account even for a mother sacrificing her life for her child, a man sacrificing his life for another's child, the soldier sacrificing his life for his country, the patriot sacrificing himself for the principlies with which he identifies himself, or for the Christian martyr or missionary whose life is so completely identified with the Lord whom he serves.

Since both mental health and morality depend upon the pursuit of ends by means of which we judge, control and direct our native impulses, we naturally ask, what then are the *right ends*.

From the point of view of mental health those are the right ideals which are capable of harmonizing and co-ordinating all our potentialities, native and acquired, so that we become fully functioning beings.

Some ideals are capable of doing this and some are not. 'Wrong' ideals are of varying kinds. Some are wrong in the sense of being *anti-social;* they are morally wrong because they are opposed to the *mores* and customs of society. So the child who identifies himself with his vicious parent will himself become vicious. Some are wrong in that they are *incapable of co-ordinating* all our potentialities. An asceticism which denies to man his emotions is, of course, a denial of this principle, for it cannot direct what it suppresses. The man who simply sets out to make money, or to make a name for himself trampling on the rights of others, does so at the expense of crushing his love. He is not whole or

healthy. Other ideals are wrong in that the individual has *no stable ideal* at all, because he had no stable identificaton and therefore his morals are pretty loose and erratic. He is at the mercy of his impulses, cruelty, sex or self-pity. That is bad both for morals and for mental health. Other ideals are wrong in that they are *too repressive* and instead of using and directing the potentialities in our nature, they crush them and that produces neurosis.

The morality which is over-repressive or based upon fear of consequences has its own special brand of neurosis, namely, the obsessions, in which a man because of fear of consequences of his forbidden desires, is under the compulsion to be over-conscientious, over-scrupulous, and to perform propitiatory acts such as the punctilious performance of rituals, the saying of prayers for hours on end, washing of hands to wash away the stain on his soul, being punctiliously tidy because his soul is untidy, until he becomes the victim of these obsessions and is almost driven crazy by them, being hag-ridden by his fierce and revengeful conscience. The man who is compelled through fear to perform religious rituals is as neurotic as the man who is compelled to touch every lamp-post. His behaviour may be exemplary from the conventional moral point of view, but he is nevertheless a sick man and a very unhappy man. He is not a healthy man nor is he a really moral being, for his behaviour, however correct, is actuated by fear; he is not morally free. The medical psychologist is constantly called upon to deal with the sick consciences of men and women.

The right and healthy ideal is one which is capable of utilizing and co-ordinating all the potentialities with which nature has provided us and devoting them to the uses of the personality. Such an aim and such an ideal are the essentials of mental health, but they will be found to be not very different from what are commonly demanded of a moral life.

The Summum Bonum

A final question for both psychology and ethics is what is the *summum bonum*, the chief end of man. For the psychologist it is, as we have seen, mental health, by which we mean the fulfilment of the whole personality and all its potentialities. I have mentioned elsewhere* that throughout nature all living organisms work towards their own fulfilment and completeness. Prune a rose tree and more branches grow. Make a wound in your skin and all the resources of the body are mobilized for the healing of

* *Psychology and Morals*. Chapter on 'The Urge to Completeness'.

that wound until the body is complete once more. In analytic treatment we release potentialities in the patient which have been repressed and restore them to the uses of the personality, thus making the patient *whole* again, and by that we mean a functioning whole. Moral and spiritual values appear to proceed on a similar principle and to have a similar aim — their goal is spiritual wholeness or holiness.

It may be objected that to aim at the fulfilment of the personality is a selfish aim. Whether or not that is so, it is in fact the goal towards which all organisms are working. But if this goal of fulfilment is selfish, it is shared by religious thinkers. Where people differ is in their conception of what constitutes that fulfilment. Some people think of fulfilment in terms of ambition or in wealth, or in social prestige, some in a 'good' life, a life of moral rectitude, or of service of others. Others consider that it cannot be attained in this life and look to a future life when 'Heaven shall make perfect our imperfect lives.' For these saints the fulfilment of life may be eternally to be in the presence of God and serving day and night in His temple. But it is still because they consider that they will thus find their highest fulfilment and blessedness that they seek that heavenly kingdom. Thus for saint and psychologist alike (if we may make the distinction!) the goal of life is the fulfilment of life. 'I am come,' said Christ, 'that ye might have life, and that ye might have it more abundantly.' Fulness of life, more abundant life, that is the end. In this as in so may other things the basic principles of mental health are in conformity with those of morality.

There is one final respect in which there is a correspondence between psychology and religion, particularly the Christian religion, namely in the supremacy of love. In psycho-pathology we are now discovering (and here I speak for myself rather than Freud) that the deprivation of love, particularly protective love in childhood, is the basic cause of all the neuroses.

Every child has the need of safety and security, which it gets from the love and care of the mother. If it is denied that love it reacts by anxiety, depression, resorts to sex gratification as a solace, or is aroused to anger and jealously, all of which, if themselves repressed and dissociated, return as neurotic symptoms. Modern psychology, has re-discovered the paramount need of love as the basic factor for the prevention of the neuroses and for the bringing up of the child to mental health. This according to the Christian ethic is also the basis of moral conduct. Love is indeed the fulfilment of the law — the secret of health, of happiness and of right living.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH

By H. H. Price, F.B.A.,
Wykeham Professor of Logic and Fellow of New College, Oxford

PSYCHICAL Research may be roughly defined as the scientific investigation of supernormal or paranormal phenomena. These phenomena are traditionally classified under two main heads, mental and physical. The mental phenomena include telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition. They also include the utterances which occur in the mediumistic trance. which usually (but not quite always) purport to be communications from the dead. Moreover, apparitions, including haunting apparitions, are usually classified under mental phenomena, because most psychical researchers regard them as telepathically-caused hallucinations. (This is certainly the most plausible explanation of many apparitions, though possibly not of all.) The most important of the physical phenomena is telekinesis, also called psychokinesis, where someone causes a physical object to move 'at a distance,' that is, without bodily contact, and without the use of any physical intermediary. I think it will be generally agreed that the evidence for the mental phenomena is much stronger, both in quality and quantity, than the evidence for the physical ones. So in what I am going to say this morning, I shall confine myself to the mental phenomena and their implications. This is not because I regard the physical phenomena as unimportant, nor do I think that the evidence for them is negligible. It is merely because time is limited. If anyone here is interested in the physical variety of paranormal phenomena, I will gladly say what I can about them in the discussion after the paper, though I ought to confess at once that my own first-hand experience of them has been small.

It is convenient and customary to group the mental phenomena together under the name 'paranormal cognition.' Telepathy may then be described as the mind-to-mind variety of paranormal cognition. The paranormally-acquired information in this case is information about the contents of another person's mind: not always about something which the other person is experiencing or thinking of at the moment, but sometimes about a subconscious memory of his, which he is not at the moment recalling. In clairvoyance, on the other hand, the information is about some material object which the subject has no normal means of observing; for

example, the contents of a sealed letter, or a playing card concealed in the middle of the pack. In precognition, information is acquired about a future event or state of affairs without the use of rational inference. It would seem that there is also such a thing as *retrocognition*, where information is acquired about a past event or state of affairs without the use of memory, inference, or testimony. Precognition, I think, is best regarded not as an independent cognitive power, but as a dimension, so to speak, of telepathy and clairvoyance; and the same applies to retrocognition. It would seem that telepathy and clairvoyance are in some degree independent of the physical time order (not wholly independent of it, of course, but to some degree).

As to the experience of apparitions, I am going to assume, for the purpose of this discussion, that all apparitions can be explained in terms of telepathy.[1] On this assumption, an apparitional experience is just a special form of paranormal cognition, parallel in principle to a telepathic dream. It is important to notice that by no means all apparitions are apparitions of the dead. (That is one of the reasons why the popular term 'ghost' is better avoided; it would sound odd to speak of the ghost of a living person.) There even seems to be such a thing occasionally as *haunting* by the living; that is, an apparition of a particular living person appears repeatedly in the same locality. But, of course, there are apparitions of the dead, and sometimes they are haunting apparitions. There really are haunted houses, though they are not nearly so common as psychical researchers would wish, and the true 'ghost stories' are not nearly so exciting as the fictitious ones.

There are two ways of explaining apparitions of the dead in terms of telepathy. If one is prepared to consider the possibility that human personality survives death, one may hold that the apparition is caused by some thought or memory or emotion which actually exists now in the mind of the deceased person. This thought or memory or emotion would affect the percipient in a telepathic manner, and would manifest itself in the form of a visual or auditory hallucination which he experiences. Where the apparition is a haunting one, occurring repeatedly in the same locality, the cause of it might be a kind of brooding memory which obsesses the surviving mind of the deceased Mr. X, a memory of something he did or suffered when he formerly lived in that locality.

[1] This may well be an over-simplification, but I think that *many* appentional phenomena, at any rate, can most plausibly be explained in this way.

If however one is not prepared to consider the possibility of survival, there is an alternative explanation, in terms of retrocognitive telepathy. According to this explanation, the percipient is telepathically affected by the past thoughts or emotions which the late Mr. X had when he was still alive; and this retrocognitive telepathic 'impression' manifests itself to the percipient's consciousness in the form of a visual or other hallucination. It may be that both these explanations are true, in the sense that some apparitions of the dead are caused by 'straight' or contemporaneous telepathy from discarnate personalities, while others are caused by retrocognitive telepathy. Where the apparition of a dead person shows signs of intelligence and purpose, as occasionally happens, I should be inclined to prefer the survivalist explanation. But haunting apparitions, at any rate, usually have what has been called a 'somnambulistic' character. They perform a stereotyped routine of actions (usually quite a simple one) which they just repeat every time they appear. Here I should be inclined to prefer the retrocognitive explanation.

I now turn to an important point about paranormal cognition in general. We should not suppose that it is all like normal sense-perception (though it does sometimes cause sensory hallucinations, if the telepathic theory of apparitions is correct). It seems best to think of paranormal cognition as a two-stage process. In the first stage, some piece of information is acquired at an unconscious level of the person's mind. In the second stage, this information has to manifest itself somehow or other in his consciousness. In old-fashioned terminology, it has to get 'across the threshold.' It is important to notice that this second stage of the process may take many different forms. The paranormally-acquired information may present itself in the form of mental imagery; in the form of a dream; in the form of a 'hunch,' for instance an unreasoned but subsequently verified belief that Mr. X is ill or in danger; in the form of an equally unreasoned impulse, for instance an impulse to go and see Mr. X or write a letter to him. Again, the telepathically or clairvoyantly acquired idea may make use of the psycho-physiological mechanism of hallucination to 'get itself across' into the percipient's consciousness. This is what happens when an apparition is experienced, if the telepathic theory of apparitions is correct. But the hallucination need not take the form of an apparition; it may take the form of hallucinatory words conveying the paranormally-acquired information, either hallucinatory spoken words or hallucinatory written ones. Or again, the paranormally-acquired idea may manifest itself not so much in the percipient's consciousness as

in his bodily behaviour. This happens in automatic writing, and also in the automatic speech which occurs in some forms of mediumistic trance.

It looks as if this second stage of the process were the difficult one, the stage of manifestation or emergence. The very fact that there are so many different ways in which a paranormally-acquired idea may manifest itself suggests that there is some kind of barrier or censorship or resistance which has to be overcome. To speak anthropomorphically and metaphorically, it looks as if a paranormally-received idea had an impulse or urge to manifest itself in some overt manner, and chooses whatever way is easiest in the circumstances. This view of the matter is strengthened when we notice that sometimes the paranormally-acquired idea can only 'get itself across' in a disguised or symbolic form; or only when it is mixed up with other items which do *not* have a paranormal origin but are just products of the percipient's own memory or imagination (thus a dream may be partly telepathic and partly not); or again, sometimes it does not succeed in getting into consciousness at all, but some other idea which is closely associated with it does.

In view of all this, it is not at all surprising that paranormal cognition is very far from being infallible. Even if the information received were always infallibly correct at the first or unconscious stage, all sorts of errors and distortions could still creep in at the second stage, when it is getting itself across into consciousness. Moreover, telepathy and clairvoyance are not at present subject to voluntary control, or hardly at all. Some day, perhaps, they will be, when we have learned more about them. But at present these paranormal cognitive powers cannot be turned on or shut off at will, any more than artistic inspiration can, which appears to work in the same unconscious and uncontrollable manner. The most that can be done is to provide conditions which are favourable for their operation and then hope for the best. This is probably the point of curious traditional practices like crystal-gazing, which seem so utterly silly to hard headed persons. I have read somewhere that Mongolian lamas use a rather similar method. They gaze at a lichen-covered stone and read Chinese characters in the wavy lines and patterns which they see. Such practices are probably rough and ready methods for encouraging unconscious mental contents to come to the surface. It may even be that some degree of telepathy and clairvoyance is going on all the time in all of us, and that what we need is not so much a method of 'turning them on and off at will,' as I put it just now, but rather a reliable and voluntarily controllable method for

ensuring that the information they give us will get into consciousness when we want it.

So much for some of the empirical facts about paranormal cognition and some hypotheses suggested by them. Now let us consider the philosophical implications of the facts. The phenomena which psychical researchers have discovered are important from a philosophical point of view, just because it is so very difficult to devise a conceptual framework, a system of explanatary ideas, which will render the facts intelligible. On the face of it, the facts which have been discovered appear 'not to fit in anywhere.' Indeed, that is what we mean by calling them supernormal or paranormal. These words would no longer be needed, if there were some generally accepted system of explanatory ideas which would render the facts intelligible.

The task of inventing a suitable conceptual framework is surely one in which philosophers should take a hand; as their predecessors did in the seventeenth century, when a new conceptual framework had to be invented (or the old one drastically revised) to make sense of the then newly discovered facts about the physical world. The new facts would not fit into the mediaeval-Aristotelian conception of the universe. A kind of intellectual revolution was needed, and it may be that something like it is needed now.

What is required is, first, a set of concepts which will unify the paranormal facts *inter se*, what might be called a working philosophy of Psychical Research itself. That is the first stage, and so far we are only at the beginning of it. But secondly, and still more difficult, we need a more comprehensive set of concepts which will unify the whole paranormal field with the rest of our knowledge, bringing it into intelligible relations with what we have learned from the established sciences and from everyday experience and observation. When this second stage of conceptual unification has been achieved, and not till then, words like 'paranormal' and 'supernormal' will no longer be necessary.

But why is it so difficult to devise the new conceptual framework which is needed? It is because the facts which Psychical Researchers have discovered *conflict* in certain ways with what is called 'the scientific outlook' or 'the modern Western educated outlook'; though we may notice that they do not conflict to anything like the same degree with the medieval European outlook, nor with the educated outlook of Classical Antiquity; nor yet with the educated Hindu or Buddhist outlook, either ancient or modern.

I use the word 'outlook'—for lack of a better one—to describe

a set of assumptions or presuppositions (often unconscious and unformulated) which determine one's intellectual attitude to the facts or reported facts which are brought to one's notice. We use these presuppositions as standards of credibility and incredibility, of intelligibility and of unintelligibility.

What I have called the modern educated Western outlook is no doubt very complex. But for the purposes of the present discussion it will be enough to mention two of the most important elements in it. The first is the belief in scientific method. The second is something entirely different. It is a set of rather general beliefs, not about method at all, but about matters of fact. They are beliefs, or assumptions, concerning human personality and its relations to the rest of the universe, beliefs about 'the mind and its place in Nature,' if I may borrow a phrase which Professor C. D. Broad has used as the title of a well-known book. These beliefs about the mind and its place in Nature are logically independent of the belief in scientific method. They might conceivably be mistaken, or partly mistaken, even though the belief in scientific method was completely justified. But for historical reasons, going back to the eighteenth century or earlier, there has come to be a very close psychological connection between the two things—between the belief in scientific method on the one hand, and the beliefs concerning 'the mind and its place in Nature' on the other.

Now we can return to Psychical Research. I said just now that the facts which psychical researchers have discovered *conflict* in certain ways with the modern Western outlook. At what points do they conflict with it? First, do they conflict in any way with the belief in scientific method? I think they do not. It would be very strange if they did, because they have themselves been discovered by the use of that method. All the same, the question is not altogether free from difficulty, and it requires some discussion.

I shall purposely state the difficulty in rather an extravagant way. In some branches of Psychical Research, and most notably perhaps in the investigation of mediumship, it may seem that *faith* on the investigator's part is a necessary condition for achieving positive results; and sometimes not only faith, but a considerable degree of hope and charity too. These Christian virtues are certainly not required in the physical sciences. There, the results which a man gets surely do not depend in any way upon his moral character.

One might reply, no doubt, that some moral virtues are required in the orthodox sciences too, distressing as it may be to admit it: common honesty, for instance, and also a certain

humility, as Thomas Huxley pointed out long ago. But this reply does not help much. Nor will it help to point out that in all the sciences a certain degree of faith is required, faith in the orderliness of the universe or something of the sort. For that is quite a different sort of faith from the one we are here concerned with. Faith in the orderliness of the universe does not *make* the universe orderly; at the most, it is merely a precondition for finding out the kind of orderliness which the universe actually has. But the faith which the psychical researcher needs, in some of his investigations at any rate, would appear to be a precondition for the very existence of the phenomena he is investigating. If the faith is lacking, it would seem that the phenomena are thereby prevented from occurring, or at any rate are less likely to occur.

But I would suggest that the test of public verifiability can still be applied. If, or so far as, it is true that absence of faith (or of hope or charity either) tends to prevent the phenomena from happening, this fact, like any other, must be capable of being publicly established to the satisfaction of all observers. Suppose that faith *is* needed for getting positive results in the investigation of mediumship, or indeed that hope and charity are needed too; then the reasons for accepting this fact (if it is one) must surely be empirical reasons. We should have to conduct what logicians would call a 'second-order' investigation, an investigation of what happens in mediumistic investigations. We should have to establish, empirically, that when people investigate the phenomena of mediumship, the results which they get vary with the degree of faith (or hope or charity) which they have, and notice perhaps that the results are completely negative when the investigator is very deficient in these qualities. The people who observe this correlation between the investigator's faith (or other qualities of character) and the results which he gets need not *themselves* have any faith at all, nor any hope or charity either. The only moral qualities they need are that modicum of common honesty and humiliy which are required for all scientific investigation whatever.

If I am right so far, the paranormal facts do not conflict with the belief in scientific method, the belief which is the first and most important of the assumptions or presuppositions which make up the modern Western educated outlook. What the paranormal facts do *seem* to conflict with is the second element which I distinguished in the modern educated Western outlook, namely, certain deep-rooted assumptions about 'the mind and its place in Nature,' or about human personality and its relations to the rest of the universe. It is assumed by the great majority of modern Western

educated people that in some form or other the materialistic conception of human personality must be the right one. Historically, there have been several different versions of this conception of human personality. The classical version of it is the theory which English-speaking philosophers call Epiphenomenalism, the theory that mental processes are unilaterally dependent upon brain processes, and are 'epiphenomenal' in the sense that they are effects but never causes. Another and more modern version of the Materialistic conception of human personality is Behaviourism, of which, again, there are several different varieties. Still another is the Marxist theory of human personality. An adherent of the modern educated outlook would not necessarily commit himself to any one of these theories as it stands. He might admit that no completely satisfactory version of Materialism has yet been suggested. But what he usually takes to be unquestionable is that in some form or other the materialistic conception of human personality *must* be right, that in one way or another way mental processes *must* be completely explicable in terms of brain-processes. Behind this assumption there is perhaps another more general assumption which is seldom formulated clearly (if indeed it can be formulated clearly), the assumption that what is publicly observable is in some sense 'more real' than what is not. It is assumed, perhaps, that either there is nothing at all which is not publicly observable, at least in principle, or if there are some events or entities which are irremediably private—mental images, for instance—then somehow they have only a sort of second-class reality; it is thought that such private events or entities, even though they do exist in a way, are no part of 'the executive order of Nature' (to borrow a phrase from Whitehead), and that in predicting and controlling what goes on in the world, no account need be taken of them. Bodily behaviour, on the other hand, and also the brain-processes which determine it, certainly *are* parts of 'the executive order of Nature', and of course we must take full account of them in our attempts to control and predict events, at any rate so far as events on this planet are concerned. I am not suggesting that this preference for the publicly observable is something conscious and explicitly formulated—except in a very few philosophers. But I suspect that it has an unconscious influence on the minds of many modern educated people, and is one of the things which lead them to assume without question that in some form or other the materialistic conception of human personality must be the correct one.

Now I wish to suggest that the queer facts which psychical researchers have discovered are very difficult to reconcile with

the materialistic theory of human personality in any of its forms. In the first place, it is obvious at once that if Psychical Research could provide conclusive evidence for the survival of human personality after death, the materialistic theory would be refuted once for all. But though there is a good deal of evidence which favours the survival hypothesis (quite enough evidence to justify us in taking that hypothesis seriously), I do not think we can reasonably claim that the evidence is conclusive. Most of it comes from mediumistic communications. There is no doubt that in some of these communications verifiable information is given, which neither the medium nor the persons present at the seance had any normal means of acquiring. But unfortunately we cannot eliminate the possibility that this information might have been acquired by means of the paranormal cognitive powers of the medium himself. (We must remember here that both telepathy and clairvoyance can be precognitive, and also retrocognitive.) We could only rule out this alternative explanation if we knew what the limits of telepathy and clairvoyance are, and at present we do not. All we can say at present is that there are cases when this explanation becomes very complicated, much more complicated than the Survivalist explanation; and further, that telepathic and clairvoyant powers so extensive and so accurate as these go far beyond what our other evidence about telepathy and clairvoyance would suggest.

But whatever view we take about the survival hypothesis, it seems to me that the phenomena of paranormal cognition, taken by themselves, are very difficult to reconcile with the materialistic conception of human personality. This is simply because of the *extra-sensory* character of paranormal cognition. I do not much care for Dr. Rhine's phrase 'extra-sensory *perception*,' which many other psychical researchers have adopted, because neither telepathy nor clairvoyance seems to me at all like perception, as I have mentioned already. A much better analogy or explanatory model to use would be the Freudian theory of dreams. But though the noun 'perception' does not seem to me to fit the facts at all, the adjective 'extra-sensory' does.

In paranormal cognition someone obtains non-inferential information concerning some event or state of affairs outside his own organism. Now according to the materialistic conception of human personality there is in the end only one way in which non-inferential information can be acquired concerning extra-somatic matters of fact, namely as the result of the physical stimulation of one or another of our sense-organs. It is assumed that for such information to be acquired there must first be a long and complex causal chain, beginning with an event outside the subject's body

and ending with an event in his brain; and it is assumed that the reception of a physical stimulus by a sense-organ must always be included in this causal chain. But in paranormal cognition we seem to have a startling exception to this rule. Non-inferential information about some extra-somatic event or state of affairs is acquired by some process which is *independent* of this causal chain, and the stimulation of a sense-organ plays no part in the process.

If someone wanted to show that the facts of paranormal cognition can after all be reconciled with the materialistic conception of human personality, how would he have to set about it? I think the only way which looks at all plausible is to postulate some new and hitherto unknown kind of matter, or some new and hitherto unknown causal properties in ordinary matter, or both.

Attempts have, of course, been made to explain telepathy and clairvoyance by means of physical radiations. But it must be pointed out that this *is* a process of pure postulation. There is no independent evidence for the existence of the supposed radiations. They are not capable of being detected by any known physical instrument. There is no known way of intercepting them or diverting them. Nor is there any known receptor organ in the human body for receiving them (I shall have more to say about this last point presently).

Again, it is not easy to see how any physical radiation theory could account for precognition, or (if you prefer to put it so) for the precognitive character which telepathy and clairvoyance sometimes have. What kind of a physical process could it be in which the effect is *earlier* in time than the cause? It would almost seem that we should be forced to postulate an *additional* physical world, over and above the ordinary one, and to suppose that it already contains duplicates of some of the future events which are going to occur later in our ordinary physical world.

The conclusion, so far, is this: The difficulties confronting a physical radiation theory of paranormal cognition can only be overcome, if at all, by transforming the ordinary scientific world-picture in a pretty thorough-going way. We should be driven to postulate strange entities, and even stranger processes, which are certainly not part of the publicly observable world as we now know it; whereas the whole purpose of such a theory is to *preserve* the ordinary scientific world-picture and the materialistic conception of human nature which is a part of it.

Still further difficulties arise, as I have hinted already, when we consider the recipient's end of the process. In ordinary sense-perception, there have to be highly specialized and very complex

receptor-organs for receiving various kinds of physical stimuli. Otherwise, whatever radiations may be impinging on our bodies, they will not produce any experiences in us at all; they will not provide us with any non-inferential information about events or states of affairs outside our own bodies. But in the human organism, so far as it is a publicly observable object, observable by anatomists and physiologists, there is no trace of any receptor-organ which might be affected by the postulated telepathic or clairvoyant radiations.

I am inclined to think that if we are determined to preserve the materialistic conception of human personality, we shall be compelled to postulate some sort of 'astral body' or 'etheric body.' We should have to suppose that the human organism is not merely what anatomists and physiologists declare it to be, but somehow contains in addition *other* sense-organs (and, presumably other nerves and brain-centres) which are made of some other and 'higher' kind of matter, capable of being affected by the postulated radiations in a way that our ordinary, familiar sense-organs are not.

Conceivably, there might be a new version of the materialistic conception of human personality, what might be called Occultistic Materialism, or Astral Body Materialism, or Etheric Body Materialism. Or perhaps it already exists in some quarters. There might, for instance, be a new version of Epiphenomenalism, in which some mental events (paranormal cognitions in particular) are held to be 'epiphenomena' of processes in the etheric or the astral body, while others, ordinary sense-experiences for instance, are held to be 'epiphenomena' of processes in the familiar physical body.

But this is no consolation to *ordinary* Epiphenomenalists, nor to ordinary Behaviourists either. What they have to do is to account for telepathy and clairvoyance in terms of what goes on in *ordinary* publicly-observable human organisms, which anatomists can dissect and physiologists can experiment upon. We may notice too that this 'Higher Body' Materialism would be compatible with the possibility of survival after death, a possibility which ordinary Materialism excludes.

My conclusion is that the facts of paranormal cognition could only be reconciled with the materialistic conception of human personality by postulating new kinds of matter, both inside the human organism and outside it, and new kinds of physical and physiological processes—entities and processes which are certainly not part of the publicly-observable world as we know it.

The facts discovered by psychical researchers do seem to me to suggest strongly that there is something wrong with the materialistic conception of human personality, and that this conception of human nature can only be saved (if at all) by abandoning the principle which is one of the main motives for holding it; that is, by giving up the principle that the publicly observable material world is the only reality there is, or at least the only reality in which causally-relevant events occur.

I do not however want to say that the hypothesis of a so-called 'Etheric Body' or of an 'Astral Body' should be ruled out altogether. People who are inclined to postulate new kinds of matter, either inside the human organism or outside it, or new properties of ordinary matter, may be feeling after something which does, I believe, deserve serious discussion; namely the hypothesis of a *tertium quid* which is intermediate between mind and matter as traditionally conceived, and has some of the properties of both—something which is extended in space (or in some sort of space) and also has mental or quasi-mental properties. This hypothesis has been suggested by various writers on Psychical Research.[2] But whatever merits or demerits such a hypothesis may have, it is utterly different from ordinary Materialism, and it would be misleading to call it materialistic at all. The whole point of it is to suggest that the traditional disjunction between 'materialistic' and 'anti-materialistic' theories is not exhaustive, and that there is a third alternative intermediate between the two.

So much for the facts of Psychical Research and some of their implications. I have not ventured to ask what significance the facts may have for religion or theology. I will only make one suggestion. I think that the materialistic conception of human personality is at present one of the greatest obstacles to religious belief. And if there are facts which make this conception of human nature less plausible than it seemed fifty or sixty years ago, I think that such facts should be of interest both to theologians and to religious people in general.

[2] For example, by Dr. Raynor C. Johnson in his book *The Imprisoned Splendour, chs.* 8-11 (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1953).

THE SALVATION OF MAN

By the Rev. F. W. Dillistone, D.D., Canon Residentiary of Liverpool

IN the first chapter of the second volume of his Gifford Lectures, Reinhold Niebuhr makes a striking remark. 'Nothing,' he says 'is so incredible as an answer to an unasked question.' This leads him immediately to speak of those who have had no questions for which the Christian revelation was the answer, no longings and hopes which that revelation fulfilled. Now whether or not he is justified in suggesting that large sections of mankind have had no questions corresponding to the Christian revelation may be a matter for debate. Where I think he is certainly right is in his reminder that we cannot at any time talk meaningfully about such a subject as the Christian doctrine of salvation without first asking whether in point of fact the question of salvation is being asked in our contemporary world.

At first sight it may appear that this is not so. Where in the world today could we hear the cry, 'Sirs, what must I do to be saved?' Where could we find man debating the question: 'Are there few that be saved?' Where should we expect to encounter the question of utter astonishment: 'Who then can be saved?' Yet these are not just isolated utterances within the New Testament framework: they reflect without a doubt much of the temper of the world of that day. Or again if it comes to hopes and aspirations, where do we hear anything even dimly suggestive of the Psalmist's 'I have longed for thy salvation, O Lord.' 'Oh that the salvation of Israel were come out of Zion. Then should Jacob rejoice and Israel should be right glad'? Thus as far as articulate questions and a precise vocabulary are concerned the salvation of man may seem to be a matter of minor importance. But a little consideration will, I think, show that at least in a vague and half-conscious way there is still nothing about which man is more concerned than his own salvation.

Let us look at one or two straws in the wind. First, and perhaps most startling, in the *New Statesman and Nation*. When one finds the leading editorial beginning with a reference to man's salvation—using the precise word—one sits up and takes notice. Yet in the issue of June 18th the opening sentence ran: 'The world has grown so sick of hope deferred that we scarcely know the difference between a booby trap and a chance of salvation.' Such a sentence might almost have been lifted bodily from the Book of the Proverbs! Or again in a recent issue of *The Economist*, reporting on the situation in China a correspondent remarks: 'The liberation army has many of the characteristics of

the Salvation Army and in China to-day there are no competitors in the field of salvation.' Liberation—a word which almost exactly represents the Biblical idea of redemption: Salvation—a word which alone seems adequate to represent the aspirations of the Chinese to-day. Whatever these papers may mean by the word Salvation—world peace, deliverance from the threat of atomic destruction, social improvement, economic stability — whatever exactly they may mean, it is interesting and significant to find them choosing this word with its long history of religious associations.

To give one further example from a modern novel, there is the striking scene in M. Camus's *The Plague** where the doctor and the priest have just left the bedside of the dying child. Each is deeply moved: each is on edge. The doctor lets himself go in a bitter outburst. Then, more calmly, he goes on.

'I don't want to start a dispute with you. We are working together for something which unites us beyond blasphemies and prayers. That's all that matters.'

'Yes,' replied the priest, 'yes, you also work for the salvation of man.'

The doctor tried to smile.

'The salvation of man—that's too big a word for me. It's his health I'm interested in. His health first of all.'

In such a scene we come very near to the place where the question of salvation seems most urgent in the minds of many of our contemporaries. For salvation is in its etymological history intimately related to matters of health and sanity and physical welfare and healing and integration. The Christian answer to the question of salvation many not be the one for which the world is looking nor the one which the world is prepared to receive. But that in one form or another the question is being asked, often urgently and even poignantly, can hardly be doubted or denied.

I

Before coming to the distinctively Christian approach to the subject it will be useful to glance at the background of the concept in pre-Christian times. So far as the Old Testament and the Hebrew view of life is concerned, I know of no more illuminating discussion than that of Pedersen in his chapter on Peace and Salvation in Israel 1-11. He points out that the Hebrew word usually translated 'Salvation' is derived from the root *ysh'*, which means 'to be wide, spacious.' The essential idea is that of a condition in which free movement and expansion is possible. Normally the subject needing such scope for development is God's people though sometimes the individual is in view. Salvation is wrought

* *Christian Faith and Communist Faith*, p. 150.

whenever victory in battle is achieved. A leader may be mainly responsible for this and he is then worthy of the title 'Saviour.' He breaks down and destroys the cramping and restrictive forces which hem God's people in. Moreover he communicates to them something of his own strength and confidence. Above all it is God Who is the saviour of mankind and when He acts on man's behalf the result is the state of affairs described so vividly in the 91st Psalm with its moving climax:

> Because he hath set his love upon me, therefore will I deliver him: I will set him up because he hath known my Name. He shall call upon me and I will hear him: yea, I am with him in trouble: I will deliver him and bring him to honour. With long life will I satisfy him and show him my salvation.[1]

From the Old Testament, then, we derive a picture of salvation as the removal of obstacles and the bestowal of strength to expand freely. Almost exclusively the reference is to the life of society in this world though in later Judaism the concept of salvation out of this age into the life of the age to come began to appear. Salvation was both corporate and individual in its outworking and it was regarded as coming ultimately from God alone. Very different, however, is the picture which comes from the Hellenistic background of early Christianity. Salvation here is associated with the restoration and preservation of life in all its forms. Man needs food and water, he needs power to reproduce his kind, he needs a continuing fertility in fold and field, he needs protection from the onslaughts of wild and unpredictable natural forces. All of the manifold powers, natural and supernatural, which bring him the means of satisfying these needs are deemed worthy of the title SOTER. Often it is difficult to say whether the natural element or the god working in and through the natural element is regarded as the actual saviour: indeed there is no final distinction between the two. The water of the Nile, Osiris the god of the Nile—each is regarded as Saviour in the Egyptian context. The corn and Demeter, the corn-goddess—each is regarded as Saviour in the Greek. The recurring life of Nature—its waxing and waning, its seed-time and harvest, spring and autumn, flood-tide and the ebbing of the waters—provides the setting within which the idea of salvation became vivid and meaningful to the settled civilizations of ancient times.

[1] 'Salvation,' says Pedersen, 'is the word embodying the whole contents of the hymn. It consists in the weak human soul having strength conferred upon it by its God when utterly submitting itself to him. It is developed, "gets space," in that everything evil which might check it is kept away from it . . . This salvation is identical with the peace which the prophets promised their people.' (333.)

Probably, as van der Leeuw points out, the periodic salvation of Spring was the strongest root of belief in a saviour in early agricultural environments. The celebration of the coming of Spring was perhaps the most notable of all regular *dromena*. 'At the great spring Dromenon,' writes Gilbert Murray 'the tribe and the growing earth were renovated together: the earth arises afresh from her dead seeds, the tribe from its dead ancestors; and the whole process, charged as it is with the emotion of pressing human desire, projects its anthropomorphic God or daemon. A vegetation-spirit we call him, very inadequately; he is a divine Kouros, a Year-Daemon, a spirit that in the first stage is living, then dies with each year, then thirdly rises again from the dead, raising the whole dead world with him—the Greeks called him in this phase "the Third One," or the "Saviour".' (Five Stages of Greek Religion 48). Spring, the god of Spring, the god that brings back vegetation and all the means for the regeneration and re-invigoration of life: this is the Saviour.

In later Greek writings the title Saviour was bestowed upon individuals whose work and manner of life brought restoration and renewal to the community or the individual. The emperor who restored prosperity to his people was called SOTER.[2] Epicurus whose life and teaching was devoted to the promotion of his ideal state of unruffled calm was named Saviour by his contemporaries while Empedocles, going from city to city in order that he might heal diseases and speak 'some little word of salvation' was regarded as an incarnation of a saviour-god bringing renewal of life to mankind. But in all these later writings the pattern of the earlier myth is not essentially changed. Salvation is the restoration of human life to its full potency, to its ideal state of harmony, to its organic health and vitality. The Divine power works through natural and human agents to repair the ravages of the earth and time spirits.

II

Against this dual background of salvation-patterns we may now set the distinctive witness of the New Testament. It almost goes without saying that the utterly new departure is the witness that Jesus is the Christ, the Saviour of the world (*Jn.* 4.42) and

[2] *Soter.* The title 'belonged originally to the old Olympian gods, and in particular to Zeus, to whom vows were paid on the completion of a safe voyage; but it was a common practice to bestow it upon the benefactor of some municipality. . . . And in the Hellenistic Age it was accorded to the Ptolemies and other rulers, above all to the Roman emperors—in a word, to the leaders to whom men looked for stable government, security and prosperity, deliverance from the upheaval of war and civil strife.'—*Scottish Journal of Theol.*, VI, 408.

that the essential mark of his Saviourhood is the deliverance of His people from their sins (*Mt.* i, 21). Strangely enough the actual title Saviour is applied to Him exceedingly rarely and the phrase 'he shall save His people from their sins' is unique in the New Testament. Yet the proclamation of His saving work contitutes the central theme of the Gospel, expressed though it may be in many forms and phrases. 'There is none other name under heaven given amongst men whereby we must be saved.'

But how is this theme worked out? I am persuaded that Ragnar Leivestad is right in his contention that there is not one single kerygmatic formulation in the New Testament, but rather two and I believe, further, that these two correspond very closely to the two background patterns of salvation, the Hebraic and the Hellenistic, which I have tried to sketch. Taking first the Hebraic we can reconstruct the proclamation of salvation as follows:

> 'Jesus from Nazareth, of the seed of David, a prophet, attested by God with mighty works and wonders, who was crucified (for our sins) by the Jews and Pilate according to the predestination of God and the prophecy of the Scriptures, who died and was buried, who was raised by God on the third day, revealed to eye-witnesses, taken up to heaven to the right hand of God and destined to be the judge of the living and dead,' is the Saviour who redeems us now from all that hinders us from walking in the way of God and who delivers us out of the coming wrath into the final glory of the Kingdom of God.

Here is the Hebrew concern for forward movement, for the overcoming of checks and hindrances and for the ultimate expansiveness of the Kingdom of God.

Secondly the Hellenistic may be set forth as follows:

> Jesus, the Son of God, 'who descended from heaven to earth, exchanging his heavenly glory for the humble form of a human body, who was killed by the rulers of this world who mistook him for an ordinary man, who (by virtue of his divine nature) broke the fetters of death and triumphantly ascended to heaven, being hailed as Lord by all powers and creatures in the universe' is the Saviour who redeems us from all the forces of darkness and decay and who restores to us the full glory of eternal life.[3]

Here is the Greek concern for upward movement, for escape from corruption and mortality and for the fulness of life in the world of heavenly reality.

Beside the distinctiveness of the New Testament witness that Jesus of Nazareth, who in history was seen and heard and known by men, is the Saviour of mankind must be set the distinctiveness of its witness to the *moral* character of the great salvation. It is not simply that He has saved us from our enemies and guided our feet into the way of peace: it is rather that He has saved us from

[3] See R. Leivestad. *Christ the Conqueror,* 289 *f.*

our sins and brought us into the world of expanding moral relationships. It is not only that he has saved us from corruption and ignorance and brought us into the realm of life and light: it is rather that He has saved us from the slavery of sin and initiated us into the glory of the moral liberty of the children of God. The phrase already quoted which stands at the very theshold of the New Testament as it has come to us constitutes an entirely appropriate title for the theme of the whole book. 'Thou shalt call His name Jesus for He shall save His people from their sins.' Sins of distrust and disobedience in the Hebrew tradition, sins of wilful blindness and distortion of the truth in the Greek tradition—it was from such sins that Jesus came to save mankind and only as men are saved into a moral and spiritual relationship with God can their salvation be regarded as fully Christian.

If now it be asked how, according to the witness of the New Testament, this salvation becomes a reality in the life of mankind the answer is again a double one. Corresponding to the first kerygmatic formulation there is the call to repent and believe the good news. Those who respond to this call set their feet at once upon the way of salvation, go forward to an expanding realization of the strength which becomes theirs in fellowship with the Saviour and with one another, and rejoice in hope of final salvation in the Kingdom of God. Corresponding to the second formulation is the call to participate in the sacred drama of death and resurrection, to be identified with the Saviour through the initiatory rite of baptism and through continuous repetitions of the eucharistic action. Those who respond to this call begin the ascent to their true home, mortify their corrupt affections and daily increase in the life of the Spirit until being finally released from the life of the flesh they enter with joy into their true destiny as the children of God in heaven. There is, it seems to me, no attempt to synthesize or to reconcile within one formulation these two strands of the New Testament. The Christian salvation is too great to be expressed within any single formulation. The all-important characteristics common to both strands of witness are the recognition that Salvation is through Jesus Christ alone and that Salvation is concerned first and foremost with deliverance from sin and with sanctification into the life of true holiness in fellowship with God.

III

How can all this even begin to take on meaning in the scientific world of to-day? Until the beginning of the twentieth century it was possible to presuppose in the Western world a cultural framework made up of elements drawn from both the Hebraic and

Hellenistic traditions. There was on the one side a generally accepted belief that God might at any time intervene in His world or in human affairs to judge and to save. Such interventions would be quite distinct from the ordinary run of things and would serve to reveal His power in judging evil and saving the weak and oppressed. On the other side there was a recognition that the universe as a whole was held within a Divine orderliness and that man by the exercise of his reason could come to know the general structure of this order and the general principles which should guide his own conduct. It was true that man often failed to conform to this Divinely-established order through ignorance or perversity but there was little doubt that his health in every sense depended upon an ever-increasing identification with the living organism of which he himself was ideally a part.

But no such general pre-suppositions can be assumed within the world to-day. Already in the nineteenth century the framework was beginning to collapse and to-day, although some of the ties and struts still remain, the general pattern is altogether different. On the one side the Hebraic belief in the possibility of unusual Divine interventions has been replaced by the conviction that dramatic changes may take place at critical moments in history through revolutions initiated from within the world-situation itself. The revolution may express itself politically, economically, psychologically. It may over-turn the centuries-old rule of an aristocracy, it may break through a long-established system of economic life, it may even change over-night the behaviour-pattern of an individual. But such changes are not to be interpreted as acts of God, either for judgment or for salvation. They are leaps, catalytic changes, critical releases prepared within the inexorable ongoing movement of universal history but touched off at a particular moment by a conjunction of circumstances favourable to sudden change.

On the other side the Hellenistic belief in the existence of a Divine order, the pattern of which could be apprehended by the Divine reason operative in the mind of man, has been replaced by the conviction that while there are impressive regularities and dependabilities in the universe which make it possible for man to order his life and control his environment to a very large degree, yet no sets of laws which he may construct can be regarded as final and his calculations for the future must be worked out in terms of probabilities rather than of regular Divine recurrences. Moreover this conviction must be regarded as applying not only to the natural order but also to the patterns of society. No longer is it possible to think in terms of human *nature* created in the

image of God or of eternal *laws* of society. Patterns of culture are relative and it is only possible to work within a framework of broad probabilities when thinking of the future of mankind. There is no God-conceived ideal or logos to which humanity can seek to conform.

Thus we live within an era in which it becomes increasingly difficult to gain any kind of impelling picture of a salvation-situation. I began by gathering together a few examples of the occurrence of salvation language in current literature. But in one case salvation was conceived simply in terms of deliverance from the threat of atomic destruction. In another its framework of reference was mainly a forced dependence upon an alien culture : salvation would consist in being liberated from the economic and sociological ties which such a dependence involved. In the third salvation denoted the restoration of a diseased body to health and strength. Only in the third case does the word begin to take on the strong flavour of positive meaning.

The fact, indeed, is that where the general view of revolutionary change which I have outlined holds firm there is no place for any conception of a Divine salvation. Similarly where the fatalistic view of scientific naturalism is accepted any thought of a comprehensive salvation is excluded. Salvation in the Marxian view may come about through the revolution to end all revolutions which will finally overcome the alienation of man from nature and from his fellows : salvation in the positivist view may come about through a growing apprehension of the patterns of nature and of society and through an increasing ability to conform to these patterns as they are learned. But salvation in the sense of that which delivers man from an attitude of resistance to the purpose of or from a lack of conformity with the nature of a living and personal God is clearly without meaning. That there is in the world a sense of alienation and frustration and unfulfilled desires can scarcely be questioned. That there is any corresponding willingness to set this sense within the context of a Christian or even a theistic interpretation of reality it would be very difficult to maintain.

It is true that there is widespread recognition amongst poets, novelists, and seers, a recognition which may be increasing in the depth of its intensity, that man's concern with what he is himself making within history and with what can be known about the nature of the physical universe in which he dwells has virtually become an obsession and that mankind stands in grave danger of developing a kind of mass-neurosis with no eyes for anything save tangible results and improved standards of material living. Lewis

Mumford for example points out that the larger the area of communication the more limited has become the area of mutual understanding: we can now communicate almost instantaneously with any part of the globe and yet a common structure of relationships has scarcely begun to exist. The possibilities of mass production are now almost unlimited and yet there has been no corresponding development of standards of proportion, definitions of limits, and canons of assimilation. 'Our production levels in every field must be based,' says Mumford, 'not on the physical capacities of our machines to multiply goods, but on the psychological capacities of the human organism to assimilate them and convert them ultimately into an orderly, purposive, rational and significant life.' Yet again the rapidly increasing use of automatic mechanisms, though spectacular in its results, is tending to rob man of any sense of personal participation in work-processes and so of any personal significance in the total picture of the universe. An obsessive concern for specialization, mechanization and objectification has deprived man of that sense of direction, that framework of values, without which meaningful personal existence becomes impossible.

But more than this there is an increasing recognition of the confusion, even the chaos, which exists in man's inner life. Nothing is more characteristic of the present state of the Western world than the incidence of mental illnesses, nervous disorders and psychological conflicts. The number of hospital beds occupied by patients suffering from neuroses of various kinds provides an index of the seriousness of the problem in the life of society at large. Moreover, at a less serious level, the quite phenomenal sale of books with titles such as 'Peace of Mind,' 'Peace of Soul,' 'Guide to Confident Living,' reveals how large is the number of those who are seeking some resolution of the inner tensions of which they are at least dimly aware. Thus the question has become urgent in our own day: How can the personality of man be integrated in an environment where the whole trend of social and technical development is towards depersonalization and dehumanization? Is the answer to be found in the increasing use of psychotherapeutic techniques? Such a view is widely held. As Paul Tillich writes in one of his essays, 'The analytic attempt to liberate the unconscious from the repressions forced upon it by society, to liberate the Ego from the authoritarian representatives of the 'Superego,' to liberate the person from the compulsive drives which subdue the personal centre and eliminate its power of making personal decisions—all this seems to be the way to the salvation of the person in the technical society.' Even if it be

held that no psychotherapeutic technique can by itself deal with man's deepest inner problems, the widespread interest in psychiatry to-day constitutes a clear witness to the existence of a poignant need in the life of mankind.

These then are the crucial questions in the life of to-day to which, it seems to me, the Christian message of salvation can still be addressed. On the one hand, there is the growing recognition of the menacing character of the technological society which threatens to eliminate all truly personal structures by its processes of mechanization and automation : on the other hand there is the growing concern about the spread of mental illness and the breakdown of truly personal relationships by reason of the disintegration of the individual personality. In face of this situation the Christian evangelist proclaims first that a truly personalised social life is only conceivable if and when it is directed towards an Eschaton conceived in truly personal terms : that man fails and falls short of his true end insofar as his energies and activities are directed towards the multiplication of objects and the perfecting of techniques rather than towards the clarification of values and the deepening of understanding in his relations with his fellow-man : and that the work of Christ was in fact a revelation from the side of God of the saving power that flows into the life of society when there is One Who in all His relationships with men seeks not to be served but to serve and in the end to give even His life a ransom for many. It was through His actual encounters with men that the Divine salvation began to operate powerfully within society : it is through continuing encounters of the saved and saving community with society at large, this community moving forward in the way of salvation towards its true Eschaton under the rule of God, that the world can be saved from its false ambitions and vain pursuits and guided to its true destiny.

Secondly the evangelist proclaims that a truly integrated individual life is only conceivable when it has a truly personal Centre : that man threshes around vainly or is torn by conflicting desires unless there is a central pattern of personal wholeness to which all his thoughts, desires and purposes can be conformed : that in point of fact the work of Christ both in its manifestation in time and in its eternal quality is precisely that of personal fulfilment through personal self-giving in sacrificial identification : and that man's individual salvation is to be found in a growing conformity with that pattern, a conformity which can be achieved by faith-identification in every part of man's being. It was through His identification with the full life of man in the world that He, the Christ, brought the saving process into the very heart of man's

existence: it is through his own identification with the Saviour that man is caught up into the saving process and becomes transformed as he relates himself to this new centre of personal living.

In conclusion, then, we may affirm that man can find his salvation not in a utopia to be attained through world-revolution: not in a state of euphoria to be achieved through a process of self-integration: not even in a nirvana to be reached through a complete withdrawal from the world and the self. 'We are saved by hope,' says the New Testament—hope of the final deliverance from the bondage of corruption unto the glorious liberty of the children of God. We are saved by faith—faith in the Son of God who loved and gave himself for men. Sonship, indeed, and the growing realization of sonship—this is salvation. 'Now are we the sons of God and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that when he shall appear we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is.'

THE CHRISTIAN HOPE FOR MAN

By the Rev. J. S. Bezzant, B.D., M.A., Dean and Fellow of St. John's College and Lecturer in Divinity in the University of Cambridge; Canon Emeritus of Liverpool Cathedral

THE Bible could be truly if not fully described as a persistent call to hope. It has been said that in the Old Testament no hope ever dies except a purer grows out of its roots, and in comparison with these the Christian revelation is 'bringing in thereupon of a better hope'. 'The God of hope', 'We are saved by hope', 'Christ Jesus who is our hope', 'Christ in you, the hope of glory', 'begotten us again unto a living hope'—these and many other expressions which mention hope reveal its fundamental importance in Christian life; and indeed expectancy largely determines the happiness and power of all human life. St. Paul, in one of his greatest sayings, places hope in the centre of the triad—between faith, without which no religion is possible, and the love which is the nature of God. And as faith is not the acceptance of historical propositions on insufficient evidence, but trust in God and in goodness, and thus includes an element of moral determination by which we hold firm to what we have once seen to be good and true, even when the vision is clouded, so hope sustains the confidence that all things work together for good to those who love

God. We can see at once why the Apostle made hope and joy *virtues*. Christian hopefulness is faith's temper. It is

> 'neither ignorance concerning the future, nor uncertainty and mere empty desire, but is the principle of that true Christian view of the world which is quickened by love into fruitful activity.'

It has as little in common with baseless optimism as with morose pessimism, and is not impatient haste to see God's purposes accomplished. It is faith's fruit of confidence that there is that going forward in God's creation to which a man may dedicate and devote his love and his labour without doing so in vain. Much here and now may be disappointing and frustrating, but as the Divine has shared our worst experiences and given to us of his Spirit, the love which he can thus shed in our hearts is a 'hope that maketh not ashamed'.

Despair may for a time nerve to vigorous action; but as a permanent attitude it is not invigorating but enervating. It is morally barren in proportion as it is sincere. Once a thoughtful man is convinced that the order of things will defeat the highest insights and intuitions of which the human spirit is capable, he cannot for long avoid the suspicion that these ideals, however treasured, are futile; and he will come to ask whether, after all, they are worth the cost and whether it were not better to do without them. Degradation of life would then follow inevitably, either rapidly or slowly.

Thoughtful men cannot avoid giving life an enduring meaning or else concluding that its only meanings are transitory and that of ultimate significance it has none. The most influential vogue in present-day philosophy, known as Existentialism, in the work of its leading exponent, examines this fundamental question in the most rigorous logical analysis of human individual life, simply in terms of what that life discloses. The upshot, as has always been plain when life in this world only is considered, is that life ends in death. For each personal life, death is the only immortal. Now the Christian hope for man, the ground and only justification of unconquerable hopes for life here and now (though not necessarily or even often their proximate *cause*) is that what appears to be the final outcome of life is in truth not so. This affirmation of faith is so much a corollary of ethical theism that the two cannot be parted; and this relationship is important because it is not legitimate to appeal to one act of faith as the sufficient ground of another and *different* faith-affirmation. If there were no God, human survival of death might be a fact and might even be established as such; but the Christian hope is not for mere survival but for a

particular kind of quality of life. This is the life of the kingdom of God, or eternal life;[1] it implies survival because that which has no existence can have no value, but survival need not imply what the Christian means by eternal life, and indeed could not imply it if there were no God of the nature which Christians hold to be the Divine nature.

The fact that all must die, if it be the last word and final fact about human life, involves, as Brunner says, that all other hope is little more than a concealed hopelessness, and only a strange absence of mind can ignore that it is so. For the reflective mind, ethical theism and the faith that God can be known by his creatures, are the essential foundation of the Christian hope for man. But adequate evidence of survival, while it would not even begin to prove the Christian doctrine, would, I think, produce a psychological condition favourable to it, such as at present in very wide circles does not exist because theistic faith is felt to be unjustified, for the reason, among others, that human immortality is felt to be in the highest degree improbable.

There are deeply religious minds, like the late Archbishop William Temple, who say they hope empirical evidence of survival will never be forthcoming in this world. They hold that it would deprive faith of disinterestedness. I cannot wholly share their hope and think the reason for it is mistaken. It would be just as possible for life to be wretched, frustrated, futile, or even evil, in two or in ten lives as in one. Without ethical or Christian theism, I think it would be necessary to know of the world in which we are to survive almost as much as we know of this world before we could trust that life in it would be desirable or good. We should need evidence that the next world is value-creating and value preserving, and when we can believe *that* of the present world, theistic faith is not commonly felt to be impossible. Disbelief or unbelief in the possibility of life beyond death is as fatal to ethical or Christian theism as any belief in that possibility which is not a corollary of such theism is irreligious. That we are alive in this world does not necessarily prompt to religious faith, and I cannot see why knowledge of survival beyond death would necessarily prompt to it or make disinterested faith in God impossible. One great obstacle to faith would be removed; and the removal

[1] The kingdom of God and eternal life are in essence one. The former, though illustrated in many figures, means essentially what it means in the conjoined petitions of the Lord's Prayer: 'Thy kingdom come; thy will be done, as in heaven so on earth.' The Johannine writer states that life eternal is to know God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent, and makes it plain that there is no knowing God without doing his will.

of other obstacles to it is an activity to which religious thinkers and teachers devote much energy and time, and to do so is a religious service.

Something like paradox is involved. Christian religion is concerned not with self-interest but with God, with his purposes and our ultimate and determining devotion to them as we come to perceive them: without this devotion, which effectively displaces self from the centre of the stage, God is not to be truly known or served. We cannot suppose the Divine purpose in creating this surpassingly mysterious universe, and producing and placing us within it, is that we should be occupied in wondering what happens to us when we leave it. If this life be one and a preparatory stage in eternal life, we cannot fulfil its purpose unless we give ourselves to the duties of the present stage. No Christian should dispute Dr. Julian Huxley's view that the great thing for both worlds is to be a good citizen of this one or that a sane and hopeful activity in this world is the best preparation for the next. The Christian would add that sincere and intelligent Christian faith affords the strongest inspiration (though not the only one) of sane and hopeful activity, that to live on baseless hope is but to die of hunger, while to deceive ourselves is neither very sane nor hopeful, and is in fact impossible to a mind awakened to the primary claim of truth. On the one hand, concern about one's personal immortality is a state of mind neither healthy nor religious; on the other hand, if immortality be held to be inconceivable or very improbable, few will be able to resist the inference that Christian faith in God must be mistaken. I see no escape from this paradox.

That Christian hope is not important is often said to be shown by the fact that atheistic Communists and others are just as ready to face death as any Christian martyrs. They are indeed ready to die on behalf of a cause; but it is often overlooked that intense belief in a cause will produce the same effects whether the cause is truly or mistakenly believed to be just and valid. Dedication to any great cause links a person with what is at least less perishable than self-centred human life on earth; but what this involves is seldom realized. It is believed that the triumph of the cause will benefit countless other lives, but the belief is effective only when it is *valued*. Destroy the minds which treasure it, and justice, or any other human good, has the status of an abstract definition. Sacrifice for a cause is worth while because those who make it believe in the value and in the triumph of the cause; this implies the continuance of the race, and the welfare of others must make up for the mortality of some. But if nothing can survive the death of the universe, the race cannot make up for the individual person.

That a godless nature cares nothing for the individual but only for the race is unduly optimistic, for a mindless or purposeless nature can have no care at all, only necessity; nor can the race care for itself, since it has no separate consciousness except the consciousness of persons. The 'race' has no existence except as a name for the totality of human persons. If the race cares for anything, it is only because persons care for it. Even in propagating his kind, man shows that the race and responsibility for it exist in himself.

Exaggeration is often the enemy of truth. If the Christian hope be destroyed, it does not follow that human life is bereft of all its goodness and joys. But it is only thoughtlessness which does not perceive that the scheme of human values must then inevitably contract. Nothing so transitory as the short span of life on earth can have great dignity and value. The energy, gaiety and hopefulness of life must then be referred to vital drives, blindly instinctive urges, and the irrational easily becomes the justification of human action, which becomes an end in itself, there being no other.

It is only possible to refer briefly to the hope of any consummation beyond life in this world as it grew in the Bible story. The Hebrews seem never to have thought that death was absolute extinction; but existence in Sheol was not worth the name of life. They loved life and feared death, but the Hebrew was for a long time content with the hope that his descendants would inhabit a more glorious Jerusalem when he was an unsubstantial ghost in the underworld. Sheol represented life's death, not its hope. When his breathing ceased, man turned again to his earth and all his thoughts perished. He had then no more contact with the living, whether man or God. If Enoch and Elijah escaped this dreary fate, it was only by not dying. It was the development of the thought of righteousness and retribution, and what these implied, that gave birth to another hope, particularly after the sense of the worth of the individual person became explicit in Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Present injustices and the triumph of the wicked must somehow later be rectified. But as late as the book of *Job*, life after death is hardly more than a fleeting glimmer of hope; it is a little firmer when associated with the experience of communion with God in one or two late Psalms. But any such references are surprisingly few, and it seems beyond doubt that any hope extending beyond the present world did little to inspire hope within it. The consciousness of God's rule here and now overshadowed any expectation that he would effectively preserve life hereafter. The

struggle to maintain belief that justice was done in this life persisted and became desperate.

Hebrew hopes for the future are almost invariably a blend of national and individual hopes, with the former more prominent before the exile than during it; individualism seems to have been a poor second best, when national hopes were dashed. After the return the emphasis is again on corporate hopes which, however, then centred round the temple and the law. Though Ezekiel could at times carry the logic of individualism to indefensible lengths, his vision of the valley of dry bones is still one of national resurrection. The prophecy of the rising of dead bodies, in a passage of uncertain date in *Isaiah* xxvi, is of a resurrection to life on earth, in order that the triumph of Jerusalem may be seen. Daniel promises individual retribution for *some* of the dead, but no general resurrection. No doubt the living faith which conceived such hopes was also potentially capable of a grander and truer hope, but it would appear to have been but partially attained, and that insecurely, by a seer or prophet here and there. As far as the Old Testament is concerned, Ecclesiastes is in this matter representative: 'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in Sheol, whither thou goest.' Nevertheless, during the period between the latest of the Old Testament books and the time of our Lord, belief in a future resurrection was widely established, except among Sadducees, and, together with events associated with this hope, set forth in imagery which has deeply influenced the New Testament and consequently the presentation of the Christian hope for man down to modern times.

For Christianity, of course, it was the resurrection of Christ which was the rock of faith and the mainspring of hope. Without that triumphant faith there is no reason to think the New Testament would ever have been written or a Christian Church come into being.[2] Jesus, if the Gospels give a fair report, said little about

[2] I cannot expand these words in a short paper. My own judgment is that the assurance of St. Paul, a man of manifest ability and education, that certain of the original disciples, whom he knew well, saw their Master alive after the crucifixion can reasonably be accepted as decisive. If not, the ground for attaching any authority to his *theology* is, to my mind, largely destroyed. He was in a better position to ascertain the facts than any later critic has been or can be. If his testimony is to be set aside, it must be on other grounds than those of historical studies. But it is unfortunate that he does not make clear whether he regarded the experiences of the other disciples as the same as or different from his own on the Damascus road. Moreover, if the triumph of Easter is represented as the assurance of human immortality *independently of faith*, the reasoning is neither religious nor valid. Take the Gospel records

life after death.[3] It may be, I think in some respects it is, true that some modern interpretations of his eschatology are more in accordance with his own mind than certain statements in the New Testament; but what is certain is that he was understood, or misunderstood, by his disciples to have promised his own early return to earth in glory, in order to establish his kingdom in Jerusalem; and it was believed that Christians who died before this event occurred would be raised from their graves to share in its glories. The hope was plainly misconceived, and its delay and final disappointment have left clear traces in the New Testament. Various 're-interpretations' were offered, and it is unfortunate that the one which survived and moulded Christian teaching until modern times was that which preserved the hope unchanged except by enlarging it, and threw it into the indefinite future, on the plea that 'one day is with the Lord as a thousand years and a thousand years as one day'. This apologetic, and those who throughout the centuries adopted it, overlooked the fact that if our Lord used language in that way, which was certain to be misunderstood, the proper name for it would be not revelation but deceit. There is no reason to suppose that Jesus did anything of the kind.

More important is the fact that, in what Jesus said about hope transcending this world, it is almost invariably found in connexion with God's kingdom or universal rule. The highest hope and blessedness was to be worthy to live within it, the worst punishment

[3] The only preserved example of his reasoning about it is his answer to the Sadducean objection, which he declared to rest upon a wrong notion of the nature of God and 'not knowing the Scriptures'. That the dead are raised followed from the fact that he was the God of the patriarchs and was 'not the God of the dead but of the living'. On another occasion he is reported to have said that those who would not hear Moses and the prophets would not be persuaded though one rose from the dead.

---

at face value as factual recordings and, even so, all that is proved is that some persons saw Jesus alive after death, intermittingly and during a brief period. That does not prove the Christian affirmation that he 'is alive for evermore'. The Fifth Lateran Council wisely repudiated the proposition that Christ's resurrection is the sole ground of belief in immortality. If there were sufficient evidence to disclose the nature of Christ's resurrection 'body', it could not decide anything about the nature of the expected risen bodies of men, since human bodies plainly go to dust and lose identity (so far as we can judge) and Christ's did not, if we trust the Gospel records. Nor did St. Paul appeal to the nature of Christ's risen body in expounding his answer to the question, How are the dead raised and with what body do they come? Apart from a basis of belief in God and Christ, the Gospel resurrection-narratives would entirely fail to convince me — not that I should feel any need to explain them away; for I should regard a few more, or less, inexplicable marvels in a godless and meaningless universe as neither a difficulty nor a ground for faith, and should think *all* attempts to account for them futile *ab initio*.

to be exclusion from it. And the most important point of all is that, throughout the Bible, in both Testaments, when any hope transcending what is realizable during lifetime in this world is spoken of, it is mainly a *corporate* hope, one which almost forgets the individual except as a member of a brotherhood, a body, a society. It is a tragedy, and one which has given greater encouragement to unbelief than to faith, that this truth has for so long and so often been obscured. The final and enduring triumph of the principles of righteousness, of an universal religious society, or even of a nation, is a greater and immeasurably a worthier hope than any selfish hope of individual survival. A living faith in the eternal victory of a great cause is less difficult to receive or to achieve than faith in the survival of a small individual, if only because the great cause wins the service of the highest capabilities and the most dedicated efforts and sacrifices from one generation to another; and this is in no contradiction to the truth, obvious to reflective thought, that it is the worth of individual souls which makes any society of them, and the causes dear to them, also of worth. Indeed the corporate hope redeems the individual personal one from taint of selfishness. For what kind of selfishness is it which asks no more for self than is desired for the triumph of righteousness and for every child of God and son of man? And it is matter of experience that the ends which have called forth the most enthusiastic zeal and devotion of worthy men are not those personally attainable for themselves in this life, but those which far transcend it. Purely selfish aspirations ever make for strife, and for that and other reasons they are not fully satisfying here and now, and are therefore incredible as a measure of eternal and immortal hope. A stone or crystal can be perfect in itself: the living members of a body cannot be. 'They without us' and we without them 'cannot be made perfect'. The only person whose life is at all worth preserving beyond death is already living for something greater than his own selfish interests, and so much so that the best in him would wither if *that* were ultimately no more than a vain hope. The Christian hope for man becomes less unreasonable and plainer the more life is not identified with petty interests and their satisfactions; for these are what St. John calls 'the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life', which there is abundant reason to believe that death does indeed destroy.

The true object of the Christian hope is not any reward of goodness except its reality, continuance and final consummation, since without this there could be no true blessedness or happiness for a being bearing the image of God. Christians should avoid all language which suggests that they want virtue to be rewarded with

other things. The desire for life transcending the human span on earth is not a demand for adequate compensations but the result of a vision of more adequate opportunities; less a demand for fairer wages than for fuller work — which may sufficiently account for its present lack of appeal. But it is also salutary to remember that any complacent contemplation of oneself as superior to any care for the victory of goodness beyond what can be realized here and now is as morally offensive as crude demands for reward. The higher we rise, the more we realize that God-given personality is capable of much more than this life gives scope for. The satisfactions of conscience are seldom found in those who most deserve them, while the greatest offender against conscience enjoys the largest immunity from its reproaches. Every declension in character administers its own anaesthetic, as every advance deepens spiritual and moral insight and susceptibility and the realization of how much is beyond human reach in this life.

If we believe in God and that, in any true sense, 'God was in Christ', then it is impossible to believe that human life, which God can unite to himself, can be ended by physical death. Then there is adequate ground for the hope, which is the ultimate inspiration of all worthy earthly hopes, that he who has begun a good work in us will complete it. The yearning to be loved and also to care for something beyond ourselves (and persons are more worth caring for than any things) — this is the common bond and seal of ordinary humanity. In its limited human form it may not be always, yet certainly it is not seldom, capable of redeeming the most debased and deteriorated character from complete defilement; it is the most sacred and divine element in human nature, the most akin to the love which Christian faith affirms moved God 'to take our nature upon him'. It is this love which cannot believe that death, often unexpected and accidental, can obliterate persons capable of it. If that faith and its inevitably accompanying hope are vain, we must face that fact that it is the noblest and purest elements in our nature which conspire to deceive. But if in pure affection we penetrate more deeply into the veiled secrets of existence than in any other activity of which we are capable, there can be no apprehensible revelation of God more direct than this, and what such love suggests should be treated with the greatest respect and reverence. Where can there be *knowledge* with a right to override this claim? May it not be only because our affections in this life are so imperfect that we do not more clearly perceive that death cannot prevail against them?

I have been concerned briefly to expound the nature and basis of the Christian hope for man rather than to defend it. For the rest,

I offer some observations, necessarily more dogmatically than I should wish, upon a few aspects of Christian preaching and apologetic which, as I think, do not encourage the acceptance of Christian faith but rather and unnecessarily hinder it.

It is past high time that those who reject what is called the Fundamentalist estimate of the Bible should much more frankly accept the logical consequence of doing so. This is, simply, that no special authority or sanctity attaches to biblical statements which express opinions current at the various dates of their utterance or the personal views of the several writers, often on matters beyond all fact-controlled speculation or on others concerning which modern knowledge and probable inferences from it afford a more solid basis for such speculation as is desirable than any possessed by ancient writers. No doubt the rarely found Hebrew idea of the resurrection of the body is very different from Greek notions of immortality (though the New Testament speaks of the resurrection of the dead, not of that of the body or the flesh) and that the Hebraic picture (for it is that rather than reasoned thought) at least embodies a value which Greek thought lacks. For long centuries 'resurrection' meant the resuscitation of the body laid in the grave, which is the simple notion in the few references to rising from the dead in the Old Testament. It has become as incredible as the idea of the survival of the intellective faculty, if not more so; and whereas the latter was at least the outcome of an intelligent attempt to think, the former can hardly be so regarded.[4] And while the Christian hope is for the preservation of whatever, in the conditions which environ life beyond death, is essential to full human nature and personality as the Creator intends it to become, this, for all we know, may be entirely compatible with the immortality of the soul and its enlarged activities, not as that was imagined by Greek thinkers but as the *psyche* or soul is postulated by some modern genetic psychology.

It is now fashionable to pour scorn on the idea of the soul. Nearly every dabbler in psychology does so, though he may have but the vaguest notion about the historical meanings of the word. If he supposes it to connote an inner ghost, living its own life inside a body and operating it as a machine, he is right in thinking the modern world has left such notions behind: they are as dead as the former 'faculty' psychology. It is the one being, the man, the person, who acts, not a body *plus* a soul *plus* a mind, or any

[4] For another example of the strange preference for 'a rather childish attempt to dodge the necessity of thought', see B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels*, pp. 374-377.

two of them. But man is not to be explained, i.e. to be made intelligible in terms applicable to any other level of being than his own; for he is a distinctive being who cannot be rendered wholly or mainly intelligible in terms of what we generally mean by material or physical substance. From the standpoint of psychology (the basic science relevant to this issue) the empirical self, as an object known, as when we say 'I know myself', the 'myself' (as distinct from the knowing 'I') is a mental construction made by an actual agent, the enduring *subject*, which is the subject of, or has, all its experiences. The soul is simply the older name for this enduring, experiencing subject. In the order in which we come to know about ourselves, it only becomes known in reflective thought; but in *logical* order it is primary, because its activity is pre-supposed in all knowing, even knowledge of the body. That we are, or have, bodies seems self-evident in adult life; but we were not born with that knowledge, and it was slowly acquired by the subject of experience continually living through experiences.[5]

When we try to analyse in thought the mysterious unity which man is, that which in thought is distinguished as the living, continuing subject, or *ego*, *psyche* or soul, is also to be distinguished from what we call the mind and the personality as these come to be. It may or may not be separable from our physical substance, but it is that basic actuality without whose activity there could be no such phenomena as mind and personality, unless we are content with the totally inexplicable or to take refuge in miracles. What we call the mind is a slowly built-up system, or a whole series of systems, complex and interacting, which, like the total personality, both grows with experience and can disintegrate. The fundamental soul, considered apart from what it does and enables man to become, may appear to be, as the philosopher Bradley said it was, a thin and insignificant conception. But is it thinner and less significant than the microscopically minute cell of granular jelly, largely water, from which the physical body comes to be? That body to-day is known to be a system of living, rushing units, self-maintained activity, a population of minute electric charges,

[5] It is often said that if experience always involves a subject-object relation (and it is meaningless to talk of an experience which is not of something to someone), to think of the 'I' as knowing itself, implies another 'I' to know it, implying an infinite series, so that the 'I' can 'never catch up with itself'. This is unreal. For to think is the subject's own nature and activity, and when *thought* of itself is its object, it simply exercises its own activity, and the think*ing* can be of one nature with its thought. For a fuller answer to this objection, see M. C. D'Arcy, *Death and Life*, pp. 12-14, and for a full exposition of the doctrine of the soul and its activities on the basis of empirical psychology, F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, Vol. I.

spinning, attracting, repelling, circling, countless times a second.[6] The very name and older idea of 'matter' seem to change into 'activity', a doing. The continuity of the body is continuity of change. The activity of the non-material subject of experiences, or the soul, is both the actual and the logical foundation of that knowledge on the basis of which the soul is often declared to be no more than a product of brain-activity. To say *that* makes no whit of difference to the constituent activities of our human nature — they are what they are — neither does it solve any problem but only sets up new mysteries. For if the continuing subject and its activities in building up what we call the mind and the unity of personality were simply a product of the brain, then it is ultimately a physical brain that produces false theories as well as true ones, there being no non-physical actuality to produce them. Then we may well ask, 'What conceivable *physical* existence has error in thought?'

The modern conception of the *psyche* or soul is, then, very different from the older idea of soul-substance, indiscerptible, and necessarily immortal. I am not referring to it as, *in itself*, either proving or even making probable man's immortal hope. My point is that if anyone concedes that the actualities of man's complex being and his various activities are explicable in terms of material being alone, then he must also concede that the universe is, in principle, explicable without God, whereupon every earth-transcending hope becomes baseless. The late Sir Charles Sherrington summed up the position involved in saying that the chemist and physicist cannot get on without the hypothesis that matter explains everything, as implying that we have reached a position identical with initiation into a faith. 'A right orientation, a rigid attitude of mind, is prescribed as necessary for progress in knowledge. There is nothing different in that than in the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius as introductory to conclusions expected to follow. And what either of these expedients may gain in insight is surely at disproportionately greater cost to breadth and soundness of judgment.' The aspects and activities of man being what they are, they do not change or vanish if it be said they are all the products of 'material substance'; all that is involved in that hypothesis is that the words 'material substance' then change their former meaning so as to embrace facts hitherto called soul, spirit, mind. Actualities are not abolished or changed by nomenclature. It would still be possible, indeed necessary, to regard material substance as an

[6] See the description of the growth of the human embryo in the late Sir Charles Sherrington's *Man on His Nature*.

example of soul, spirit or mind. Whether it is so, or whether matter and spirit are an ultimate dualism, is not a psychological or a scientific question, but a purely speculative one, and no important theological questions would be affected, except in verbal expression, by either answer to it.

We must acknowledge that for very large numbers of people to-day, one of the most powerful factors which make the ultimate Christian hope for man seem utterly unreal is that, for various reasons, the imagery of its setting and in which it was for so long preached, has become either irremediably repellent or no longer suggests anything desirable. Language about heaven and hell, formerly almost universal, would to-day not be tolerated by any intelligent congregation, if indeed by any congregation. We find it impossible to account for the waking nightmares which produced the hideous pictures of hell unless we can think they had some deep psychological cause; they can only now be regarded as having issued from diseased minds. The approval given to them by men otherwise sane and humane can, I think, only be explained by their acceptance of biblical texts as conveying infallible information about the other side of death. Even the cool mind of St. Thomas Aquinas could write: 'In order that the saints may enjoy their beatitude more richly, a perfect sight is granted them of the punishment of the damned.' It is amazing to us that so great a mind failed to realize that no one in the least deserving of beatitude could even experience it, let alone enjoy it, if he was aware of what was going on in hell as pictured in his age. The demonstrable fact is that the New Testament contains many only partially transformed Judaic elements, and those which refer to rewards and punishments after death represent the stage then reached in the long process of moralizing Sheol, a process unfortunately arrested when everything in the New Testament came to be regarded as Divinely-given information.

On the other hand, much of the traditional imagery descriptive of heaven suggests what no one any longer desires. If hell offends, heaven bores. The Jesuit Fr. M. C. D'Arcy can write:

> 'We risk talking foolishness when we have recourse to imagery and metaphor. There is imagery which degrades and imagery which enlightens, metaphor which has lost its vigour and relevance and metaphor which can give a relish. Choirs and crowns and palms and white robes once meant much as images, but now they are too like the plaster statuary of St. Sulpice. Even the Scriptural imagery, unless the writer meant it to be taken seriously, can become antiquated and repellent.'

This has happened, and no less if the Scripture writers meant their imagery to be taken seriously than if they did not. In this

matter, as in some others, we are at the end of a period of reaction. In the Middle Ages the doctrine of purgatory, which can have a noble side as in *The Dream of Gerontius*, was the focus of many and grave abuses. The reformers simply eliminated it, leaving heaven and hell as the stark alternatives which, at the last day, would be the destiny of men according to their condition at death. For the reasons given above, hell has now in effect been banished; and we are left with little more than a popular sentimental notion that all who die are forthwith in paradise or heaven. This involves a conception of God so genially tolerant as to be morally indifferent, and perverts immortal issues from a moral and spiritual stimulant into a narcotic. The only hope for the Church in this whole matter is to rethink the whole subject, with as complete independence as possible, alike of mediaeval and reformed traditions.

I think the way of wisdom would be to speak of the Christian hope for man always and only in relation to faith in God, and in Christ as the revelation of the Divine nature, and to say little or nothing about what may be called spiritual geography and topography, or about how the dead live or with what body they will hereafter come. These are matters belonging to the other side of death; and there is no more reason to suppose we can imagine them reliably than we have to suppose a caterpillar on a leaf can imagine what it is like to fly in air. The Christian faith and the Christian hope are inseparable. There may be other causes of desire to believe in life after death, which may not be religious at all. With such, Christians need to be concerned only in order to try to correct them. Again, to be convinced of immortality on scientific or philosophical grounds would only be religious in as far as truth is important for religion. All such discussions deal only in part with the great issue as it stands for the Christian.

If God is in truth the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, it inevitably follows that his creation, when fully and rightly understood, will preserve and fulfil the highest activities and aspirations it makes possible. God, in and through his created order, has given us reason, the capacity to recognize and to do good and evil and also, particularly in his self-disclosure in Christ, taught us to love and to pity and that these capacities are divine. Consequently, no purely physical order can have power to quench these principles. It is no less certain that conscious and deliberate evil-doing, if persisted in and chosen as a way of life, cannot issue in goodness or in beatitude; even in this life, whatever of the consequences of wrong-doing may be evaded, there is one that remains inexorable —deterioration of character. But the forms human destinies will

take in their fruition beyond this life can only be expressed in metaphors, symbols, parables, all of which, however refined, issue from our own nature and our experience in this world, and can only be figurative, even if that, of any other world. We shall be fortunate if we can find new symbols to replace the outworn and which will only partly contradict while supplementing each other. Artists rather than theologians are more likely to produce them. Meanwhile there is no reason for surprise or distress if our present powers and understanding cannot express a consummation which eye has not seen nor ear heard and heart cannot conceive.

FRONTIERS OF ASTRONOMY*

Mr. Fred Hoyle's book, *The Nature of the Universe*, which appeared in 1950, was responsible for disturbing the faith of a number of people who thought it was an attack on the Christian religion — a view which the writer of this review never shared. In his recent book, *Frontiers of Astronomy*, Mr. Hoyle candidly admits that many of his earlier views are now untenable (very few astronomers will be surprised by this admission). No doubt his opinions have been greatly modified as a result of his examination of the excellent photographs of the heavens taken by the 200-inch telescope at Mt. Palomar, where he has spent some time studying them and making various deductions in the realm of cosmogony. This last book is much more comprehensive — and probably much more speculative — than the earlier one, and those who read it will probably conclude that many of his latest pronouncements are by no means final. This does not imply that his views are not to be taken seriously, though it does imply that theories unsupported by observational evidence must be accepted with a certain amount of reserve until such evidence is forthcoming. An additional very important fact must be borne in mind, and that is that few branches of science are now so self-contained that they can afford to ignore developments in other branches. This applies especially to cosmogony, which is closely inter-related with such subjects as geology, geophysics, seismology, physics, etc., and fresh evidence in any of these may have important repercussions in various sections of astronomy.

Many readers will find Chapter VI, 'The Origin of the Planets', especially interesting, though it is a very restricted part of astronomy, dealing, as it does, with such a parochial matter as the solar system — a mere speck in the universe. Non-astronomers reading this chapter may not find some of the explanations very clear, and one example of this occurs on p. 89 in the statement, 'If all the planets were scooped up and mixed into the Sun, the Sun would certainly rotate much faster than it does.' No doubt Mr. Hoyle thought that everyone reading this would assume that in the 'scooping up' process the planets would still maintain their angular momenta, of which they contribute over 97 per cent. to the solar system, the Sun supplying the remaining 3 per cent. But some readers might visualise a giant hand projecting the planets vertically into the Sun, in which circumstances, far from the Sun rotating much faster, it would rotate more slowly. Again, it has been necessary to make use of Alfvén's theory of the rôle played by a magnetic field

**Frontiers of Astronomy*, by Fred Hoyle; with 59 plates and 67 line diagrams. (William Heinemann Ltd., 25/- net. 1955.)

in the development of our solar system by the process explained, but Mr. Hoyle is fully aware of the fact that many physicists do not accept Alfvén's theory, and indeed he is candid enough to admit that 'certain difficulties of a highly technical character still remain to be overcome', an admission with which many astronomers will agree. An important deduction from the above theory is that the larger planets should lie far out from the Sun, and this actually occurs, but it is rather disconcerting to find that the most distant planet, Pluto, discovered in 1930, is comparable in size with our earth. The suggestion that Pluto is an escaped satellite of Neptune would save the situation if there were any evidence to support it, but such evidence is not forthcoming. Another deduction is that the densities of the satellites of the different planets tend to decrease as the distances of their planets from the Sun increase, and this is found to be generally true, but Titan, the largest of Saturn's nine satellites, has a density 2, which is about twice as great as the theory requires. Mr. Hoyle again is candid in admitting that this is 'something of a difficulty'. If such difficulties arise in attempting to explain the origin of our insignificant planetary system, readers need not be surprised if other incomparably more complex problems arise in probing into the secrets of the far-off galaxies separated from us by hundreds of millions of light-years. As pointed out at the end of Chapter XIX, '. . . clearly sign-posted roads are not to be expected at a pioneering frontier.'

The problem of the continuous origin of matter is dealt with near the end of the book. It may be pointed out, what some readers probably know, that this theory is not specially due to Mr. Hoyle or his colleague cosmogonists, but was advocated by others about a quarter of a century ago. It may be admitted that if we accept the view of an expanding universe — and the evidence for it is almost irrefutable, though it is impossible to say whether the expansion is continuous — and if we further accept the hypothesis of the constant density of matter in the universe, it is certain that there must be continuous creation of matter. The difficulty lies with the hypothesis of constant density for which there is no evidence, and it is very doubtful whether this theory of continuous creation will have more than an ephemeral existence.

There is so much in this book that it is impossible even to refer to the numerous subjects discussed, and this review will end with drawing readers' attention to the views expressed on the origin of life (on pp. 100–104) in which ultra-violet light plays an essential rôle under the favourable conditions of comparatively low temperatures. The views expressed are in the main those which the biochemist could accept, but it is doubtful whether many of them will favour the view that life originated before the earth was aggregated. The gases from which the earth and other planets condensed intercepted a very much larger fraction of the Sun's ultra-violet light that the earth did after aggregation, and during the aggregation process, if the temperature was sufficiently low, life in a very primitive form appeared. Such, very briefly, is Mr. Hoyle's theory of the origin of life, concerning which the only remark that the revewer wishes to make is that it is difficult to disprove this theory but more difficult still to prove it. Nevertheless, he is convinced that some day the biochemist will be able to produce life in a very low form — even lower than the virus — and if this prediction should ever be fulfilled the biochemist may become a greater menace to the human family than the nuclear physicist.

In commending this book for very careful study, the reviewer would like to add that a second edition is certain to be required in the near future: if so, some modifications and amendments will probably be made.

M. Davidson, D.Sc.